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In his State of the Union Address on February 6, 1985, Presi-
dent Reagan defended his request for additional aid to the contras
by asserting, "Support for freedom fighters is self-defense and to-
tally consistent with the O.A.S. and U.N. Charters."' This state-
ment is incorrect. Behind it lies a U.S. policy of disdain for inter-
national law. Such disdain, and the weakening of international law
and institutions that it causes, have starkly negative implications
for the national security interests of the United States.
At least since 1981, the United States has organized, financed,
and coordinated military and paramilitary activities in and against
the territory of Nicaragua. These activities have included both
support of counter-revolutionary or contra forces based in Hondu-
ras and within Nicaragua, and direct military action by employees
of the United States against the territory of Nicaragua. In April,
1982 and again in April, 1984, Nicaragua sought to have the United
Nations Security Council adopt resolutions aimed at bringing such
activities to a halt. The resolutions achieved overwhelming sup-
port, but were vetoed by the United States.
2
1. "State of the Union," Address by President Reagan, Before a Joint Session of the
Congress (Feb. 6, 1985), 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 140, 146 (Feb. 11, 1985).
2. The 1982 draft resolution, which reminded all member states of their obligations
under the U.N. Charter and appealed to them "to refrain from the direct, indirect, overt or
covert use of force against any country of Central America or the Carribean," and to seek a
peaceful resolution of the problems of the region, was vetoed by the United States. Only the
United Kingdom and Zaire abstained. China, France, Guyana, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Pan-
ama, Poland, Spain, Togo, Uganda, and the U.S.S.R. voted in favor of the resolution. See
U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 14941 (April 1, 1982) (draft resolution of Panama); U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 2347,
at 62 (Apr. 2, 1982).
The 1984 draft resolution condemned the mining of Nicaraguan ports, affirmed the
right of free navigation and commerce in international waters, reaffirmed "the right of Nica-
ragua and of all -the countries in the region to . . .determine their own future free from all
foreign interference and intervention," and called on all states "to refrain from carrying out,
supporting or promoting any type of military action against any State of the region ...." It
also expressed support for the peace efforts of the Contadora Group. Similarly, it was also
vetoed by the United States. Only the United Kingdom abstained. See U.N. Doc. S/16263
(Apr. 4, 1984)(draft resolution of Nicaragua); U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 2529, at 111-12 (Apr. 4,
1984)(vote).
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After defeat of the second resolution on April 4, 1984, Nicara-
gua decided to take its case to the International Court of Justice
(ICJ). On Friday, April 6, having learned of Nicaragua's plans to
file suit, the United States attempted to modify the terms of its
1946 acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction in order to
exclude the case from the Court's consideration. 3 Nicaragua filed
its application or complaint against the United States on April 9,
1984, requesting at the same time an order of provisional measures
or interim protection from the Court.4 Following oral arguments on
Nicaragua's request, the Court issued its Interim Protection Order
on May 10, 1984,1 calling upon the United States to halt its mining
of Nicaraguan harbors and to observe the basic principles of inter-
national law which prohibit the threat or use of force against Nica-
ragua or intervention in matters within Nicaragua's domestic
jurisdiction.
On November 26, 1984, following written and oral arguments,
the Court issued a judgment6 rejecting U.S. arguments that it
lacked jurisdiction and that the claim was not admissible before
the Court. On January 18, 1985, the United States announced that
it would not participate in further proceedings before the ICJ.
7
This action, however, has not halted the Court's hearing of the un-
derlying issues in the substantive or merits phase of the
proceedings."
These developments raise fundamental questions regarding
the international legal policies of the United States. First, what is
the strategy of the United States for maintaining and improving
international peace and security? Is this objective to be pursued
through military, economic and ad hoc diplomatic means alone, or
3. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1984, at 1, col. 2 (nat'l ed.); Washington Post, Apr. 9, 1984,
at Al, col. 1.
4. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.),
Application of Nicaragua (Apr. 9, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Application]. References are to
the page numbers of the Application as printed and published by the Court (1984 General
List No. 70).
5. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 169 (Interim Protection Order of May 10)[hereinafter cited as Interim Protection
Order of May 10, 19841.
6. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 392 (Jurisdiction and Admissibility Judgment of Nov. 26) [hereinafter cited as
Judgment of Nov. 26, 1984].
7. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PROCEEDINGS INITIATED BY Nic-
ARAGUA IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, Jan. 18, 1985, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 246
(1985); infra notes 121, 299-300 and accompanying text.
8. Oral arguments were held in September, 1985.
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is international law also to be used? Second, what is the policy of
the United States toward strengthening international law and in-
stitutions in general, and, in particular, what is the U.S. policy to-
ward strengthening the legal prohibition against the threat or use
of force? Third, what is its policy with respect to the international
adjudication of disputes and its former goal of increasing the use
and authority of the ICJ?
The present article begins in Part I(A) by addressing the fun-
damental question of whether international law matters at all. Part
I(B) contains an analysis of the origins and details of U.S. covert
operations against Nicaragua. Part I(C) concludes Part I with a
brief overview of the nature of the proceedings in the ICJ. The
substantive legal issues raised by Nicaragua and which are to be
determined by the ICJ in its judgment on the merits are examined
in Part II. The law prohibiting the threat or use of force is consid-
ered in connection with U.S. actions against Nicaragua in Part
II(A), together with the U.S. claims of self-defense. Part II(B) and
Part II(C) briefly consider the legality of U.S. actions in terms of
the prohibition against intervention in the internal affairs of any
state, and the principle requiring the peaceful settlement of inter-
national disputes.
This article, which was completed in October, 1985, is based
on information publicly available through September, 1985. It thus
covers the events which are the subject of Nicaragua's claim before
the World Court. Among the latest developments is the decision of
Congress in July, 1985, to provide some twenty-seven million dol-
lars in "humanitarian" assistance to the contras carrying out at-
tacks against and within the territory of Nicaragua. This decision
and the upcoming decision of the ICJ on the merits directly raise
the question of the importance of international law. Three ques-
tions arise. First, should Congress take international law into ac-
count in deciding how to vote now or in the future? If it does, the
question of whether support of the contras is self-defense becomes
critical because if it is not legally justified as self-defense such sup-
port would directly violate the ICJ's Order of Interim Protection.
It is notable that the United States was not sufficiently confident
of its self-defense argument to make it before the Court. Second,
in view of the determination by the Court that it has jurisdiction
in the case of Nicaragua v. U.S., was it wise for the Reagan admin-
istration to permit the case to proceed to a final judgment on the
merits, by failing to reach a settlement with Nicaragua to withdraw
1986]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
the case? Third, following the ICJ's final judgment, expected by
mid-1986, how should the administration react to what all expect
will be a strong condemnation of U.S. actions against Nicaragua, a
final order by the ICJ to bring these actions to an immediate halt,
and the initiation of special proceedings to establish how much the
United States should compensate Nicaragua for the damages it has
caused? Should the Reagan administration defy the final judgment
of the Court? If it does, should Congress sit idly by?
A. Why International Law Matters: The Imperative of
Strengthening International Order
1. The Importance of Strengthening International Order
It is impossible to conceive of an increasingly secure interna-
tional order without improving the effectiveness of international
law and institutions. The very concept of order presupposes law, as
orderly and predictable interactions between states cannot exist
without such authoritative rules.9 Moreover, the maintenance or
strengthening of international order requires the control and re-
duction of the use of force across international frontiers. In a nu-
clear world where the possibility of global dominance by a single
power no longer exists, the very idea of reducing armed conflict
presupposes the existence of international legal norms controlling
the use of force across borders.1" Particularly important is the pro-
9. Compare the following:
[T]he creation and maintenance of an ongoing and involved system of rela-
tionships, such as exists internationally, requires law. When, therefore, order is
used to refer to such a system of relationships, it can truly be said that order is
dependent on law. For order cannot exist without understandings about permis-
sible behavior, and the most fundamental as well as the most numerous of these
relationships are unavoidably legal in character. Thus the significance of interna-
tional law is enduring and vital. It does not control the ebb and flow of interna-
tional politics, but it does provide an indispensable framework for the political
process. Without it, relations, if not minimal, could not be other than anarchical
in the most drastic meaning of the word. Internationally, as elsewhere, law is a
concomitant of ordered relations.
James, Law and Order in International Society, in THE BASES OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER 60,
63, 83-84 (A. James ed. 1973).
10. Today, armed conflict involves the distinct possibility of nuclear war. The 1973
Arab-Israeli war and the resulting potential nuclear confrontation between the Soviet Union
and the United States provides a dramatic case in point. See Blechman & Hart, The Politi-
cal Utility of Nuclear Weapons: The 1973 Middle East Crisis, 7 INT'L SECURITY 132 (1982);
Jarber & Kolkowicz, The Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973, in S. KAPLAN, DIPLOMACY OF
POWER 412, 38-67 (1981).
Given the increasing destructiveness of modern weapons, even conventional warfare
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hibition of the use of force by one state against another except in
response to an armed attack." Law is a necessary concomitant of
order. The inherent interdependence of order and law simply does
not stop at the water's edge. In short, international order requires
international law, and in particular, the legal prohibition of the
threat or use of force by one country against another.'
2
While the avoidance of war remains the principal reason for
controlling the use of force across international frontiers, it is also
important to appreciate the consequences of a climate of military
insecurity fostered by the failure to uphold the legal prohibition
against force. Military planners will be forced to divert resources
from development to defense. They will be forced to develop their
own nuclear-weapons capability,' 3 in order that the military and
economic security of their country will not depend on the uncer-
tain responses of self-interested partners in a system of shifting
alliances. In such an atmosphere, not only nuclear, but also con-
ventional arms races will be more likely to occur. These, in turn,
will have seriously destabilizing effects on the international order.
Trade and investment will be inhibited by growing military insecu-
could cause death, famine, and disease on a scale far beyond previous human experience.
Recent studies suggest the possibility that virtual annihilation could result at a much lower
threshold than heretofore thought, due to the so-called "nuclear winter" which might be
produced from a nuclear war. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1984, at 1, col. 5 (nat'l ed.).
11. The importance of the use of force by one state against another is recognized in the
U.N. Charter which begins with the following words:
WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
DETERMINED
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our life-
time has brought untold suffering to mankind...
U.N. CHARTER Preamble. Compare the following statement by President Ronald Reagan:
The major objective of my administration, as of every other American adminis-
tration since World War II, is to prevent nuclear war. Twice in my lifetime, I
have seen the world plunge into wars costing millions of lives. Living through
those experiences has convinced me that America's highest mission is to en-
courage the world along the path of peace, and to ensure that our country and
all those who share our aspirations of peace and freedom can live in security.
Letter of President Ronald Reagan Responding to Letter of Venezuelan Citizens (Nov. 5,
1982), reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., Jan., 1983, at 81.
12. Article 3(g) of the OAS Charter provides as follows: "International order consists
essentially of respect for the personality, sovereignty and independence of States, and the
faithful fulfillment of obligations derived from treaties and other sources of international
law." Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S.
No. 2361, as amended by Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, art. 3(g), 21 U.S.T. 607,
T.I.A.S. No. 6847 [hereinafter cited as OAS Charter]. Cf. U.N. CHARTER, Preamble, art. 1
para. 1, art. 2 paras. 1-2.
13. See, e.g., Rowles, Nuclear Power and Non-proliferation: The View From Brazil, 14
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 711, 737-43, 779, 783 (1981).
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rity, and by a decreasing confidence in the ability of international
law and institutions to effectively regulate conduct in non-military
spheres. Increasingly nationalistic attitudes will make effective col-
laboration among governments increasingly problematic. Such po-
tential developments, only briefly sketched here, deserve the most
serious consideration by those who believe that supporting and up-
holding the legal prohibition of the threat or use of force is in any
sense a subordinate concern.
1
4
Adequate military defense programs must be maintained, but
an exclusive emphasis on increasing military power will not
strengthen international order. Adversaries will respond in kind.
Arms races will ensue with disequilibrating effects. International
order requires confidence-building measures;' 5 international agree-
ments to limit the development, testing and deployment of desta-
bilizing weapons systems;'8 and the strengthening of commonly-ac-
cepted standards of behavior. 7 None of these can be achieved
14. One example of the negative impact of the illegal use of force on international trade
is provided by the sharp drop in U.S.-Soviet trade which followed the Soviet Union's inva-
sion of Afghanistan. Another example is the sharp deterioration in trade within the Central
American Common Market following El Salvador's invasion of Honduras in July, 1969. A
striking example of how increasingly nationalistic attitudes can block or sharply inhibit ef-
fective collaboration among governments to meet common problems and future challenges is
found in the positions taken by the United States in the final stages of the negotiations for
the Law of the Sea Treaty, and the subsequent refusal of the United States to sign the
treaty.
15. See, e.g., S. TALBOTT, DEADLY GAMBITS 321-23 (1984). Such measures are an impor-
tant component of arms control treaties. "SALT was full of CBMs," Talbott observes. Id. at
321.
16. See, e.g., Nye, ReStarting Arms Control, 47 FOREIGN POL'Y 98 (1982); Lodal, Fin-
ishing Start, 48 FOREIGN POL'Y 66 (1982); Burroughs, Ballistic Missile Defense: The Illusion
of Security, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 843 (1984). See also Talbott, Buildup and Breakdown, 62
FOREIGN AFF. 587 (1984).
17. The need for such standards and strengthened international institutions has been
clearly recognized by leading political scientists in the United States. See, e.g., S. HOFFMAN,
PRIMACY OR WORLD ORDER 242-45, 254-55, 287-301 (1978); S. HOFFMAN, DUTIES BEYOND Bon-
DERS 57-73 (1981). Hoffman observes that, "The preservation of the political independence
and territorial integrity of states from armed attack is the cornerstone of international soci-
ety." Id. at 61. See also A. GEORGE & R. SMOKE, DETERRENCE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
610-11 (1974). Two recent works suggest a renewed awareness on the part of some political
scientists of the central importance of international law in establishing and articulating such
commonly-accepted standards of international behavior. See T. NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY,
AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES 308, 323-24 (1983); R. MANSBACH & J. VASQUEZ, IN SEARCH OF
THEORY: A NEW PARADIGM FOR GLOBAL POLITICS 281-93, 325-28, 331-87, 486-87 (1981). See
also R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL
ECONOMY 246-47, 257-59 (1984); Kull, Nuclear Nonsense, 58 FOREIGN POL'Y 28, 52 (1985).
But see Cohen, Constraints on America's Conduct of Small Wars, 9 INT'L SECURITY 151
(No. 2, Fall 1984) (international law not considered).
Not surprisingly, international lawyers are generally acutely aware of the importance of
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without international law. Each becomes more difficult to achieve
as confidence in international law and institutions decreases. Such
confidence cannot be maintained or increased without a continuing
determination on the part of the United States and other countries
to support and uphold the international legal prohibition against
the use of force. The maintenance and strengthening of interna-
tional order, and the enhancement of the effectiveness of interna-
tional law and institutions, constitute fundamental national secur-
ity interests of the United States. 8
2. The Fabric of International Order
It is in terms of those interests mentioned above that the re-
sponse of the United States and other countries to the interna-
tional "crises" in different parts of the world must be understood.
Many ask, for example, how the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan"
can be compared to U.S. actions in Grenada 0 or Nicaragua. The
commonly accepted standards of international behavior. See, e.g., L. HENKIN, How NATIONS
BEHAVE (2d ed. 1979); A. CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1974); R. FALK, THE END OF
WORLD ORDER (1983); J. PERKINS, THE PRUDENT PEACE: LAW AS FOREIGN POLICY (1981).
18. Given the risks of miscalculation, of setting in motion forces not easily controlled,
and of eventual nuclear conflict which tend to accompany the international use of force, the
strengthening of international order, law, and institutions is directly related to national sur-
vival and thus constitutes a national security interest second to none. While the long-term
nature of these interests tends to obscure their significance from decisionmakers operating
within political and bureaucratic environments which focus attention on short-term objec-
tives and pay-offs, this fact in no way relegates them to a second order of importance in
terms of reality and its consequences. For varying treatments of U.S. "national interests",
see George & Keohane, The Concept of National Interests: Uses and Limitations, in A.
GEORGE, PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONMAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY: THE EFFECTIVE USE OF INFORMA-
TION AND ADVICE 217-37 (1980); S. BROWN, THE FACES OF POWER 7-9 (1983); S. BROWN, ON
THE FRONT BURNER: ISSUES IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 1-14 (1984)(survey of contending views);
R. MANSBACH & J. VASQUEZ, supra note 17, at 8, 104-05, 186-88, 191-92; L. HENKIN, supra
note 17, at 36-37, 331-39 (2d ed. 1979). For a provocative consideration of what constitutes
"national security," see Ullman, Redefining Security, 8 INT'L SECURITY 129 (1983).
19. See, e.g., Valenta, Soviet Decisionmaking on Afghanistan, in SOVIET DECiSIONMAK-
ING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY (J. Valenta & W. Potter eds. 1984); S. BROWN, THE FACES OF
POWER 552-63 (1983); C. ALIBERT, Du DROIT DE SE FAIRE JUSTICE DANS LA SOCIT]rT INTERNATI-
ONALE DUPUIS 1945, 414-27 (1983).
20. See, e.g., W. GILMORE, THE GRENADA INTERVENTION: ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTATION
(1984); Joyner, The United States Action in Grenada: Reflections on the Lawfulness of
Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 131 (1984); Gordon, Wilder, Rovine & Wallace, International
Law and the United States Action in Grenada, 18 INT'L LAW. 331 (1984); Comment, The
United States Action in Grenada: An Exercise in Realpolitik, 16 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 53 (1984). For a defense of the invasion, see Robinson, Letter from the Legal Adviser,
United States Department of State, 18 INT'L LAW. 381 (1984) (collapsing the U.S. justifica-
tion ultimately to consent); Moore, Grenada and the International Double Standard, 78
AM. J. INT'L L. 145 (1984). See also Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing
416 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:3
answer has little to do with the democratic nature of the United
States or the totalitarian nature of the Soviet Union. The answer is
not that American actions were aimed at furthering Western dem-
ocratic values while Soviet actions were aimed at defending the
communist and egalitarian values of a socialist state. Each super-
power has acted for both ideological and geopolitical reasons. Af-
ghanistan is directly comparable to Nicaragua and Grenada be-
cause each involved a flagrant violation by a superpower of the
most fundamental norms of international law. Each of these ac-
tions has torn a hole in the fabric of international order, and weak-
ened community support for, and hence the deterrent force of, the
international law prohibiting the use of force across international
frontiers. Each, in a fundamental manner, has weakened interna-
tional security. This in fact has been widely recognized by most
other nations, as demonstrated by the overwhelming votes against
the transgressors in the United Nations Security Council 21 and the
General Assembly;22 only their most dependent allies have sup-
ported their actions.
The larger issues addressed above can be brought into focus
by posing a series of questions. Why should the Soviet Union not
Charter Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1984). But see Schachter, The Legality of Pro-
Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 645 (1984) (Professor Schachter delivers a strong
rebuttal to Professor Reisman, citing Myres Smith McDougal in the process).
21. In the Security Council, the draft resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Af-
ghanistan was approved with only the U.S.S.R. (casting a veto) and the German Democratic
Republic voting against. 35 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Jan.-Mar. 1980) at 4, U.N. Doc. S/13729
(1980). The draft resolution condemning the invasion of Grenada was approved by 11 votes,
with three abstentions (Togo, the United Kingdom, and Zaire). Only the U.S. voted against
it (casting a veto). 38 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1983, U.N. Doc. S/16067; U.N. Doc. S/
PV.2491, at 197 (Oct. 28, 1983).
22. The General Assembly approved a resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan by a vote of 104-18, with 18 abstentions. G.A. Res. ES-6/2, U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 1) at 2, U.N. Doc. A/ES-6/2 & add. I & 2 (1980). In the case of Grenada, the corre-
sponding resolution was approved by a vote of 108-9, with 27 abstentions. G.A. Res. 738,
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. -) at 9, U.N. Doc. A/38/L.8 (1983).
In the General Assembly, only Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Cuba, Czech-
oslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Hun-
gary, the Lao People's Republic, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, the Ukrainian Soviet So-
cialist Republic, and Viet Nam voted with the Soviet Union against the resolution calling
for withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. G.A. Res. ES-6/2, U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 1) at 2, U.N. Doc. A/ES-6/2 and add. 1 & 2 (1980).
In the vote in the General Assembly on Grenada, the United States was joined only by
Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, El Salvador, Israel, Jamaica, St. Lucia, and St.
Vincent and the Grenadines in 9pposing the resolution calling for withdrawal of foreign
troops from Grenada. The Western Allies abstained. G.A. Res. 38/738, UN GAOR Supp.
(No. -) at 9, U.N. Doc. A/38/L.8 (1983).
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have invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 or Hungary in 1956? Why
should the Soviet Union not have invaded Afghanistan in 1979,
and why should it withdraw its troops now? Iraq's invasion of Iran
in 1980, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 pose similar
questions. Why should the Soviet Union not invade Poland if it
finds political developments there unacceptably threatening? Why
should it not have massed its troops on the Polish frontier in an
obvious threat of intervention in 1980 and 1981?23
The importance of the prohibition against the use of force is
not limited to actions by the superpowers or to volatile regions on
their borders, as the following questions reveal. Why should Argen-
tina not have invaded the Falklands?2 4 Why should Venezuela not
seize disputed territory from Guyana by using military force?"6
Why should the General Assembly not seat the Kampuchean gov-
ernment installed by Vietnamese troops in 1978?2" As these ques-
23. Regarding the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Hungary in 1956, see
J. VALENTA, SOVIET INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1968: ANATOMY OF A DECISION (1979);
T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, WORD POLITICS: VERBAL STRATEGY AMONG THE SUPERPOWERS
(1972); Franck & Weisband, The Johnson and Brezhnev Doctrines: The Law You Make
May Be Your Own, 22 STAN. L. REV. 979 (1970); Wright, Intervention, 1956, 51 AM. J. INT'L
L. 257 (1957); L. SOHN, UNITED NATIONS LAW 634-80 (1967); C. ALIBERT, supra note 19, at
365-84 (comparing Hungary and Czechoslovakia).
On the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 see Valenta, Soviet Decisionmaking on
Afghanistan, 1979, in SOVIET DECISIONMAKING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 165-84 (J. Valenta &
W. Potter eds. 1984); C. ALIBERT, supra note 19, at 415-27; Legal Responses to the Afghan!
Iranian Crises: A Panel, 74 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 248 (1980).
Regarding Iraq's invasion of Iran in 1980 see Sterner, The Iran-Iraq War, 63 FOREIGN
AFF. 128 (1984); C. ALIBERT, supra note 19, at 106-26.
With respect to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 see Ajami, Crusade in Lebanon:
The Shadows of Hell, 48 FOREIGN POL'Y 94 (1982); Yaniv & Lieber, Personal Whim or Stra-
tegic Imperative: The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon, 8 INT'L SECURITY 117 (1983); Z. SCHIFF &
E. YA'ARI, ISRAEL'S LEBANON WAR (1984); Levenfeld, Israeli Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in
Modern Lebanon: Self Defense and Reprisal under Modern International Law, 21 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1982); Note, The Legal Implications of Israel's Invasion into Lebanon,
13 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 458 (1983).
On the Soviet Union's massing of its troops on the Polish frontier in an obvious threat
of intervention in 1980, see Moreton, The Soviet Union and Poland's Struggle for Self-
Control, 7 INT'L SECURITY 86 (1982).
24. See, e.g., Franck, Dulce et Decorum Est: The Strategic Role of Legal Principles in
the Falklands War, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 109 (1983); Glover, International Law in the Falk-
land Islands, 1982 N.Z.L.J. 191; THE SUNDAY TIMES OF LONDON INSIGHT TEAM, WAR IN THE
FALKLAND: THE FULL STORY (1982).
25. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1980, at 5, col. 5 (nat'l ed.).
26. See Warbrick, Kampuchea: Representation and Recognition, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
234 (1981). In a White House statement issued in 1983, the rationale for opposing the seat-
ing of the Kampuchean government was stated as follows:
The Heng Samrin regime . . . was installed in Pnom Penh and is maintained
there solely by the force of Vietnamese arms. Seating representatives of the
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tions suggest, there is a common thread which unites these real or
hypothetical events in disparate countries around the globe. The
delicate fabric of international order has or would be torn by each
of the actual or potential actions mentioned above. That fabric is
rent because international law is the thread with which the fabric
of international order is woven. 7
It is against this background that one must evaluate the wis-
dom of U.S. covert operations against Nicaragua 28 and its attempts
to evade an impartial adjudication of the legality of its actions by
the ICJ.29 These actions reveal the United States' failure to take
into account its fundamental national interests in strengthening
international order and the international legal norms prohibiting
the use of force. There is evidence to suggest that not only have
the decision makers responsible for U.S. covert operations against
Nicaragua failed to give adequate weight to these fundamental na-
tional interests, but also they have at times failed to address these
Heng Samrin regime would indicate international acceptance of a government
imposed by a foreign aggressor in violation of the U.N. Charter and in defiance
of the General Assembly....
D.P'T ST. BULL., Nov., 1983, at 37.
27. U.S. Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick made this essential point in addressing the
U.N. General Assembly in 1982, in relation to a draft resolution calling for the withdrawal of
foreign troops from Afghanistan:
Of all the issues before this Assembly, none has more far-reaching implications
than the issue of Afghanistan. The aggression committed by the Soviet Union in
Afghanistan and its proxies elsewhere has had and continues to have a great
impact upon the climate and course of East-West relations. Such aggression om-
inously affects the entire fabric of international relations and the future of the
state system based upon respect for the principles of territorial integrity, na-
tional independence, and political sovereignty. These actions bear directly upon
the capacity of states, especially those most vulnerable, to retain their unique
identities and to fulfill their aspirations in peace and security.
The Afghan people are fighting for their own survival, but their struggle has
a much broader meaning. If a small, relatively defenseless, nonaligned country
like Afghanistan is allowed to be invaded, brutalized, and subjugated, what other
similarly vulnerable country can feel secure? ...
Rejecting Soviet arguments, Ambassador Kirkpatrick also demonstrated the importance of
international law as a commonly-accepted standard of international behavior. She stated:
But what, one may legitimately ask, gives the Soviet Union the right to insist
that the violent overthrow of a non-aligned government constitutes an "irreversi-
ble" revolution? According to what tenet of international law, on the basis of
what article of the U.N. Charter, do they base their position?
Address to the General Assembly, Nov. 24, 1983, DEP'T ST. BULL. Jan., 1983, at 78-79. The
resolution was adopted on November 29, 1983 by a vote of 114-21, with 13 abstentions and 9
absent or not voting. Id. at 80.
28. See infra Part I(B).
29. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; infra notes 121, 187 and accompanying
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questions."
3. Problems of Partial Compliance
In a legal system characterized by partial compliance with in-
ternational legal rules prohibiting the threat or use of force, how
should a state act in order to further the fundamental goals of
strengthening international order and the effectiveness of interna-
tional law and institutions? Is it rational to violate the prohibition
against the use of force because other nations do so?" Or, con-
versely, is it more rational in attempting to achieve these funda-
mental objectives to comply with such legal norms, while mobiliz-
ing the political support of other nations to increase the costs
incurred by those who violate such basic principles of international
law? -2 Is it not more rational to attempt to strengthen and increase
support for these legal norms and institutions within the interna-
tional system by foregoing short-term political and military gains,
thereby increasing the costs of their violation, and hence their de-
terrent force?
The question of whether norm observance is a rational strat-
egy in a system of partial compliance is frequently answered in the
negative by those skeptical of international law. 3 Such a conclu-
sion is offered, however, without having contemplated its conse-
quences and implications. It is a conclusion used to dismiss the
relevance of international law, often as a justification for actions
violative of international law's basic prohibitions, 4 or as an excuse
for refusing to participate in the strengthening of international law
and its institutions.5 Yet, those who dismiss international law fail
to recognize that in doing so they abandon the goal of increased
30. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 6, 1984, at 4, col. 1 (nat'l ed.).
31. See, e.g., Reisman, supra note 20.
32. See, e.g., L. HENKIN, supra note 17, at 318, 337-39.
33. See, e.g., M. LACHS, THE TEACHER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 13-18 (1982); L. HENKIN,
supra note 17, at 319-32. See also L. HENKiN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 28-32 (1980).
34. See, e.g., Reisman, supra note 20 and accompanying text.
35. The refusal to participate in efforts to strengthen international law and institutions
may result from a "unilateralist" outlook according to which national interests can best be
pursued and protected in the absence of constraints imposed by international law, relying
instead on what tend to viewed as a nation's "sovereign" prerogatives. This unilateralist
perspective may frequently be traced to underlying beliefs about the ineffectiveness of inter-
national law and the futility of supporting international legal norms when other nations are
viewed as likely to violate them with impunity whenever they wish to do so. See, e.g., Keo-
hane & Nye, Two Cheers for Multilateralism, 60 FOREIGN POL'Y 148 (1985).
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international order; they ignore the fact that a superpower's viola-
tions of fundamental international norms communicate that super-
power's view of permissible international behavior, to allies and
adversaries alike, much more powerfully than words.
Such conclusions also result in the failure to act in support of
these norms when they are violated by other states, particularly
when the state is perceived as friendly.36 The net effect is a reduc-
tion in the costs imposed upon potential and actual violators and a
further weakening of the norm.
While a complete answer to the question of how a state should
act to strengthen international order and law in a system of partial
compliance cannot be offered here, one should not lose sight of his-
tory. Twice, after experiencing the devastation of total war, the
leaders of the world, including those of the United States, con-
cluded that a strengthening of international law and institutions
was an indispensable means of constructing a more stable interna-
tional order. Both the League of Nations and the United Nations
were created with the principal aim of reducing the use of force.
The founders of both institutions established mechanisms through
which nations could act to support legal norms in situations of par-
tial compliance. The ultimate failure of the League and the weak-
ening of the United Nations in recent years in no way invalidates
the strategy for securing international order adopted in 1919 and
1945. The decisions of these leaders establish a presumption in
favor of the observance of law as a rational strategy for construct-
ing international order in a system of partial compliance. The bur-
den of persuasion is on those who would reject international law. If
they are to rebut the presumption, they must do so by explaining
how violations of basic norms of international law can lead to the
strengthening of international order and the increasing effective-
ness of international law and institutions. Given the relationship
between order and law, it is doubtful that this can be done.
The basic questions regarding U.S. strategy for achieving
greater international order and its policy towards strengthening
the international law regulating the use of force cannot be avoided
36. Particularly noteworthy examples of U.S. failure to communicate to allies its sup-
port of fundamental legal norms prohibiting the use of force include the case of Argentina's
invasion of the Falklands in 1982, and the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975. See
supra note 24 and accompanying text; Clark, The "Decolonization" of East Timor and the




by dismissing the importance of international law because of par-
tial compliance by other states. Rather, these questions must be
thoroughly considered not only by experts in international law, but
also by the policy-makers, legislators, journalists, leaders of non-
governmental organizations, and private citizens whose beliefs and
actions ultimately determine the policies adopted by the United
States.
International lawyers face a curious dilemma. If they discuss
these issues only among themselves, it is not likely that their in-
sights will be shared by those whose decisions ultimately deter-
mine state behavior. If, on the other hand, they address policy-
makers and others whose understanding of international law
shapes national policies and behavior, they run the risk of speaking
within a legal paradigm whose arguments and complexities will not
be understood. They also run the related risk that highly sophisti-
cated and well-reasoned arguments will be rejected because of the
reader's simplistic belief that international law is not "law," is "in-
effective," or is not "enforceable," 3 and therefore should not be
followed where other important interests are at stake.38
Because of the importance of strengthening international or-
der, law, and institutions, international lawyers must nonetheless
induce others to seriously consider the previous questions as well
as substantive questions of international law. Ultimately, the
strengthening of the international law regulating the use of force,
and hence the strengthening of international order, will depend on
these phenomena being understood by non-specialists.
International law affects everyone. An important effect is the
way in which it may cause domestic public opinion and domestic
political forces to focus their attention on the long-term costs and
benefits of alternative policies. The most critical decisions -
whether to observe the Order of Interim Protection of the Court or
to continue the funding of covert operations against Nicaragua; 9
37. See, e.g., L. HENKIN, supra note 17, at 12-27, 89-98, 322-32.
38. Id. at 322-32.
39. Interim Protection Order of May 10, 1984, supra note 5, at 184-87. The Court's
Order of Interim Protection islegally binding on the parties. See S. ROSENNE, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT (2d rev. ed. 1985). However, this assertion, while
representing the better view, has been the subject of doctrinal dispute. See J. SZTUCKI, IN-
TERIM MEASURES IN THE HAGUE COURT 260-94 (1983); J. ELKIND, INTERIM PROTECTION: A
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (1981).




whether to seek a negotiated settlement of the case;4 or whether to
comply with the final judgement on the merits"1 -will be made
within the next several years. One would hope that the considera-
tions discussed above would be taken into account by those who
make or influence these decisions.
It is important not only to understand the arguments before
the World Court, but also to place these arguments into a broader
context. That context should relate U.S. policies and specific legal
arguments to the fundamental U.S. national interest in creating a
strengthened international order where more effective interna-
tional law and institutions can be used.
B. United States Covert Operations Against Nicaragua
1. The Origins of the Covert War Against Nicaragua
U.S. opposition to the Sandinista forces in Nicaragua existed
well before the overthrow of the corrupt and brutal regime of
Anastasio Somoza. From the fall of 1978 until the final collapse of
the Somoza regime on July 19, 1979, American policy-makers con-
sistently attempted to achieve a transition to a moderate regime
that would not be dominated by the Marxist leaders of the
Sandinista movement.' When military collapse appeared immi-
nent in June, 1979, the United States proposed to the Organization
of American States (OAS) that an Inter-American Peacekeeping
Force be created to supervise the transition. The proposal, how-
ever, was summarily rejected by the other members of the OAS.'
40. While the Reagan administration has apparently decided not to pursue this option,
which would probably require a general settlement of the dispute with Nicaragua, it remains
an attractive alternative as opposed to the expected condemnation of the U.S. by the ICJ in
its judgment on the merits. Payment or a negotiated settlement of the damages award will
necessarily remain on the agenda of U.S. policymakers until one of these two alternatives is
adopted.
41. The initial decision whether or not to comply with the Court's decision will be made
by the Reagan administration. Given its recent posture toward the Court, a negative deci-
sion would not be surprising. However, if the U.S. does decide not to comply with the ad-
verse decision by the ICJ, the issue will not go away. It would appear likely that some
administration, at some point in the future, would end the country's non-compliance with
the Court's judgment on the merits.
42. See J. BOOTH, THE END AND THE BEGINNING: THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION 128-54,
161-81 (1982); Sims, Revolutionary Nicaragua: Dilemmas Confronting Sandinistas and
North Americans, in CONFRONTATION IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN 53, 56-57; W. LAFEBER, INEVI-
TABLE REVOLUTIONS: THE UNITED STATES IN CENTRAL AMERICA 233-35 (1983).
43. See J. BOOTH, supra note 42, at 177; Organization of American States, 17th Meeting
of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Relations, Resolution II, June 23, 1979, OAS Doc.
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The Carter administration proposed a seventy-five million dollar
aid package with the intent of influencing the revolution's course
in a positive direction, but its approval was stalled in Congress for
almost a year. 4 The new administration under President Reagan
shifted from the Carter administration's approach of positive in-
ducements, manifesting increasing hostility toward the Sandinista
regime; it authorized covert operations against Nicaragua as early
as March, 1981,"5 and expanded such operations in November,
1981, following a National Security Council meeting." By mid-
1984, U.S. hostility toward Nicaragua had led to the creation,
funding, and support of a paramilitary force of counter-revolution-
aries or contras operating in and against Nicaragua, and direct
American involvement in military actions such as blowing up oil
storage facilities and mining Nicaraguan harbors.
Three factors seem to have been at the root of U.S. policy to-
ward Nicaragua. The dominant factor is a general hostility toward
a Marxist government which might become a totalitarian regime
similar to that of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other communist
states.47 Such a regime, it is believed, will necessarily violate
human rights on a massive scale,4  cannot be trusted,' 9 and will
OEA/SER. F/I.17, Doc. 40/79; W. LAFEBER, supra note 42, at 229-37.
44. See Sims, supra note 42, at 239-42.
45. While details of the March decisions remain obscure, having been overshadowed by
revelations concerning the decisions taken in November and December, 1981, President
Reagan reportedly authorized a $19.5 million program of covert activities aimed at halting
the flow of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador and other neighboring countries. See
Dickey, Central America: From Quagmire to Cauldron?, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 659, 668-69 (1984);
Application, supra note 4, Annex A, at 22.
46. Washington Post, Apr. 29, 1984, at Al, col. 4; Washington Post, Nov. 23, 1983, at
Al, col. 4.
First, covert financial assistance to "moderate" elements in Nicaragua was authorized to
continue. N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1982, at 1, col. 4 (nat'l ed.); N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1982, at 6,
col. 1 (nat'l ed.); Washington Post, Mar. 10, 1982, at Al, col. 6. Second, authorization was
given for the CIA to create and train a 500-man paramilitary force, at a cost of $19.5 million,
with the possibility of its expanding if necessary. Washington Post, Mar. 10, 1982, at Al, col.
5; N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1982, at A10, col. 5 (nat'l ed.); Washington Post, Mar. 10, 1982, at
Al, col. 6. Third, continued support and coordination with a second paramilitary force being
trained in Honduras by Argentina was apparently approved. Newsweek, Nov. 8, 1982, at 42,
44. General Vernon Walters and other officials had discussed possible covert operations with
Argentina and Honduras earlier in 1981. For details of U.S.-Argentine collaboration in sup-
port of the contras, see N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1983, at 6, col. 3 (nat'l ed.).
47. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards, COMMENTARY, Nov.
1979, at 34-35, reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY 5-29 (H. Wiarda
ed. 1982); Sanchez, The Communist Threat, 52 FOREIGN POL'Y 43, 47 (1983).
48. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick, supra note 47, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY at
27-29.
49. See, e.g., Vaky, Reagan's Central American Policy: An Isthmus Restored, in CEN-
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inevitably attempt to spread revolution to neighboring countries.50
The second factor is the fact that Nicaragua has contributed
in various ways to the efforts of the Salvadoran revolutionaries
currently attempting to overthrow the U.S. backed government in
El Salvador. Large quantities of arms flowed from Nicaragua to the
guerrillas in El Salvador, particulary during 1980 and early 1981. 51
While there appears to be little evidence of a significant arms flow
since that time,52 ammunition and other supplies appear to have
gotten through on a much more limited scale.53 The United States
also sees Nicaragua as providing other forms of assistance and ad-
vice, such as providing a safe haven for the Salvadoran rebels and
providing locations for carrying out command and control
functions.54
The third factor which accounts for U.S. policy is the percep-
tion that a Marxist Nicaragua constitutes a grave threat to the
TRAL AMERICA: ANATOMY OF CONFLICT 233, 248-49 (R. Leiken ed. 1984). President Reagan's
response to a question about Nicaraguan leaders at a press conference on November 3, 1983,
was revealing. "I haven't believed anything they've said since they got in charge," he said,
"and you shouldn't either." Id. at 249. See also Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1984, at Al, col. 1
(Deputy Defense Secretary Fred C. Ikl6 and CIA Director William J. Casey said to "think
there is little point in talking to communists since any agreement will be violated.").
50. See, e.g., Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1984, at Al, col. 1. A high administration offi-
cial was quoted as saying, "[N]obody expects that over a long period of time they [the
Sandinistas] wouldn't promote external revolution." Id.
51. See, e.g., Bolafhos Hunter, Nicaragua: A View From Within, in CROSOS AND OPPOR-
TUNITY: U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 383, 393-94 (M. Falcoff & R.
Royal eds. 1984).
52. See, e.g., Washington Post, July 8, 1984, at Al, col. 1; Smith, Dateline Havana:
Myopic Diplomacy, 48 FOREIGN POL'Y 157, 160-62 (1982); Birns & Anderson, A Contra-
Diction, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1984, at E23, col. 2 (nat'l ed.); Rosenfeld, Cause for Invasion?,
Washington Post, Nov. 16, 1984, at A23, col. 1. For the "evidence" presented by the Reagan
administration, see, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF STATE & DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, BACKGROUND
PAPER: NICARAGUA'S MILITARY BUILD-UP AND SUPPORT FOR CENTRAL AMERICAN SUBVERSION
18-21, 23-25 (July 18, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Background Paper]. But cf. Washington
Post, July 19, 1984, at A17, col. I (June draft of Background Paper called flow of supplies
only "sporadic").
53. See, e.g., Washington Post, July 8, 1984, at Al, col. 1.
54. See, e.g., BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 32, at 23-25. It should be noted that Nica-
ragua does not border El Salvador and has not been used as a sanctuary from which rebels
launch attacks and to which they may safely retreat. In contrast, the contras based in Hon-
duras have used Honduran territory as a sanctuary, behind the shield of U.S. military forces
in the area and the threat of their use or the use of other U.S. forces. It appears that Nicara-
gua has been dissuaded from fully exercising its rights of hot pursuit and self-defense under
international law by its realization that any such action would be characterized as Nicara-
guan aggression and an armed attack against Honduras, giving the United States the legal
right to use military force against Nicaragua in exercise of the right of collective self-defense
guaranteed by article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
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United States in terms of its strategic and geopolitical interests.
This is partly due to the United States' fear that Nicaragua's
revolution, whether by example or force of arms,5" will result in the
fall of neighboring governments to the communists. 6 The possibil-
ity that Nicaragua will forge close military ties with the Soviet
Union and Cuba, however, provides the greatest threat."' Such ties
might eventually include not only Soviet and Cuban military ad-
visers and supplies of military weapons and equipment,58 but also
Soviet ground, air, and naval bases and even the stationing of large
numbers of Cuban or Soviet troops in Nicaragua.59 Were these
55. Critical distinctions are usually submerged in the terminology used by the Reagan
administration, such as Nicaragua's perceived penchant for "exporting revolution." These
distinctions include the difference between behavior which violates international law and
that which does not. There is a great difference, for example, between illegally sending arms
to rebels in El Salvador and allowing certain of their leaders to live in Nicaragua. There is a
great difference between "exporting revolution" by arms shipments or troops, on the one
hand, and doing so by example, propaganda, and providing support of a non-military na-
ture, on the other. See Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2
U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, amended by Protocol of Buenos Aries, art. 20, 21 U.S.T. 607,
T.I.A.S. No. 6847; Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, art. 1, 62
Stat. 1681, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 4 Bevans 559 [hereinafter cited as Rio Treaty].
When coupled with the belief that a Marxist government inevitably supports armed
revolution in neighboring states, the demand that Nicaragua stop "exporting revolution"
easily becomes confused with a demand that it change its internal form of political organiza-
tion. The use of such inchoate terminology tends to lead to confusion both in defining for-
eign policy objectives and in understanding the costs and chances of success of pursuing one
objective as opposed to another. See, e.g., Vaky, supra note 49, at 233-50.
56. See, e.g., Vaky, supra note 49, at 239.
57. Considerable military cooperation between Nicaragua and Cuba and the Soviet
Union already exists, although its precise nature and extent are subjects of dispute. See,
e.g., Bolahos, supra note 51, at 390-93.
58. In January, 1984, U.S. administration officials estimated that there were some 2,000
military and security advisers among the 6,000 Cubans in Nicaragua. Washington Post, Jan.
31, 1984, at A10, col. 4. U.S. officials denounced Nicaraguan plans to build a military airport
as representing a potential Soviet base. Washington Post, Sept. 7, 1984, at A24, col. 1. State-
ments by Nicaraguan officials that they are interested in obtaining Soviet MIGs or French
Mirages to build up a combat air force have done little to ease U.S. concerns. See, e.g., id.
The removal of foreign advisers is a primary goal of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua. Sec-
retary of State George Shultz put the matter bluntly in April, 1985, as follows:
First, Nicaragua must stop playing the role of surrogate for the Soviet
Union and Cuba. As long as there are large numbers of Soviet and Cuban secur-
ity and military personnel in Nicaragua, Central America will be embroiled in
the East-West conflict. . . .Central America is West. The East must get
out . ..
Address by Secretary Shultz, in Indianapolis (Apr. 22, 1985), reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, CURRENT POLICY, No. 691, at 3 (1985).
59. For the views of leading Defense Department officials, see Ik16, U.S. Policy for Cen-
tral America: Can We Succeed?, in THE NICARAGUA READER: DOCUMENTS OF A REVOLUTION
UNDER FIRE 21-26 (P. Rosset & J. Vandermeer eds. 1983) (speech originally delivered to the
Baltimore Council on Foreign Affairs, Sept. 12, 1983); Sanchez, The Communist Threat, 52
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events to occur, U.S. strategic interests would be adversely affected
in a most serious way.60
These three factors have led the United States to set three
principal objectives in dealing with Nicaragua. The first objective
is an end to the supply of arms, equipment, and other assistance to
the Salvadoran guerrillas and also to leftist groups in other neigh-
boring countries."1 The second objective is a demand that the Nic-
araguan Government open up its political processes to prevent it
from becoming (or remaining) a totalitarian Marxist state.6 2 The
third objective is an assurance from Nicaragua that close military
FOREIGN POL'V 43 (1983).
60. See, e.g., Hayes, United States Security Interests in Central America in Global
Perspective, in CENTRAL AMERICA: INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE CRISIS 85-102 (R.
Feinberg ed. 1982); Cirincione & Hunter, Military Threats, Actual and Potential, in CEN-
TRAL AMERICA: ANATOMY OF CONFLICT 173-92 (R. Leiken ed. 1984).
61. Secretary Shultz stated this central goal in April, 1985 as follows:
Third, Nicaragua must absolutely and definitively stop its support for insur-
gents and terrorists in the region....
Address by Secretary Shultz, supra note 58, at 3. A somewhat related objective was put as
follows:
Second, Nicaragua must reduce its armed forces-now in excess of 100,000
and heavily armed-to a level comparable to those of its neighbors.
Id.
62. Secretary Shultz has reaffirmed this objective in the following terms:
And fourth, the Sandinistas must live up to their commitments to demo-
cratic pluralism made to the OAS in 1979. The internal Nicaraguan opposition,
armed and unarmed, represents a genuine political force that is entitled to par-
ticipate in the political processes of the country. The government in Managua
must provide the political opening that will allow their participation.
Address by Secretary Shultz, supra note 58.
President Reagan has stated this objective in even blunter terms. When asked at a news
conference whether his goal was to remove the Sandinistas from power, he replied, "Well,
removed in the sense of its present structure, in which it is a communist totalitarian state,
and it is not a government chosen by the people." Washington Post, Feb. 22, 1985, at Al,
col. 6. Those to be invited back into the government included, in particular, the contras. Id.
When asked several weeks later how he could justify "helping to overthrow a government
merely because we don't like its political coloration," President Reagan replied:
Well, they call themselves a government. . . .This is one faction of a
revolution that overthrew a dictatorship. But then, just as Castro had done in
Cuba, one faction got in and muscled the other ones out.
Some of them are jailed, some driven into exile. Some are leading the free-
dom fighters now. I think we have to ignore this pretense of an election they just
held. This is not a government. This is a faction of the revolution that has taken
over at the point of a gun.
And under the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States, there is every reason for us to be helping the people
that want the original goals of the revolution instituted (emphasis added).
Washington Post, Mar. 6, 1985, at A8, col 1 (remarks in interview with Business Week
magazine).
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and other ties with the Soviet Union will not be forged or allowed
to remain in place, so that no Soviet military forces or facilities
will be established in that country."3 Achievement of the second
objective will help ensure that of the third. While the accuracy of
some of the views set forth above may be questioned, 4 it is sub-
mitted that they do represent the views of the Reagan
administration.
It is essential, for both analytical and policy purposes, to keep
these three objectives separate. One might think that the first ob-
jective, halting the arms flow to El Salvador, could be successfully
resolved either through negotiations"s or through recourse to the
OAS under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or
"Rio Treaty."66 Even the third objective-the assurance that close
military ties will not be maintained with the Soviet Union or Cuba,
and that no foreign military bases or facilities will be estab-
lished-might be achieved through negotiations that include a
proper mix of positive incentives, particularly access to American
markets and economic aid.6
7
The second objective is the problem. The Carter administra-
tion sought to solve the problem through positive engagement and
the use of aid and other traditional instruments of political persua-
sion. 8 Later, and after an increase in the authoritarian nature of
63. See, e.g., supra note 58.
64. See, e.g., Ullman, At War With Nicaragua, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 39, 52-54 (1983).
65. On September 21, 1984, Nicaragua announced that it would accept a peace plan
proposed by the Contadora countries which would largely achieve these objectives. Washing-
ton Post, Sept. 23, 1984, at A34, col. 1. The U.S. promptly moved to oppose ratification of
the pact by the other Central American countries, at least in its current form, insisting there
were verification problems. Washington Post, Sept. 30, 1984, at Al, col. 2. In December,
1984, for example, Langhorne Motley, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Af-
fairs, was reported as saying that the Nicaraguan military build-up meant that verification
of any Contadora peace treaty would be "all but impossible." The White House, it was
reported, held the view that any serious peace treaty would require hundreds, perhaps
thousands of people to verify compliance. Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1984, at A20, col. 1.
In early 1985, Nicaragua offered to forego the introduction of more advanced weapons
systems such as MIG aircraft. The Reagan administration's reaction to the proposal, how-
ever, was cool. See Washington Post, Mar. 3, 1985, at Al, col. 1. On the course of negotia-
tions with Nicaragua in general, see Gutman, America's Diplomatic Charade, 56 FOREIGN
POL'Y 3 (1984).
66. The supplying of arms by Nicaragua to guerrillas in El Salvador would constitute a
violation of Article 18 of the OAS Charter; see, e.g., Rowles, The United States, the OAS,
and the Dilemma of the Undesirable Regime, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 385, 401-02 (1983).
67. See supra note 65.
68. See Sims, supra note 42, at 58-62. But c.f. NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8, 1982, at 42, 44 (a
secret war for Nicaragua)(non-military covert activities initiated under President Carter).
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the Sandinista regime,69 the Reagan administration sought to re-
solve the problem through a combination of negotiations and coer-
cion; coercion came to dominate the two-track policy, particularly
after mid-1983. 70 Nonetheless, sharp divisions have at times ex-
isted within the administration over which track should be given
priority.71
2. Key Decisions in Washington
Long before the fall of the Somoza regime, in 1978 President
Carter authorized non-military covert aid to moderate and pro-
democratic organizations in Nicaragua.72 This covert aid seems to
have continued through 1980 and early 1981 after the Sandinistas
assumed power. 73 Within months after President Reagan took of-
fice in 1981, actions were taken which reflected both a heightened
hostility toward the Nicaraguan regime and an abandonment of at-
tempts to influence internal developments through the offering of
positive inducements such as foreign assistance and preferential
access to U.S. markets. Nicaraguan involvement in a heavy flow of
arms to guerrillas in El Salvador in the fall of 1980 and early
1981,'7 a major offensive by Salvadoran rebels in January, 1981,
75
69. See, e.g., Gleijeses, Nicaragua: Resist Romanticism, 54 FOREIGN POL'Y 122, 122-38
(1984); Sims, supra, note 42, at 66-72. Many authors, including the above, suggest a strong
relationship between the increasing hostility of the United States, manifested in both covert
and overt actions, and the growth in the autocratic nature of the Sandinista regime. See W.
LAFEBER, supra note 42, at 293-99; J. BOOTH, supra note 42, at 222-27; Fagen, Revolution
and Crisis in Nicaragua, in TROUBLE IN OUR BACKYARD: CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE UNITED
STATES IN THE EIGHTIES 125-54 (M. Dishkin ed. 1983); Ullman, At War With Nicaragua, 62
FOREIGN AFF. 39-58 (1983); Schoultz, Nicaragua: The United States Confronts a Revolu-
tion, in FROM GUNBOATS TO DIPLOMACY 116-34 (R. Newfarmer ed. 1984). Compare Radosh,
The Drift Toward Repression, in CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY: U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN 407-23 (M. Falcoff & R. Royal eds. 1984); Kirkpatrick, U.S. Security
Interests and Latin America, in RIFT AND REVOLUTION: THE CENTRAL AMERICAN IMBROGLIO
342-50 (H. Wiarda ed. 1983).
70. See, e.g., Rubin, Reagan Administration Policymaking and Central America, in
CENTRAL AMERICA: ANATOMY OF CONFLICT 299-335 (R. Leiken ed. 1984).
71. See, e.g., Vaky, supra note 49, at 237; Washington Post, Aug. 8,1984, at Al, col. 4;
Washington Post, Apr. 29, 1984, at Al, col. 4; Washington Post, Nov. 23, 1983, at Al, col. 4;
N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1984, at 8, col. 3 (nat'l ed.); N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1984, at 8, col. 1 (nat'l
ed.); Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1984, at Al, col. 1.
72. Supra note 68.
73. Id.
74. See supra notes 51-53.
75. See, e.g., T. MONTGOMERY, REVOLUTION IN EL SALVADOR: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION
138-39 (1982); W. LAFEBER, supra note 42, at 255-56.
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and internal developments in Nicaragua 7 fed and confirmed the
fears of the new administration, which was already predisposed to
view events in the region in terms of the global struggle against
communism. 77 A thorough analysis of the interaction of these and
related factors in producing U.S. decisions is beyond the scope of
this study,78 although it should be noted that a striking similarity
appears to exist between the manner in which U.S. relations with
Nicaragua deteriorated after 1980 and the manner in which U.S.-
Cuban relations worsened after Fidel Castro assumed power in
Cuba in January, 1959.79
In the spring of 1981, the Reagan administration halted for-
eign assistance to Nicaragua, moved to curtail sugar imports from
and wheat exports to Nicaragua, and began to oppose the granting
of loans to Nicaragua by international financial institutions.8 0 The
Reagan administration also authorized a substantial increase in
covert intelligence activities in Central America, including
Nicaragua."
During the summer, Robert MacFarlane, a principal assistant
to Secretary of State Alexander Haig, began to develop and coordi-
nate planning for a wide range of military and other options that
might be pursued in order to defend against the perceived threat
of Soviet, Cuban, and Nicaraguan subversion in Central America.82
These options, which included a blockade of Cuba to halt the flow
of arms to Nicaragua and El Salvador, were considered by the Na-
tional Security Council (NSC) on November 16, 1981. While Haig's
proposed blockade of Cuba was rejected, President Reagan and the
NSC did agree to carry out a program of covert action against and
within Nicaragua. 3 Finally, it was decided that contingency plans
76. See supra note 69.
77. See supra note 70; Vaky, supra note 49; A. HAIG, CAVEAT: REALISM, REAGAN, AND
FOREIGN POLICY 27, 117-40 (1984).
78. See generally Sims, supra note 42.
79. See Sims, supra note 42; C. BLASIER, THE HOVERING GIANT: U.S. RESPONSES TO REV-
OLUTIONARY CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA 177-202 (1976); Ullman, supra note 64. For a pre-
scient analysis, see LeoGrande, The Revolution in Nicaragua, 58 FOREING AFF. 28, 49-50
(1979).
80. See, e.g., Sims, supra note 42, at 63.
81. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
82. These options, which included a potential blockade of Cuba in order to halt the
flow of arms to Nicaragua and El Salvador, were considered by the National Security Coun-
cil on November 16, 1981. N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1981, at 1, col. 2 (nat'l ed.); Washington Post,
Nov. 23, 1983, at Al, col 4; Washington Post, Apr. 29, 1984, at Al, col. 4.
83. N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1981, at 1, col. 2 (nat'l ed.). See also supra note 46.
19861 429
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
should be drawn up for dealing with unspecified "unacceptable
military action by Cuba." These plans were to cover "possible use
of U.S. forces to deter the introduction of Cuban military forces
into Central America," and to consider "possible use of direct pres-
sure against Cuba," including a "petroleum quarantine and/or re-
taliatory air reaction against Cuban forces and installations.
84
On December 1, 1981, President Reagan authorized the crea-
tion of a 500-man paramilitary force which the CIA was to train.
The authorization was subsequently communicated to the Con-
gressional Intelligence Oversight Committees in a "presidential
finding."8 5 Formally, at least, it was described as a small com-
mando force aimed at the "Cuban infrastructure" in Nicaragua,
and thus at interdicting the flow of arms from Nicaragua to El Sal-
vador.8 6 Speaking off the record, administration officials later said
that under the November plan, commandos stationed in camps
along the Honduran-Nicaraguan border were to conduct hit-and-
run operations against Nicaragua. These operations or attacks were
to destroy vital targets-such as power plants and bridges-in or-
der to undermine the economy and divert the attention and re-
sources of the Nicaraguan Government. The CIA was to work pri-
marily through non-Americans, but in some cases would "take
unilateral paramilitary action-possibly using U.S. person-
nel-against special Cuban targets.
87
Although the stated purpose for the creation of the 500-man
commando force was to interdict the arms flow to El Salvador, the
1981 decisions started a broad program of covert political and mili-
tary activities directed against the Nicaraguan Government. Two
aspects of these developments are particularly noteworthy. The
first is the close collaboration between the CIA and Argentine offi-
cials who began training Nicaragua contras as early as May of
1981.88 The second aspect is the fact that key decision-makers in
84. Washington Post, Apr. 29, 1984, at Al, col. 4; Washington Post, Nov. 23, 1983, at
Al, col 4.
85. As required by 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1982); 50 U.S.C. § 413 (1982).
86. Washington Post, Nov. 23, 1983, at Al, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1982, at 1, col. 5
(nat'l ed.).
87. Washington Post, Mar. 10, 1982, at Al, col. 6.
88. N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1982, at 6, col. I (nat'l ed.).
It is clear that the United States and Argentina were working together in the spring of
1982 preparing paramilitary forces which would launch attacks across the Nicaraguan fron-
tier. This factor may have contributed greatly to the miscalculations in Buenos Aires which
led to the invasion of the Falklands (Malvinas) on April 2, 1982. See Lebow, Miscalculation
in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falklands War, in R. JERVIs, R.N. LEBOW & J.
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the Reagan administration seem to have had a much broader pro-
gram of action in mind than just merely stopping the flow of arms
into El Salvador."' The combination of covert financial assistance
to opponents of the regime, the targeting of vital Nicaraguan facili-
ties for destruction, the speed with which the covert paramilitary
forces soon began to grow,90 and the overt measures directed
against the Nicaraguan economy, suggested that the American
strategy was one of pressuring the Sandinista regime to not only
halt arms shipments to El Salvador, but also to change the Nicara-
guan Government's direction and internal policies."1
By the spring of 1982, public reports of contra activities
against Nicaragua,92 revelations in the press about the NSC's deci-
sions in November, 1981,'" and the increasing size of the paramili-
tary forces based in Honduras" led to serious Congressional con-
cern that the purpose of the covert military activities might be to
overthrow the Sandinista regime, or to provoke an armed conflict
between Honduras and Nicaragua which might lead to the direct
intervention of U.S. military forces. In April 1982, the House Per-
manent Select Committee on Intelligence adopted language, in a
classified annex to its report on the intelligence authorization bill
STEIN, PSYCHOLOGY AND DETERRENCE 89 (1985); Franck, Dulce et Dulcorum Est: The Strate-
gic Role of Legal Principle in the Falklands War, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 109, 111 (1983); Lewis,
Ideology and Ignorance, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1982, at 27, col. 2 (nat'l ed.) (quoting Ambas-
sador Jeane Kirkpatrick's explanation to a national television audience that Argentina's in-
vasion was not necessarily aggression because Argentina claimed the islands).
89. Quoting highly classified National Security Council records, the Washington Post
reported that, "The CIA, in seeking presidential authorization for the $19 million paramili-
tary force, emphasized that 'the program should not be confined to that funding level or to
the 500-man force described,' the records show." Washington Post, Mar. 10, 1982, at Al, col.
6.
90. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1982, at 6, col. 1 (nat'l ed.); Washington Post, Mar.
10, 1982, at Al, col. 6; Washington Post, Nov. 23, 1983, at Al, col. 4.
91. See supra note 68; Vaky, supra note 49, at 237, 248-49.
92. For a detailed Nicaraguan chronology and description of these activities, see Appli-
cation, supra note 4, Annex A, at 24-26.
93. See, e.g., Washington Post, Feb. 14, 1982, at Al, col. 5; Washington Post, Mar. 10,
1982, at Al, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1982, at 1, col. 5 (nat'l ed.).
94. See Washington Post, Nov. 23, 1983, at Al, col. 4; Application, supra note 4, Annex
A, at 32-34.
The size of the contra force was estimated at 500 in December, 1981; there were report-
edly 1000 contras in February and 1,500 in August, 1982. It is unclear whether the August
figure merely reflected the inclusion of the 1,000-man force which was previously being
trained by Argentina, which curtailed its role in the wake of American support for Britian in
the Falklands conflict. See Washington Post, Nov. 23, 1983, at Al, col. 4. The contra forces
had increased to 4,000 men in December, 1982, 5,500 men in February, 1983, and 7,000 men
in May, 1983. By November, 1983, the number was reported to have reached 12,000 men.
See, e.g., id.; N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1982, at 6, col. 1 (nat'l ed.).
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for fiscal year 1983, which restricted the purposes for which the
funds could be used. It provided that the funds could not be used
to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government or to provoke a military
exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras.95 This language was
retained in the Conference Committee report which was approved
in August. Subsequently, President Reagan reportedly authorized
a large increase in the size of the paramilitary force and an expan-
sion in its activities, with an additional thirty million dollars being
allocated to the program. 6
Following an article in Newsweek magazine in early Novem-
ber, 1982," senior administration officials admitted that the
United States was supporting small-scale covert military opera-
tions against Nicaragua. They stressed, however, that the activities
were not intended to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government, but
rather only to harass it. A senior national security official insisted
that the operations were limited to hit-and-run raids into Nicara-
gua by small paramilitary units based in Honduras, skirmishes
with Nicaraguan troops along the Honduran border, and financial
support for political opponents of the Sandinista regime.98
In 1983, several factors led to a major escalation of covert mili-
95. These restrictions were retained in the conference report, which both the House
and the Senate approved in August, 1982. House Intelligence Committee Report on H.R.
2670 (Boland-Zablocki bill), reproduced in part in Center for National Security Studies, 8
FIRST PRINCIPLES, July-Aug., 1983, at 1-5.
Representative Boland's amendment to the 1983 defense appropriations bill, which was
included in a continuing resolution enacted into law in December 1982, adopted the restric-
tion approved by both Houses that previous August, but never enacted into law. The origi-
nal Boland Amendment is found at Pub. L. 97-377, § 793, 96 Stat. 1865 (1982). See Destler,
The Elusive Consensus: Congress and Central America, in CENTRAL AMERICA: ANATOMY OF
CONFLICT 319, 327-28 (R. Leiken ed. 1984). The original Boland Amendment applied only to
funds authorized for fiscal year 1983, and is no longer in force. Subsequent restrictions on
U.S. support of the contras have frequently been referred to generically as "the Boland
Amendment."
96. See Application, supra note 4, Annex A, at 28. This alleged action followed CIA
briefings of congressional oversight committees in August, 1981. See supra note 95.
97. NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8, 1982, at 42-55 (a secret war for Nicaragua). Newsweek reported
that the constant military pressure was designed to keep the Nicaraguan government "in a
jumpy state of alert." It quoted U.S. officials as stressing that the primary objective was
cutting off supply routes to El Salvador, but stated further, "IT]hey also hope that a
threatened Sandinista government will bring itself down by further repressing its internal
opposition, thereby strengthening the determination of moderate forces to resist. If that
happens, says one U.S. official in Central America, then the Sandinistas will fall like a house
of cards in the wind." Id. at 48. The account also described the intentions of the contras
based in Honduras to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. Id.
98. N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1982, at 6, col. 1 (nat'l ed.). The officials, speaking on a back-
ground basis, were not named in this report.
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tary operations against Nicaragua. Perhaps the most important
was a shift in control of decision-making concerning Nicaragua
away from the State Department and toward a group led by CIA
Director William Casey, National Security Adviser William Clark,
United Nations Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, and high-ranking
Defense Department officials.""
The second factor was a direct consequence of the first.
Deeply skeptical towards successful negotiations with the
Sandinistas,"° the newly dominant group of hard-line decision-
makers gained President Reagan's support for a series of steps
designed to greatly increase the military pressure on Nicaragua.
New decisions were made in June or July 1983 to continue or ac-
celerate an expansion in the size of anti-Sandinista paramilitary
forces, and to broaden the scope of their activities inside Nicara-
gua.101 The size of the contra forces had indeed already grown at
an extraordinary rate; its size was estimated at 500 men in Decem-
ber, 1981, and by November, 1983, the force was estimated at
12,000.102 The scope of covert activities was also broadened to in-
clude direct attacks on critical strategic and economic targets
within Nicaragua, movement of contra forces to permanent camps
much deeper in Nicaragua, and greater direct involvement of U.S.
personnel in these operations.0 3
The decisions made in the summer of 1983 were taken in the
face of increasingly stiff Congressional opposition. In early May of
1983, the House Intelligence Committee voted to cut off the fund-
ing of all covert operations in Nicaragua, regardless of their stated
purpose. 0 4 On July 28, the House approved a bill that cut off
funding of covert operations and prohibited the use of any govern-
ment funds for this purpose. It also directed the President to seek
99. See Rubin, supra note 70, at 303-12; Destler, supra note 95, at 328-30. During the
high-level review of U.S. policies in early 1983, CIA Director Casey reportedly urged an
expansion of the contras operations, claiming that the Sandinistas might be overthrown by
the end of the year. Rubin, supra note 70, at 309-10. Cf. Washington Post, Feb. 24, 1985, at
A23, col. I (reported CIA plan to oust Sandinistas by end of 1983).
100. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 94.
102. See Washington Post, Nov. 23, 1983, at Al, col. 4. But cf. Washington Post, Dec.
16, 1984, at Al, col. 1 (Congressional doubts about accuracy of figures and suspicions that
they were inflated to show growing support for contras).
103. See Application, supra note 4, Annex A, at 30-40 (compilation of statements from
Congressional Record).
104. See House Intelligence Committee Report on H.R. 2670, supra note 95, at 6.
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a peaceful solution to the Nicaraguan question through the OAS. 10 5
During the same period, the administration decided, in June,
1983, to hold large scale joint military exercises in Honduras,
known as "Big Pine II," which were to last for some six months.
These were accompanied by large naval maneuvers off the coasts of
Nicaragua. Together, these exercises involved over 4,000 U.S.
troops in Honduras and at least nineteen American ships."' 6
As the frequency and intensity of the fighting in Nicaragua
and armed clashes along the Honduran border grew, the stated jus-
tification for the covert operations became virtually untenable.
Consequently, President Reagan made a new "presidential find-
ing" which abandoned the arms interdiction rationale and pro-
vided a much broader justification for covert military operations
against Nicaragua. The new finding was presented to Congres-
sional oversight committees on September 20, 1983, stating the jus-
tification in vague and open-ended terms, such as stopping Nicara-
gua from exporting revolution. 107
Following the spectacular destruction of Nicaraguan oil stor-
age facilities and other bold attacks in early October, 10 8 the House
moved again to cut off funding for the contras. The bill approved
on July 28th was dead due to continuing Senate support for the
covert activities. The House then took action which the Senate
could not ignore; the House incorporated into the Intelligence Au-
thorization Act for fiscal year 1984 the same language as was in the
July 28th bill. The cut-off of funding and the flat prohibition of
U.S. support from any agency was again approved by the House on
October 20, 1983, by a vote of 243-171.1°9 This forced a House-
105. H.R. 2760, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. H5721-62 (daily ed. July 27,
1983), 129 CONG. REC. H 5819-5882 (daily ed. July 28, 1983). The bill was approved by a vote
of 228-195. Id. at H5881-82. The debates on July 27 and July 28 are extremely interesting as
they reveal that one of the primary motivations of the proponents of a cut-off of funding
was their view that the covert operations violated international law.
106. See Rubin, supra note 70, at 312.
107. See, e.g., Destler, supra note 95, at 331. Whatever its precise terms, it was incon-
sistent with the clear prohibition of the Boland Amendment which expired in October along
with the continuing resolution in which it had originally been included. See supra note 95
(expiration of Boland Amendment).
108. See Application, supra note 4, Annex A, at 36-38.
109. See Destler, supra note 95, at 331; H.R. 2968, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC.
H8359-64 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1983); 129 CONG. REC. H8389-8433 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1983). An
amendment strengthening the prohibition of covert aid was approved by a vote of 227-194.




Senate compromise, which was enacted into law in December,
1983. The compromise provided for the authorization of twenty
four million dollars for covert operations against Nicaragua, to-
gether with a prohibition of any other direct or indirect support by
any U.S. agency."10 This put the administration on a short leash,
because at the current rate of expenditure a supplemental appro-
priation would be needed by the spring of 1984. Opponents of the
covert operations also succeeded in halting any back-door funding
of covert actions against Nicaragua in the Intelligence Authoriza-
tion Act, which became law in December."'
Despite these prohibitions and limitations, the Reagan admin-
istration pressed ahead with its escalation of military and paramili-
tary actions against Nicaragua. President Reagan approved the
mining of Nicaraguan harbors in or before mid-February 1984. The
uproar caused by the mining of Nicaraguan ports and harbors from
February to March (and perhaps even from January to early
April), particularly after direct U.S. complicity became known in
early April," 2 contributed to the eventual June defeat of the ad-
ministration's request for twenty-one million dollars in supplemen-
tal funding for covert operations against Nicaragua." 3 Conse-
quently, all U.S. funding and support beyond the twenty-four
million dollars approved in November was legally prohibited for
the remainder of fiscal year 1984.1"
In the heat of a Congressional and Presidential election, the
issue of funding covert activities came up in the conference com-
mittee charged with drafting a continuing appropriations resolu-
110. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 98-212, § 775, 97 Stat. 1421,
1452 (Dec. 8, 1983). Section 775 provided that,
[Niot more than $24 million of funds available to the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United
States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the
purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, mil-
itary or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization,
movement, or individual (emphasis added).
This prohibition was also contained in the 1984 Intelligence Authorization Act, Pub. L. 98-
215, § 108, 97 Stat. 1473, 1475 (Dec. 9, 1983). For an overview of Congressional action re-
garding the funding of covert activities against Nicaragua, see CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY, 1983, at 43-54 (Report for House Comm. on For-
eign Aff., Comm. print, 1984).
111. See supra note 110; Destler, supra note 95, at 331.
112. See, e.g., Washington Post, Apr. 10, 1984, at Al, col. 6; Washington Post, Apr. 11,
1984, at Al, col. 5; Washington Post, Apr. 12, 1984, at Al, col. 1.
113. See N.Y. Times, June 26, 1984, at 1, col 6 (nat'l ed.).
114. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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tion for fiscal year 1985. The House obtained a prohibition of all
direct or indirect funding of such activities until March, while the
Senate achieved agreement that up to fourteen million dollars
would be appropriated for covert operations against Nicaragua,
provided that a special resolution was adopted by both Houses af-
ter February 28, 1985. This compromise was signed into law on
October 12, 1984.
The adoption of such a special resolution would not only have
authorized the fourteen million dollars in funds, but also would
have lifted the prohibition against back-door funding of such activ-
ities through the use of contingency funds or other devices. That
prohibition provided:
During fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other
agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence ac-
tivities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which
would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, mili-
tary or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation,
group, organization, movement or individual."
15
In order for this prohibition to be lifted, the President would have
had to submit a report to the Congress detailing the need for the
fourteen million dollars;116 and a joint resolution would have had
to be approved 1 which in its operative part contained the follow-
ing language: "that the Congress approves the obligation and ex-
penditure of funds available for fiscal year 1985 for supporting, di-
rectly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in
Nicaragua." 8 Special and expedited voting procedures were also
included in order to guarantee a prompt vote on the resolution." 9
After President Reagan's re-election in 1984, a long and in-
tense policy debate within the administration was triggered by
press leaks regarding the possible introduction of Soviet MIG air-
craft into Nicaragua. 20 The outcome was a hardened attitude to-
115. Continuing Appropriations Act for 1985, Pub. L. 98-473, § 8066(a), 98 Stat. 1837,
1935-37 (Oct. 12, 1984).
116. Id. § 8066(b)(1) (President's report); Id. § 8066(d) (limit of $14 million).
117. Id. § 8066(b)(2).
118. Id. § 8066(c)(1).
119. Id. § 8066(c).
120. Washington Post, Apr. 27, 1984, at Al, col. 6; N.Y. Times, May 19, 1984, at 5, col.
1 (nat'l ed.); Application, supra note 4, Annex A, at 30.
In November, 1984, following President Reagan's reelection, U.S. aircraft overflying
Nicaraguan territory produced loud sonic booms. These sonic booms occurred during a pe-
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ward Nicaragua and a determination to make an all-out effort to
induce Congress to adopt the special resolution lifting the prohibi-
tion against funding and appropriating the fourteen million dol-
lars. Consistent with this approach were the administration's deci-
sions, announced on January 18, 1985, not to take part in further
proceedings (on the Merits) before the ICJ, and to break off the
bilateral talks with Nicaragua in Manzanillo, Mexico.1 2'
Following an intense public relations campaign by President
Reagan and other high officials,122 the special resolution came to a
vote on April 23, 1985. It was approved in the Senate by a vote of
53-46, but was defeated in the House by a vote of 248-180.21 As a
result, the total prohibition of aid to the contras or other covert
activities against Nicaragua continued in force. It was clear, how-
riod of heightened tensions in connection with possible delivery to Nicaragua of Soviet MIG
aircraft. Washington Post, Nov. 10, 1984, at A19, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1984, at 1, col.
3 (nat'l ed.); N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1984, at 8, col. 6 (nat'l ed.)(no U.S. denial of sonic boom
charges); Washington Post, Nov. 14, 1984, at Al, col. 5. In an interview with The New York
Times, Otto J. Reich, a top administration spokesman, confirmed that the sonic booms were
intended to scare the Nicaraguans. N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1985, at 1, col. 2 (nat'l ed.). To-
gether with large-scale military maneuvers in Honduras and off the coasts of Nicaragua, the
booms seemed to fit within the administration's "perception management program," in ef-
fect at least since 1983, which has aimed at keeping the Nicaraguans concerned that the
United States might invade the country. Id. See Lewis, The MIGs are Coming!, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 18, 1984, at 25, col. 1 (nat'l ed.)(focusing on shift in justification from that of flow of
arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador, to one of arms flow to Nicaragua); Washington Post,
Nov. 14, 1984, at Al, col. 6 (seven separate exercises underway in Honduras); N.Y. Times,
Nov. 9, 1984, at 6, col. 4 (nat'l ed.)(25 U.S. warships on maneuvers in Caribbean); N.Y.
Times, Nov. 11, 1984, at 1, col. 3 (nat'l ed.)(military options for increasing pressure under
consideration, including "quarantine" of Nicaragua); N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1984, at 1, col. 5
(nat'l ed.) (options considered include air strikes, quarantine); N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1984, at
8, col. 1 (nat'l ed.) (policy struggle within administration); Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1984,
at Al, col. 1 (hardened administration stance on Nicaragua as result of policy debate).
121. See Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1984, at Al, col. 1; Washington Post, Jan. 20, 1985,
at 19, col. 1.
122. See generally Washington Post, Feb. 24, 1985, at A23, col. 1; Washington Post,
Mar. 12, 1985, at A8, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1985, at 1, col. 5 (nat'l ed.). In early March,
President Reagan said of the contras opposing the government of Nicaragua, "They are our
brothers, these freedom fighters, and we owe them our help." He continued, "They are the
moral equivalent of our Founding Fathers and the brave men and women of the French
resistance. We cannot turn away from them. For the struggle is not right versus left, but
right versus wrong." Washington Post, Mar. 2, 1985, at Al, col. 2. In a news conference on
February 21, President Reagan, when asked if his goal was to remove the Sandinistas gov-
ernment from power, replied, "Well, removed in the sense of its present structure, in which
it is a communist totalitarian state, and it is not a government chosen by the people." He
said he would change his view "if the present government would turn around and say ....
uncle, all right, and [the contras may] come on back into the revolutionary government."
Washington Post, Feb. 22, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
123. Washington Post, Apr. 24, 1985, at Al, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1985, at 1, col.
6 (nat'l ed.); N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1985, at 10, cot. 1 (nat'l ed.).
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ever, that President Reagan would make renewed efforts to lift the
prohibition and resume funding of the contras before the fiscal
year was out.'
2 4
The April victory of the opponents to funding was short-lived.
This was due to sharp congressional reaction to Nicaraguan Presi-
dent Daniel Ortega's trip to Moscow immediately after the April
vote, and to broader fears-particularly among Southern Demo-
crats-of being perceived as "soft on Communism." These reac-
tions contributed greatly to President Reagan's success in ob-
taining House approval on June 12th for twenty-seven million
dollars in "humanitarian assistance" to the contras. The House
terms were adopted in a Conference Committee report filed on
July 29, and approved by both Houses within the next few days.1"'
On August 15, 1985, President Reagan signed the bill into law."2 6 A
decrease in Congressional opposition to funding the contras was
further revealed by the terms of the 1986 Intelligence Authoriza-
tion Act, signed into law on December 4, 1985. The new legislation
weakened restrictions on the use of the twenty-seven million dol-
lars appropriated in August, while providing for the exchange of
intelligence information and "advice" between U.S. officials and
the contras."7
Meanwhile, funds, materiel, and other supplies continued to
reach the contras, whether through "private" sources, 2 8 third gov-
ernments,'"" overt U.S. "humanitarian assistance," or renewed cov-
ert aid. The end of the contras' war to overthrow the Sandinista
Government was not in sight: it appeared that the war of the con-
tras might continue indefinitely; the possibility of a sharp escala-
tion in U.S. military and paramilitary activities against Nicaragua
could not be ruled out.
124. At a news conference on April 4, 1985, President Reagan emphasized that the ad-
ministration would support the contras even if Congress rejected his request for $14 million
to support them. "We're not going to quit and walk away from them, no matter what hap-
pens," he said. N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1985, at 1, col. 4 (nat'l ed.).
125. See N.Y. Times, June 13, 1985, at Al, col. 6 (nat'l ed.); Washington Post, Aug. 17,
1985, at A15, col. 1; 131 CONG. REc. H6671 (daily ed. July 29, 1985)(conference report filed);
131 CONG. REC. H6897-6909 (daily ed. July 31, 1985)(House approval); 131 CONG. REC.
S10629-35 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1985)(Senate approval).
126. 1985 Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 99-88, ch. 5 and §§ 101-06, 99
Stat. 293, 332-29 (1985).
127. 1986 Intelligence Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-169, §§ 101, 102, 105, 401,
Stat. (1985). See CONF. REP. 373, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. at 13-17 (November 14, 1985).
128. See infra notes 261-64 and accompanying text.




While a comprehensive treatment of direct and indirect U.S.
military and paramilitary operations against Nicaragua is beyond
the scope of this article, it will be useful to provide a brief sum-
mary of some of the more important actions carried out against
that country. These activities have included both direct U.S. ac-
tions against the territory of Nicaragua and indirect actions carried
out by the contra forces which have been organized, financed, sup-
ported, and coordinated by the United States. Given the degree of
U.S. involvement in the latter, it is not always possible to draw a
clear line separating the two. Nonetheless, it is useful for analytical
purposes to attempt to separate the two categories.
The first category of covert activities against that country in-
cludes those actions against Nicaragua where direct U.S. participa-
tion, direction, and control appear to be clear. On October 2, 1983,
oil storage facilities at Benjamin Zeled6n on Nicaragua's Atlantic
Coast were attacked, causing the loss of 324,000 gallons of fuel. 30
A combined air and sea attack on October 10, 1983, destroyed oil
storage facilities at the Pacific port of Corinto, resulting in the loss
of 3.2 million gallons of fuel.'3 ' The oil pipeline facilities at Puerto
'Sandino, on the Pacific Coast, were attacked on October 14, 1983
by frogmen using underwater explosive devices.'3 2 CIA officers
aboard a "mother ship" furnished the speedboats and directed the
CIA-trained commandos ("unilaterally controlled Latino assets")
raids against Corinto and other targets in the fall of 1983,' 3  and
also in March and early April of 1984.1"
Beginning in late January or in early February, and continuing
through March, 1984, CIA commandos, under the direct supervi-
sion of American CIA officials, conducted a mining operation
against Nicaraguan ports and harbors. Operating from a mother
ship that remained more than 12 miles offshore, commandos using




133. Washington Post, Apr. 18, 1984, at Al, col. 4.
134. Washington Post, Mar. 30, 1984, at Al, col. 6; Washington Post, Apr. 1, 1984 at
A22, col. 3; Washington Post Apr. 2, 1984, at A1, col. 2. For a summary of the mining opera-
tions and sea attacks by the special speedboats, see CENTRAL AMERICAN HISTORICAL INSTI-
TUTE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, UPDATE, Apr. 5, 1984.
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the CIA, with parts supplied by the U.S. Navy,135 at the Nicara-
guan ports of Corinto and Puerto Sandino on the Pacific, and El
Bluff on the Caribbean coast.1 38 A helicopter or helicopters from
the mother ship reportedly provided "cover" or support for the
minelaying operations.13 7 Administration officials, speaking on a
background basis, stated that the mining was intended to disrupt
the Nicaraguan economy and, with luck, disrupt military supply
lines to that country.
13 8
In addition to these actions, it appears that the United States
(the CIA and other U.S. agencies) has also been directly involved
in air attacks against targets in Nicaragua; supplied and resupplied
by air the contras operating within that country; and repeated
overflights of Nicaraguan territory, including both surveillance
flights and flights producing sonic booms aimed at intimidating the
population and government officials.139 On February 2, 1984, two
air attacks against a radio transmitter and a military camp, were
reportedly directed by the CIA with the help of specially-trained
Latin Americans. The attacks resulted in four Nicaraguan deaths.
135. N.Y. Times, June 6, 1984, at 4, col. 1 (nat'l ed.).
136. Application, supra note 4, Annex A, at 42-44; N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1984, at 1, col.
5 (nat'l ed.); N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1984, at 1, col. 1 (nat'l ed.); N.Y. Times, June 1, 1984, at
4, col. 1 (nat'l ed.)(U.S. Navy assistance in manufacturing mines); N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1984,
at 1, col. 3 (nat'l ed.).
137. Washington Post, Apr. 10, 1984, at Al, col. 6.
138. N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1984, at 1, col. 6 (nat'l ed.); Washington Post, Apr. 10, 1984,
at Al, col. 6. When asked during an interview about the purpose of the mining operations,
Secretary of State Shultz said, "You have to ask the contras about that .... It looks like
the purpose must somehow be to interrupt the commerce of the country." Washington Post,
Apr. 7, 1984, at Al, col. 1. Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam, however, in testi-
mony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, stated that the mining of Nicaraguan
harbors could be legally justified as collective self-defense. See The Mining of Nicaraguan
Ports and Harbors, Hearings on H. Con. Res. 290 Before the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (Apr. 11, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Mining Hearings]; N.Y.
Times, Apr. 12, 1984, at 1, col. 6 (nat'l ed.).
139. N.Y. Times, May 3, 1984, at 5, col. 1 (nat'i ed.); N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1984, at 1,
col. 5 (nat'l ed.); Washington Post, Apr. 27, 1984, at Al, col. 6.
In November, 1984, following President Reagan's reelection, U.S. aircraft overflying
Nicaraguan territory produced loud sonic booms. These sonic booms occurred during a pe-
riod of heightened tensions in connection with possible delivery to Nicaragua of Soviet MIG
aircraft. Washington Post, Nov. 10, 1984, at A19, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1984, at 1, col.
6 (nat'l ed.)(no U.S. denial of sonic boom charges); Washington Post, Nov. 14, 1984, at Al,
col. 5. In an interview with the New York Times, Otto J. Reich, a top administration spokes-
man, confirmed that the sonic booms were intended to scare the Nicaraguans. N.Y. Times,
Mar. 30, 1985, at 1, col. 2 (nat'l ed.). Together with the large-scale military maneuvers in
Honduras and off the coasts of Nicaragua, the booms seemed to fit within the administra-
tion's "perception management program," in effect at least since 1983, which has aimed at
keeping the Nicaraguans concerned that the United States might invade the country.
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These attacks, part of a larger program, were launched from air
bases in El Salvador or Honduras and carried out with bombs and
planes provided by the CIA. ""
The possibility of Nicaragua receiving MIGs and potential
U.S. military responses to such a development were the subject of
intense discussion in November, 1984, both within the administra-
tion and in the press.141 These discussions, in which military op-
tions such as air strikes or a blockade were apparently considered
(a fact openly leaked to the press) became part of a much broader
policy debate within the administration regarding policy toward
Nicaragua.
It is not easy to distinguish between specific activities con-
ducted directly by U.S. officials or employees (direct involvement)
and those carried out by the contras where the degree of U.S. in-
volvement in their direction is unclear or more difficult to ascertain
(indirect involvement) given the secret nature of covert operations
against Nicaragua. U.S. intelligence officials have reportedly stated
that
[tlhe overall direction of covert action against Nicaragua was
dealt with by interagency working groups including State De-
partment, Pentagon, and White House representatives as well as
the CIA. But the day-to-day conduct of the paramilitary opera-
tion itself, the 'secret war,' belonged mainly to [CIA Director]
Casey and his subordinates."4 2
Beginning as early as December, 1981, contra forces based in
Honduras began conducting cross-border raids into northern Nica-
140. N.Y. Times, May 3, 1984, at 5, col. 1 (nat'l ed.). See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1984,
at 1, col. 4 (nat'l ed.)(dispatch from Nicaragua).
141. See Lewis, The MIGs are Coming!, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1984, at 25, col. 1 (nat'l
ed.) (focusing on shift in justification from that of flow of arms from Nicaragua to El Salva-
dor, to one of arms flow to Nicaragua); Washington Post, Nov. 14, 1984, at Al, col. 6 (seven
separate exercises underway in Honduras); N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1984, at 6, col. 4 (nat'l ed.)
(25 U.S. warships on maneuvers in Caribbean); N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1984, at 1, col. 3 (nat'l
ed.) (military options for increasing pressure under consideration, including "quarantine" of
Nicaragua); N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1984, at 1, col. 5 (nat'l ed.) (options considered include air
strikes, quarantine); N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1984, at 8, col. I (nat'l ed.) (policy struggle within
administration); Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1984, at Al, col. 1 (hardened administration
stance on Nicaragua as a result of policy debate).
142. Washington Post, Dec. 16, 1984, at Al, col. 1. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1983 (U.S.
ties to anti-Sandinistas reported to be extensive), reprinted in THE NICARAGUA READER:
DOCUMENTS OF A REVOLUTION UNDER FIRE 215-19 (P. Rosset & J. Vandermeer eds. 1983).
See also Application, supra note 4, Annex A, at 28.
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ragua.'" These attacks, which continued through the first half of
1982, included blowing up two vital bridges in the north on March
14, 1982.1"1 Larger attacks occurred in the summer of 1982, and,
according to Nicaragua, became an almost daily occurrence
thereafter. 1 5
In March, 1984, while the mining operations were fully under-
way, over 6,000 contras launched a major offensive against targets
deep inside Nicaragua.1" Contra forces in southern Nicaragua,
close to the Costa Rican border, have also carried out a number of
attacks against Nicaraguan targets. According to leaders of the
group, it has been largely supported by CIA funds. 47 Refusal by
Eden Pastora, military leader of the group, to accede to CIA pres-
sures to join with the rebels operating in the north (on the ground
that they are led by former officials of the Somoza National
Guard) led to a drying up of CIA support for the group. 148 Both in
the north and in the south, the contras' ability to continue their
war against the Nicaraguan Government still appeared in mid-1985
to be highly dependent on CIA backing, despite the assistance they
have apparently received from "private" sources and third
countries. 149
By April 1985, the United States had provided at least eighty
million dollars in support for the contras and other covert opera-
tions against Nicaragua.' 0 This figure is probably an underestima-
tion, given the ability of the United States to indirectly transfer
large amounts of weapons and materiel to the contras by leaving
them behind after conducting military maneuvers in Honduras,""
or by funneling them through military assistance programs to third
143. See Application, supra note 4, Annex A, at 24.
144. Id. at 26. In its Application, Nicaragua stated that CIA Director William Casey
had admitted CIA responsibility for the bridge attacks in briefings to Congressional over-
sight committees. Id.
145. Id. at 26.
146. See Application, supra note 4, at 42; Washington Post, Apr. 10, 1984, at A14, col.
6.
147. See, e.g., Washington Post, June 20, 1984, at Al, col. 5; Washington Post, July 25,
1985, at Al, col. 5.
148. See, e.g., Washington Post, July 25, 1985, at Al, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1985,
at A3, col. 1; N.Y. Times, May 31, 1984, at 1, col. 1 (nat'l ed.)(U.S. pressures on southern
group threatening cut-off of funding).
149. See, e.g., Washington Post, June 20, 1984, at Al, col. 5 (Pastora charges cut-off of
CIA funds; rebels in south near collapse); Washington Post, July 25, 1984, at Al, col. 5.
150. See, e.g., Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1984, at Al, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1985,
at 4, col. 6 (nat'l ed.).
151. Cf. Washington Post, Jan. 1, 1984, at Al, col. 5.
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countries such as El Salvador and Honduras.1 2
Shortly before Congress voted on new assistance to the con-
tras on April 23, 1985, a White House document describing admin-
istration plans for expanding covert military and paramilitary ac-
tions against Nicaragua was leaked to the press. This document,
which had been sent to congressional intelligence oversight com-
mittees, included the President's "determination," justification,
and request for funds to resume aid to the contras "at levels suffi-
cient to create real pressure on the Government of Nicaragua
(20,000- to 25,000-man force in the north and 5,000- to 10,000-man
force in the south)."'6 3 The document indicated that while the
United States was publicly placing an emphasis on negotiations,
the administration believed that only direct pressure from ex-
panded contra forces could force Nicaragua to accept U.S. de-
mands. While the "direct application of U.S. military force" had
been ruled out for the present, the document warned that such ac-
tion "must realistically be recognized as an eventual option, given
our stakes in the region, if other policy alternatives fail."' 54
According to the plans set forth in the document, CIA staff
members (permanent personnel) and contract personnel would not
enter Nicaragua or "participate in military or paramilitary opera-
tions of any kind."' 55 Rather, the "U.S. presence will be limited to
a small group of CIA advisers outside Nicaragua whose function
will be to provide intelligence, limited tactical advice based on that
intelligence and logistical guidance."'' 5 The report went on to say
that in order "to keep the U.S. profile as low as possible," the CIA
would make "maximum" use of "cooperative arrangements with
third countries.'
157
Regarding other CIA involvement, the report said that "the
CIA procurement mechanism will be used to provide supplies" and
that "funds will also be used to cover transportation and adminis-
trative costs of both U.S. [personnel] and personnel of the armed
opposition. '"158 This program was proposed, the report explained,
to "help prevent consolidation of the Sandinista regime" in Nica-
152. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 13, 1985, at 5, col. 1 (nat'l ed.); Washington Post, Sept.
15, 1984, at Al, col. 2 (transfer of aircraft through Honduras to contras).








ragua. This offered the best prospects for "achieving a negotiated
solution" in which Nicaragua agreed to reduce its armed forces; to
send home Soviet and Cuban military advisers; to halt aid to leftist
guerrillas in El Salvador; and to accept free elections, a free press
and other institutions of a democratic pluralistic society.151
In April, administration officials estimated that there were
15,000 contras fighting in the north of Nicaragua and another
5,000 fighting along that country's border with Costa Rica.16 0 It re-
mained to be seen whether their number would grow or decrease,
and what the U.S. role would be in the process. In any event, it
was announced on April 30, 1985, following the defeat of the ad-
ministration's request for additional funding for the contras on
April 23, that the United States would impose a broad range of
economic "sanctions" against Nicaragua, including a trade em-
bargo, in order to increase the "pressure" on the Sandinista re-
gime. Whether the real objective of the economic embargo and
continued encouragement, if not direct support, of the contras was
to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government or merely to force it to
accept a negotiated settlement which met U.S. demands remained
unclear.' 61
C. Nicaragua's Case in the World Court: An Overview of the
Proceedings
1. The International Court of Justice
The ICJ is the successor to the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice (PCIJ), which was founded in 1920 but ceased to
function for all practical purposes during World War II."'2 The
new Court was created by the United Nations Charter and is "the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations.' 6 3 It is composed
of fifteen judges who are elected by an absolute majority of both
the General Assembly and the Security Council.' No two mem-
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., id. Cf. N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1985, at 4, col. 6 (nat' ed.)(10,000-15,000
rebels in North and fewer than 5,000 in South).
161. See N.Y. Times, May 1, 1985, at 1, col. 6 (nat'l ed.); infra notes 208, 347 and
accompanying text.
162. See generally M. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE,
1920-42 (1943).
163. U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
164. Statute of the International Court of Justice, arts. 4-12, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No.
993, 3 Bevans 1179 (1945) [hereinafter cited as L.C.J. STAT.]. In the Security Council, no
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bers of the court may be from the same state,'6 5 and the selection
is to be carried out with a view toward ensuring that the body as a
whole will be representative of "the main forms of civilization and
of the principal legal systems of the world." 66 Judges serve in an
independent capacity,167 and are bound to exercise their powers
"impartially and conscientiously."' 6 8 Judges serve for nine years,
may be re-elected, 69 and cannot be removed from office except for
cause. Removal is by the unanimous decision of the remaining
judges. 17 0 The work of a judge is a full-time and exclusive
occupation.1
7 '
The ICJ may render decisions in disputes between states
which have accepted the Court's jurisdiction,17 2 and also render ad-
visory opinions on any legal question when so requested by the Se-
curity Council or the General Assembly, or any other organs au-
thorized by the General Assembly. 73 The ICJ resolves disputes in
accordance with international law, 7 4 unless the parties request
that a decision be made solely on the basis of considerations of
fairness and justice.
75
In contentious proceedings, such as the case brought by Nica-
ragua against the United States, any party which does not have a
judge of its nationality sitting on the Court has the right to name
an ad hoc judge for that particular case or proceeding.17 6 At the
same time, a judge of the nationality of a party retains the right to
sit in the case before the Court. 77 The decisions of the Court are
formally binding, but only between the parties and only with re-
spect to the case in question.178 As in many civil law legal sys-
distinction is made between the votes of permanent and non-permanent members in con-
nection with such elections. Id. art. 10, para. 2.
165. Id. art. 3, para. 1.
166. Id. art. 9.
167. Id. art. 2.
168. Id. art. 20.
169. Id. art. 13.
170. Id. art. 18.
171. Id. arts. 15, 17, & 23.
172. Id. arts. 34 para. 1, 36, 37.
173. U.N. CHARTER art. 96; I.C.J. Stat., supra note 164, art. 65.
174. I.C.J. Stat., supra note 164, art. 38, para. 1.
175. Id. art. 38, para. 2 (authority to decide a case ex aequo et bono if parties so
agree).
176. Id. art. 31, paras. 2-3. Nicaragua did not exercise this right with respect to its
request for provisional measures. Interim Protection Order, supra note 5, at 4.
177. I.C.J. Stat., supra note 164, art. 31, paras. 2-3.
178. Id. art. 59.
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tems, 179 however, this limitation on the formally binding effect of
decisions does not detract in practice from the extremely authori-
tative nature of the ICJ's decisions.180 The Court's decision in a
specific case is final and not subject to appeal.'8 ' Each member of
the United Nations is legally bound to comply with the Court's
decision in any case in which it has been a party.8 2 If one party
fails to comply with a judgment, the other may take the matter to
the Security Council, which may if it deems such action necessary,
make recommendations or take measures to enforce the
judgment. 83
2. The Three Stages of the Proceedings in Contentious Cases
In a contentious case, such as that brought by Nicaragua
against the United States, proceedings before the Court may be
divided into as many as three different phases or stages.'" The
first, following the filing of an application with the Court, arises
only when a party requests the Court to order provisional mea-
sures to protect the parties' rights during the course of the litiga-
tion. The second stage involves consideration by the Court of any
preliminary objections, particularly as to jurisdiction or admissibil-
ity, which the respondent may have raised. If the Court finds that
any of the preliminary objections are valid, for example, that it
lacks jurisdiction to hear the case, the case is dismissed thereby
ending the proceedings. If, on the other hand, the Court decides
that the preliminary objections are not meritorious,'8 5 it proceeds
to the third stage, the consideration of the merits or substantive
validity of the applicant's claim. The Court's decision on the mer-
its ends the case, except for possible additional proceedings to de-
termine the amount of damages to be assessed against the losing
party.
In the present case, the Court will reach all three stages of the
proceedings. The first stage concluded on May 10, 1984, when the
179. See, e.g., J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 47 (2d ed. 1985).
180. See, e.g., M. LACHS, THE TEACHER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 186-87 (1982).
181. I.C.J. Stat., supra note 164, art. 60.
182. U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para. 1.
183. Id. art. 94, para. 2.
184. In addition, proceedings aimed at establishing the amount of compensation due
the winning party may follow the third or merits phase of the proceedings.
185. In certain circumstances, the Court may defer its decision on a question raised as a
preliminary objection by joining it to the merits stage of the proceedings. However, this
practice has been circumscribed in recent years.
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Court issued an Order indicating provisional measures in response
to Nicaragua's earlier request.86 The second stage of the proceed-
ings, dealing with preliminary objections raised by the United
States, concluded with the Court's Judgment of November 26,
1984. The third or merits phase of the proceedings is currently in
progress, notwithstanding the refusal of the United States to take
part, and is expected to end with the final Judgment of the Court
on the Merits by mid-1986. In the event of a judgment against the
United States, further proceedings to establish the amount of dam-
ages are anticipated.1
8 7
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE LEGALITY OF UNITED STATES
COVERT OPERATIONS AGAINST NICARAGUA
It is worth noting that the United States has never effectively
denied or refuted the essential factual allegations made by the
press and contained in Nicaragua's April 9, 1984 application to the
186. See Interim Protection Order of May 10, 1984, supra note 5.
187. See Judgment of Nov. 26, 1984, supra note 6.
The above sketch describes the three stages of the proceedings on the applicant's claim.
Further and more complicated variations are possible when the respondent files a counter-
claim or when a third state seeks to intervene in the proceedings.
One significant development could have delayed the present proceedings. On August 15,
1984, El Salvador filed a request with the.Court to intervene in the preliminary proceedings,
in order to argue that the Court did not have jurisdiction to decide the case brought by
Nicaragua against the United States. See Washington Post, Aug. 18, 1984, at A27, col. 1.
The text of the Salvadoran request to intervene is reproduced in 24 I.L.M. 38 (1985).
The Statute of the Court provides that a state may make a request to intervene when it
considers that it "has an interest of a legal nature" that may be affected by the decision in
the case. See I.C.J. Stat., supra note 164, art. 62, para. 1.
A request to intervene may also be made by a state when the construction of an inter-
national convention to which it is a party is involved in the litigation. See I.C.J. Stat., supra
note 164, art. 63. Article 63 establishes:
1. Whenever the construction of a convention to which states other than those
concerned in the case are parties in question, the Registrar shall notify all such
states forthwith.
2. Every state so notified has the right to intervene in the proceedings; but if it
uses this right, the construction given by the judgment will be equally binding
on it.
The Court itself decides whether to grant or deny such a request. Proceedings relating to a
request to intervene are incidental to proceedings in the principle case. The Court set a
deadline of September 14, 1984 for receipt of written observations from the interested coun-
tries on El Salvador's request. Washington Post, Aug. 18, 1984, at A27, col. 1. On October 4,
1984, the Court dismissed El Salvador's request to intervene under article 63 in the prelimi-
nary objections stage, holding open the possibility of its intervening in the merits stage of
the proceedings. See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicara-
gua v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 215, 215-17 (Order of Oct. 4 Rejecting Intervention of El Salvador
in Jurisdictional Stage), reprinted in 24 1.L.M. 43, 43-44 (1985).
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ICJ.1 8a Had the United States in reality taken the view that Nica-
ragua's substantive charges were inaccurate, it could have achieved
an impartial determination of their validity by waiving its prelimi-
nary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and proceeding to
an adjudication on the merits. Given the ample documentation in
the public record and the failure of the United States to deny the
basic facts reported in the press concerning its involvement in cov-
ert operations against Nicaragua, these facts are assumed to be
true for purposes of the following legal analysis. 89 Whether these
188. President Reagan, for example, when asked about contra attacks on Nicaraguan
oil storage facilities, replied, "I'm not going to comment .... But I do believe in the right
of a country, when it believes its interests are best served, to practice covert activity..."
DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec., 1983, at 6. When asked about the administration's response to a
House cut-off of funding to the contras, Secretary Shultz stated, "We have to see to
it-particularly by virtue of supporting those who want to fight for their countries and their
principles-that they're able to do so. So we haven't, by any means, accepted the House's
verdict as the final verdict." DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept., 1983, at 49.
President Reagan, when asked, following the enactment of the Boland amendment in
December, 1982, why the United States did not openly support the contras instead of pro-
viding covert aid, replied, "Why, because we want to keep on obeying the laws of our coun-
try, which we are obeying [laughter]." DEP'T ST. BULL., July, 1985, at 30, 31. In February,
1985, President Reagan affirmed that his goal was the removal of the "present structure" of
the Nicaraguan government. See supra note 62.
While denials have been made from time to time they have often been discredited by
subsequent revelations. See, e.g., Statement of Alan Romberg, State Dep't spokesman on
March 21, 1984, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1984, at 1, col. 3 (nat'l ed.)("We note that the anti-
Sandinista forces have widely advertised that certain Nicaraguan ports have been mined.
We have no further information on that incident. We have received a protest from the So-
viet Union charging U.S. responsibility and we reject that charge.").
189. Two preliminary legal points may be mentioned here, before proceeding to a de-
tailed analysis of the legality of U.S. actions against Nicaragua. The first is the fact that acts
of employees of the CIA who are not U.S. citizens (sometimes referred to as "unilaterally
controlled Latino assets") are, under international law, acts of the government of the United
States. See, e.g., International Law Commission, Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Part
I, art. 8(a), [19801 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, Vol. 2 (Pt. 2) at 30. Article 8(a) provides, "The
conduct of a person or group of persons shall also be considered as an act of the State under
international law if: (a) it is established that such person or group of persons was in fact
acting on behalf of that state .. " Id.
The second point is that the organization, financing, support, and coordination of covert
operations against Nicaragua carried out by the contras or by the military forces of another
state (such as Honduras or El Salvador), if sufficient direction and control exist, may result
in the United States being legally responsible under international law for the actions carried
out by these groups or government forces. See, e.g., id. arts. 8(a), 9, & 27; Declaration of
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Principle I (Prohibiting the
Threat or Use of Force), para. 8, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Declaration on Friendly Relations]; Resolution on Defi-
nition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, art. 3(g), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N.
Doc. A/9631 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Definition of Aggression]. The two resolutions cited
above, which were unanimously adopted by the General Assembly (by consensus), represent
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actions of the United States can be justified as undertaken in law-
ful exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense is a
separate question.
The following analysis considers the legal norms which the
community of states has developed over the centuries in order to
control the use of force across international frontiers.1 90
A. The Threat or Use of Force by the United States Against
Nicaragua
1. Direct United States Military Activities Against Nicaragua
a. Action Against the Territorial Integrity and Political In-
dependence of Nicaragua in General
The cornerstone of the United Nations Charter is the prohibi-
tion against the threat or use of force across international frontiers.
This prohibition, contained in article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter, represents the most important legal restraint against war.
Article 2(4) states, "All Members shall refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force against the territo-
rial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."' 191
The United States has violated this prohibition by acts involv-
ing the force against the territorial integrity and political indepen-
dence of Nicaragua. Examples include blowing up oil storage de-
pots at Corinto, mining Nicaraguan harbors, and overflights of
Nicaraguan territory. 192 These actions have also violated other
treaty commitments of the United States. Article 20 of OAS Char-
ter, for example, provides "The territory of a state is inviolable; it
in the portions cited an authoritative interpretation of U.N. Charter, art. 2 para. 4, which
prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state. The actions referred to above also constitute direct violations of OAS Charter,
arts. 18 & 20. Treaties, it should be stressed, are every bit as binding under international
law as are principles of customary international law. I.C.J. Stat., supra note 164, art. 38(1);
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra art. 17.
190. See generally I. BROWNL1E, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
(1963); 1-2 B. FERENCZ, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW (1983).
191. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
192. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (oil storage depots at Corinto); supra
notes 135-38 and accompanying text (mining of harbors); supra notes 130, 132, 139-40 and
accompanying text (other measures and overflights). See generally supra notes 130-42 and
accompanying text. On the question of whether overflights constitute a use of force, see I.
BROWNLIE, supra note 190, at 363-64.
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may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or
of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indi-
rectly, on any grounds whatever .. .",193 (emphasis added). Simi-
larly, these actions violate article 1 of the Rio Treaty, which estab-
lishes that "The High Contracting Parties formally condemn war
and undertake in their international relations not to resort to the
threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the provi-
sions of the Charter of the United Nations or of this Treaty."
1 9 '
The United States actions against Nicaragua were not author-
ized by the United Nations Security Council or by a competent
regional agency such as the Organization of American States. Con-
sequently, the only exception to the prohibitions referred to above
under which they might be justified is the right to collective self-
defense under article 51 of the United Nations Charter. 195 Whether
such a justification is legally valid is considered below.
b. The Mining of Nicaraguan Ports and Harbors
The mining of Nicaraguan ports and harbors by the United
States in the Spring of 1984 violated not only the legal prohibitions
discussed above, but also several other legal obligations to Nicara-
gua and third states. There can be little doubt that the mining
violated the prohibition against "the territorial integrity or politi-
cal independence of any state" contained in article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter;196 the prohibition against the use of
"measures of force taken by [a] State, directly or indirectly, on any
grounds whatever" against the inviolability of the territory of an-
other State, established in article 20 of the OAS Charter;197 and
the prohibition against the threat or use of force contained in arti-
cle 1 of the Rio Treaty.198
193. OAS Charter, supra note 12, art. 20.
194. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, art. 1, 62 Stat. 1681,
T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 4 Bevans 559 [hereinafter cited as Rio Treaty]; Garcia-Amador, The Rio
de Janeiro Treaty: Genesis, Development, and Decline of a Regional System of Collective
Security, 17 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 1 (1985).
195. See, e.g., Rowles, supra note 66, at 388-96.
196. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. President Reagan and other officials
sought to defend the mining operations by stressing that the mines were not of the type that
could sink a ship. When asked about the mining in an interview for Irish television, Presi-
dent Reagan explained, "Those were homemade mines that couldn't sink a ship." Washing-
ton Post, May 30, 1984, at Al, col. 1. See N.Y. Times, June 1, 1984, at 4, col. 1 (nat'l ed.);
Washington Post, Apr. 10, 1984, at Al, col. 6.
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The justification offered by the United States was that the
mining constituted an exercise of the right of self-defense. The Le-
gal Adviser's Office at the State Department prepared a memoran-
dum which was presented privately to congressional committees on
March 28, 1984, apparently justifying the mining operations as col-
lective self-defense.' 9 9 The State Department does not appear to
have published the opinion or otherwise made it public.
The mining of Nicaraguan ports and harbors would also ap-
pear to violate the norms governing international maritime com-
merce. Under customary international law, "ships of all States,
It is clear, however, that the violation of the territorial waters of another state is pro-
hibited by these provisions. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 190, at 265-68, 361-62;
Randelzhofer, Use of Force, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 265, 267-70
(1982); Cf. Definition of Aggression, supra note 189, art. 3, which establishes that the follow-
ing constitute prima facie acts of aggression:
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a state against the territory of another
state or the use of any weapons by a state against the territory of another
state;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a state by the armed forces of another
state;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another state of such
gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement
therein (emphasis added).
While General Assembly resolutions do not ipso facto create customary international law, a
legal declaration adopted by consensus such as the Definition of Aggression represents
strong evidence that the norms enunciated therein represent customary international law.
See 2 B. FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION 11, 34-41, 50-53 (1975); A. RIFAAT,
INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION 277-80 (1979). But cf. T. BRUHA, DIE DEFINITION DER AGGRESSION
277-324 (1980) (skeptical analysis of legal effect of the Definition of Agression).
In any event, regardless of the status of the U.N. General Assembly's Definition of Ag-
gression, the United States is bound by the terms of 1975 Protocol of Amendment to the
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (revised Rio Treaty), which it has ratified.
See Protocol of Amendment to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, July 26,
1975, art. I (amendment to art. 9) [hereinafter cited as Protocol of Amendment to Rio
Treaty], reprinted in 3 GENERAL SECRETARIAT, INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL As-
SISTANCE: APPLICATIONS, app. A (1977); Rowles, supra note 66, at 392-95. This treaty, not yet
in force, specifically incorporates the language of the Definition of Aggression quoted above
into article 9 of the text of the revised Rio Treaty. Under the principle of customary inter-
national law which requires a state to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of a treaty it has ratified pending its entry into force, the United States is under a
duty not to commit acts such as those referred to above. See Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, art. 18, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875
(1969). Nicaragua has not ratified the Protocol of Amendment to the Rio Treaty. See
Rowles, supra note 66, at 392-95. This does not, however, affect the obligations of the
United States under the principle of international law set forth in article 18 of the Vienna
Convention, which is a codification of or has become customary law.
199. See supra note 138.
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whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage
through the territorial sea."' °
While United States officials have argued that all nations were
notified of the mining by announcements made by contra lead-
ers,20 1 the fact remains that the United States, which conducted
the mining, made no such notification; its failure to notify consti-
tuted a violation of international law. In the Corfu Channel
Case,202 the Court considered issues related to Great Britain's
claim to a right of innocent passage through international straits,
the mining of the straits, and Great Britain's violation of Albanian
territorial waters in order to seize as evidence mines such as those
which had damaged its ships. The Court held that,
The obligations incumbent upon the Albanian authorities con-
sisted in notifying, for the benefit of shipping in general, the ex-
istence of a minefield in Albanian territorial waters and in warn-
ing the approaching British warships of the imminent danger to
which the minefield exposed them. Such obligations are based
* . . on elementary considerations of humanity, even more ex-
acting in peace than in war; the principle of the freedom of mar-
itime communication; and every State's obligation not to allow
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights
of other States .... In fact, nothing was attempted by the Al-
banian authorities to prevent the disaster. These grave omis-
sions involve the international responsibility of Albania. 0 3
The Court in the Corfu Channel Case stressed that the obliga-
tions referred to above were not based on the 1907 Hague Conven-
tion on the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines,20' ap-
plicable in times of war. The fact that Albania was apparently not
a party to that convention may have led the Court to avoid reli-
200. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 17, 23 1.L.M. 1261
(1982), U.N. Pub. E. 83.V.5. (1983). This provision represents a codification of customary
international law. It is virtually identical to article 14 para. 1 of the 1958 Geneva Conven-
tion on the Territorial Sea. See Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,
Apr. 29, 1958, arts. 1(1), 12(2), 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639. See generally NGUYEN
Quoc DIHN, P. DALLIER & A. PELLET, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 585-86 (2d ed. 1980).
201. See Mining Hearings, supra note 136, at 31, 40 (statement of Kenneth W. Dam).
For an interesting interchange with specific reference to the Corfu Channel Case, see id. at
39-40. Regarding the notification, Dam stated: "[T]he international shipping community
was notified. In fact, the Contras talked about it to everybody who would listen, notified
Lloyd's of London, and were trying to get people to hear it." Id. at 40.
202. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania) (Merits), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22-23, 36.
203. Id. at 22-23.
204. Id. at 22.
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ance on it. It is, however, worth noting that both Nicaragua and
the United States have ratified the Hague Convention, article 2 of
which provides: "It is forbidden to lay automatic contact mines off
the coasts and ports of the enemy, with the sole object of inter-
cepting commercial shipping."20 5
Finally, the mining of Nicaraguan ports and harbors would ap-
pear to violate various provisions contained in the 1956 bilateral
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty between Nicaragua
and the United States.20 Article 19(1) of that Treaty provides
that, "Between the territories of the two Parties there shall be
freedom of commerce and navigation."20 7 This provision clearly re-
quires each party to allow goods and ships to freely enter and leave
the territory of the other; it seems that the requirement applies, a
fortiori, to the territory of the Nicaragua. 0
205. Convention Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, Oct.
18, 1907, T.S. 541, 1 Bevans 669 [Convention No. 81. See 1982 Treaties in Force 281 (Nica-
ragua and U.S. Parties; Albania not a party in 1982). Whether this prohibition is applicable
to the present case would depend on whether the United States and Nicaragua can be con-
sidered at war or engaged in hostilities, and whether the reference to "automatic contact
mines" might be interpreted so as to take into account technological developments since
1907.
206. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1956, United States-
Nicaragua, 9 U.S.T. 449, T.I.A.S. No. 4024 [hereinafter cited as FCN Treaty].
207. Id. art. 19(1).
208. This article is of particular relevance in view of the imposition by the United
States of economic sanctions against Nicaragua, for the adoption of such measures would
appear to violate article 19(1), at least where the requirements under international law for
taking non-forcible reprisals (or "countermeasures") are not met. See generally E. ZOLLER,
PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF COUNTERMEASURES 35-44, 125-38 (1984);
Bowett, Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States, in ECONOMIC COERCION AND THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 7, 14-17 (1976).
The classic formulation for the lawful exercise of reprisals is found in The Naulilaa
arbitration (1928), 2 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 1011. The arbitrators stated the require-
ments as follows:
Reprisals are acts of self-help by the injured State, acts in retaliation for
acts contrary to international law on the part of the offending State, which
have remained unredressed after a demand for amends. In consequence of such
measures, the observance of this or that rule of international law is temporarily
suspended, in the relations between the two States. They are limited by consid-
erations of humanity and the rules of good faith, applicable in the relations be-
tween States. They are illegal unless they are based upon a previous act con-
trary to international law. They seek to impose on the offending state
reparation for the offense, the return to legality, and the avoidance of new of-
fenses (emphasis added).
Quoted in J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 401 (6th ed., H. Waldock ed. 1963). The opinion
also makes clear that, in the words of Brierly, "the measures adopted must not be excessive,
in the sense of being out of all proportion to the provocations received." Id. at 401. Since
the advent of the U.N. Charter, reprisals may no longer involve the use of force. U.N. CHAR-
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Article 17(3) of the Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation
Treaty, in article 17(3), also establishes that, "Neither Party shall
impose any measure of a discriminatory nature that hinders or
prevents the importer or exporter of products of either country
from obtaining marine insurance on such products in companies of
either Party." 0 9 The interpretation of this provision is not free
from doubt, but it appears from the Treaty that the mining could
have hindered the obtaining of marine insurance on products being
shipped to or from Nicaragua.2 10
At the same time, article 10(3) of the treaty establishes that
"Neither party shall unreasonably impede nationals and compa-
nies of the other party from obtaining on equitable terms, through
normal commercial channels, the capital, skills, arts, and technol-
ogy it needs for its economic development. '211 This provision
seems to include mining and other measures which are aimed at
interrupting commerce. Under the treaty, questions regarding the
interpretation of the preceding articles may be resolved by the ICJ,
to which all disputes "as to the interpretation or application" of
the treaty are referred by the compromissory clause contained in
article 24(2).22 Consequently, any questions regarding the applica-
TER, art. 2, para. 4.
In a memorandum prepared at the request of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
the Legal Adviser of the State Department explained that U.S. sanctions against Iran satis-
fied the essential requirements for non-forcible reprisals, as follows:
[Uinder the law of nonforcible reprisals, a nation may lawfully take otherwise
unlawful nonforcible actions if (1) the actions are in response to prior interna-
tional delicts by another nation; (2) the aggrieved nation has sought redress un-
successfully through other means; and (3) the actions are proportional to the
prior delict.
Memorandum of the Legal Adviser, Davis Robinson, Application of the Treaty of Amity to
Expropriations in Iran, 129 CONG. REC. S16055, S16056 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1983), reproduced
in 22 I.L.M. 1406, 1407 (1983). This memorandum is of particular relevance to the FCN
Treaty with Nicaragua, because it deals at length with issues related to the suspension of
such a treaty and with non-forcible reprisals or "countermeasures" such as those imposed
on Nicaragua by Presidential order on May 1, 1985. With respect to the latter, see, e.g., N.Y.
Times, May 1, 1985, at 1, col. 6 (nat'l ed.). For the text of the order, see Exec. Order No. 12,
513, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,629 (issued May 1, 1985). See also Office of Foreign Assets Control,
Department of Treasury, Nicaraguan Trade Control Regulations; Final Rule, 31 C.F.R. §
540, published in 50 Fed. Reg. 19,890 (issued May 8; published May 10, 1985).
209. FCN Treaty, supra note 206, art. 17(3).
210. As one European diplomat in Managua observed, "What insurance company is
going to be willing to cover this sort of thing?" Washington Post, Apr. 2, 1984, at Al, col. 2.
211. FCN Treaty, supra note 206, art. 17(3).
212. Id. art. 24(2). This article states: "Any dispute between the Parties as to the inter-
pretation or application of the present Treaty,. not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy,
shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice, unless the Parties agree to settle-
ment by some other pacific means."
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bility of the FCN treaty to U.S. covert actions against Nicaragua
are to be decided by the ICJ.
There can be little doubt that the United States mining of
Nicaraguan ports and harbors violated both prohibitions against
the use of force and a number of other norms and principles of
international law. A fundamental question raised by the mining re-
mains, however, and that is how the United States ever decided
upon such a disastrous and ultimately self-defeating course of ac-
tion. The answer appears to be that the legal implications of the
mining operations were never taken into account. This was proba-
bly due to the fact that the operation was under the control of the
CIA, which does not typically take into consideration the interna-
tional legal implications of its actions.213 The mining may have
been authorized in a general way in December, 1983,214 receiving
high-level consideration at the National Security Council level and
specific authorization by President Reagan in mid-February,
1983;215 but by then, it was apparently already under way.210
2. United States Support of Contra Activities Involving Armed
Attacks Against Nicaragua
We now turn to an examination of the legality of indirect ac-
tions in support of the contras (and other actors) who have en-
gaged in a continuing, escalating pattern of armed attacks against
the territory of Nicaragua since 1981. Actions in this second cate-
gory-including failures to act-may be broken down into the fol-
lowing sub-categories:
1) the organization, financing, logistical support, supply of
Also worthy of note is the fact that the treaty may be terminated by either party on one
year's notice. Id. art. 25(3). In view of the Reagan administration's decision to terminate the
treaty, communicated to Nicaragua on May 1, 1985, it should be noted that it may be termi-
nated only on one year's notice. Otherwise, suspension is governed by the principles of cus-
tomary international law embodied in articles 60 and 65 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties. Supra note 198, arts. 60, 65. The FCN Treaty ceased to be in force on May
1, 1986. Information supplied to the author by the Office of the Legal Advisor, Treaty Af-
fairs, Dep't of State.
213. See Washington Post, Apr. 21, 1984, at Al, col. 5; Washington Post, Apr. 13, 1984,
at A20, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1984, at 1, col. 3 (nat'l ed.).
214. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1984, at Al, col. 6 (nat'l ed.); Washington Post, Apr. 10,
1984, at Al, col. 6.
215. Washington Post, Apr. 11, 1984, at Al, col. 5.
216. Administration officials pointed out that the leading contra group, the Nicaraguan
Democratic Force, publicly announced on January 8, 1984, that it had mined Nicaraguan
ports. N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1984, at 1, col. 6 (nat'l ed.).
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weapons and other materiel, and coordination of contra activities
involving the use of force against Nicaragua;
2) the financing of, or supply of arms and equipment to contra
forces engaged in activities involving the use of force in and
against Nicaragua;
3) the provision of arms, other materiel, and financial assis-
tance to third countries with the knowledge that such resources
will be made available to the contras; and
4) the encouragement of or failure to prevent the organization
and carrying out of private actions in the United States which have
as their aim the provision of arms, other materiel, or financial as-
sistance to contras engaged in activities involving the use of force
against Nicaragua.
A principal objective of covert activities is to hide such facts
from view in order to avoid public accountability-both to other
nations and to domestic audiences-and public knowledge of the
violations of international law which such activities may entail.
Consequently, knowledge of the relevant facts is fragmented and
incomplete. Nonetheless, enough details regarding U.S. covert op-
erations against Nicaragua have become public, through leaks or
otherwise, to allow certain generalizations and conclusions as to
their legality.
a. Organization, Financing, Support, and Coordination of
Contra Activities Against Nicaragua
Evidence in the public record suggests that U.S. covert actions
in organizing, financing, supporting, and coordinating contra
paramilitary activities against Nicaragua, from December 1981 un-
til at least the spring or summer of 1984, were on such a large scale
that the contras were in effect acting as agents of the United
States under its direct supervision and control. To the extent such
control was in fact exercised, the attacks of the contras against
Nicaragua constitute actions for which the United States is respon-
sible under international law. That is, the actions of the contras
are, in legal effect, actions of the United States. 17 The foregoing
conclusion is derived from the general principle in international
217. See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, supra note 190, at 278-79, 331; Draft Articles on States
Responsibility, supra note 189, art. 8(a); Schwebel, Aggression, Intervention and Self-De-
fense in Modern International Law, 136 RECUE1L DES CouRs 411, 458, 482 (1972-I).
456 [Vol. 17:3
U.S. COVERT OPERATIONS
law which is analogous to the principle found in municipal law
(that is, domestic law) that the principal is responsible for the acts
of his agent.218 If it is unlawful for a state to commit a certain act,
it is equally unlawful for that state to engage others to commit
that act on its behalf. This principle has been formulated by the
International Law Commission in its Draft Articles on State Re-
sponsibility, as follows: "The conduct of a person or group of per-
sons shall also be considered as an act of the State under interna-
tional law if: (a) it is established that such person or group of
persons was in fact acting on behalf of that State ... "2"19
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits the use of
force whether by direct or indirect means.220 While there has been
disagreement in the past among both governments and writers re-
garding the exact degree of involvement necessary for the actions
of insurgents to be imputed to a state supporting them,22 U.S.
covert operations against Nicaragua do not represent a borderline
case. This conclusion is confirmed by an examination of authorita-
tive interpretations that have been made by the United States,
other United Nations Members, and others in the past.
The General Assembly's 1970 Declaration on Friendly Rela-
tions, adopted by consensus and with the support of the United
States, contained the following language as part of an authoritative
interpretation of article 2(4): "Every State has the duty to refrain
from organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces
or armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the terri-
tory of another State. ' '22 This clarification of article 2(4) was
reached without a dissenting vote. It now constitutes both an
agreed interpretation of article 2(4)223 and a rule of customary in-
218. See, e.g., A..VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 703-55 (1977)
(employer's liability in German law).
219. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 189, art. 8(a). The International
Law Commission is a specialized body whose 25 members are elected by the General Assem-
bly to assist in the codification and progressive development of international law. Members
serve in an individual capacity and are generally among the most eminent scholars in the
field. See L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER, & H. SMIT, supra note 33; Franck & El
Baradei, The Codification and Progressive Development of International Law: A UNITAR
Study of the Role and Use of International Law Commission, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 630 (1982).
220. See supra note 217.
221. See, e.g., id.
222. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 189, Principle 1 (Prohibiting Threat
or Use of Force), para. 8.
223. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 198, art. 31(3). The
Committee which elaborated the text of the Declaration, beginning in 1963, worked in gen-
eral on the basis of unanimity. Rosenstock, The Declaration on Principles of International
19861
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ternational law.2 24 The United States has itself repeatedly reaf-
firmed the principle contained in the paragraph quoted above.225
Law Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 Am. J. INT'L L. 713, 713-14 (1971). Rosen-
stock characterizes the Declaration as,
the most important single statement representing what the Members of the
United Nations agree to be the law of the Charter on these seven princi-
ples. . . .The principles involved. . .are acknowledged by all to be principles of
the Charter. By accepting the respective texts, states have acknowledged that
the principles represent their interpretations of the obligations of the Charter.
The use of the word "should" rather than "shall" in those instances in which the
Committee believed it was speaking de lege ferenda (i.e., in terms of progressive
development of law or law-in-the-making, which has not yet crystallized into
customary law] or stating mere desiderata further supports the view that the
states involved intended to assert binding rules of law where they used language
of firm obligation.
Id. at 714-15.
224. See Malanczuk, Countermeasures and Self-Defense as Measures Precluding
Wrongfulness in the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibil-
ity, 43 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR AUSLXNDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND V8LKERRECHT 705, 765
(1983) (interpretation of art. 2(4)). See Schwebel, supra note 225, at 458-60. See also infra
note 225. Cf. Rosenstock, supra note 223, at 717.
Of particular significance is assessing the legal effect of the Declaration in the following
language at its end:
[The General Assembly] . . .
3. Declares further that: The principles of the Charter which are embodied in
the Declaration constitute basic principles of international law, and conse-
quently appeals to all States to be guided by these principles in their interna-
tional conduct and to develop their mutual relations on the basis of strict obser-
vance of these principles.
Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 189, General Part, § 3. This statement, the
process by which the Declaration was elaborated, and its adoption by consensus (without a
dissenting vote) provide persuasive evidence that the principal provisions of the Declaration
represent customary international law.
225. See Schwebel, supra note 217, at 456, 458-60, 482; Contemporary Practice of the
United States Relating to International Law, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 733, 733-34 (1974) (state-
ment of R. Rosenstock to U.N. Special Committee on Defining Aggression). Cf. Memoran-
dum of Acting Legal Adviser, George H. Aldrich, 1974 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5, 7; Memorandum of J. Willis, Attorney Adviser, 1976 DIGEST OF
UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 5 (Non-intervention). The United States
joined in proposing inclusion of language to the same effect as that quoted in the text in the
Six-Nation Proposal presented to the U.N. Special Committee on Defining Aggression. See
Schwebel, supra note 217, at 493-95 (text of Six-Nation draft proposal). Article IV(B)(6) of
the draft defined as aggression "[o]rganizing, supporting or directing armed bands or irregu-
lar or volunteer forces that make incursions or infiltrate into another State." Id. at 495. The
Definition of Aggression, supra note 189, art. 3(g), defines the following as an act of aggres-
sion: "The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or merce-
naries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to
amount to the acts listed above..." The acts referred to in the last phrase include "the
invasion or attack . . . . of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, how-
ever temporary, resulting from such an invasion or attack. ... Id. art. 3(a). The adoption
by consensus of the Definition of Aggression provides additional evidence that the excerpt
from the Declaration on Friendly Relations quoted in the text constitutes customary inter-
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Had it proceeded to an adjudication on the merits by the ICJ,
the United States might have argued, in addition to self-defense,
that the degree of its coordination, direction, and control of the
contras' attacks against Nicaragua was insufficient to establish
that the contras were acting under its supervision and control. Al-
though this argument would not go far to absolve the United
States from legal responsibility, for reasons set forth below, the
distinction is an important one. If such control existed, however,
the actions of the contras constituted acts of the United States.
The United States might have argued that its support, even if
it amounted to direction and control over the contras, did not vio-
late article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter or article 1 of the
Rio Treaty. It might have further argued that these acts did not
constitute even "measures of force taken by a State, directly or
indirectly" against the territorial inviolability of Nicaragua, and
thus did not violate article 20 of the OAS Charter. These proposi-
tions are legally untenable however; it is unlikely that the ICJ
would embrace them.
Acceptance of such arguments, moreover, would emasculate
the legal prohibitions against the use of force. Whether or not the
words "directly or indirectly" make the prohibition in article 20 of
the OAS Charter even stronger than those in article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter and article 1 of the Rio Treaty, ' the im-
plications of such arguments are extremely dangerous, in addition
to being contrary to previous United States policy. They would
permit the Soviet Union or any other state to mount a military
assault against another state on the same scale as that conducted
by the United States against Nicaragua without violating article
2(4). To adopt such a position would be so self-defeating and dam-
aging to the international order that it is doubtful the United
States would have made such an argument before the ICJ had it
decided to participate in the merits phase of the proceedings.
2 7
Finally, while the United States might have argued that it did
not exercise direction and control over the contras' attacks against
Nicaragua, the facts that have been made public suggest that such
national law. See also Protocol of Amendment to the Rio Treaty, supra note 198, art. 9(g)
as revised.
226. On the combined force of the prohibitions contained in articles 18, 19 & 20 of the
OAS Charter, see 1 F. GARCIA-AMADOR, THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, pt. 1, at 97 (1983).
227. At least, one would hope that the international lawyers in the Legal Adviser's Of-
fice of the State Department would not have willingly made such an argument.
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an argument might not have been sustained before the ICJ. The
evidence of United States organization, financing, logistical sup-
port, supply of arms and materiel, and coordination and direction
of contra activities"' would appear to be strong. If the U.S. actions
cannot be justified as collective self-defense, these actions and
those of the contras which are imputable to the United States con-
stitute the illegal use of force by the United States against the ter-
ritorial integrity and political independence of Nicaragua in viola-
tion of international legal norms.229
b. Financing of or Supply of Arms and Materiel for Contra
Activities Against Nicaragua
Even if the facts were such as to support the argument that
support of contra activities up to mid-1984 did not involve suffi-
cient coordination, direction and control to make the armed at-
tacks of the contras against Nicaragua imputable to, and, there-
fore, legally actions of the United States. The question remains
whether such actions nonetheless violated international law. More-
over, continued efforts by the Reagan administration to secure
funding to finance the contras (by furnishing money to be paid to
individual insurgents, for example) and to provide them with arms
and materiel 2 0 raise the question of whether such military assis-
tance would be permissible under international law.
In its authoritative interpretation of the prohibition of the use
of force contained in article 2(4), the General Assembly adopted by
consensus the following language in its 1970 Declaration on
Friendly Relations: "Every state has the duty to refrain from or-
ganizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife
228. See supra notes 72-157 and accompanying text.
229. United States actions violate article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, article 1 of the Rio
Treaty, and article 20 of the OAS Charter, among other norms. They also violate article 18
of the OAS Charter. If they cannot be justified as measures of collective self-defense under
article 51 of the U.N. Charter-and they cannot as we shall see below-they also violate
article 21 of the OAS Charter, which provides, "The American States bind themselves in
their international relations not to have recourse to the use of force, except in the case of
self-defense in accordance with existing treaties or in fulfillment thereof." OAS Charter,
supra note 12, art. 21. Even under a liberal interpretation of the provision which would
permit the use of force not only in self-defense but also pursuant to decisions by competent
regional or United Nations organs, the United States' actions in question are prohibited by
article 21. See 1 F. GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note 226, pt. 1, at 89.
230. Depending on the degree of United States involvement, resumed funding of the
contras could well place U.S. actions in subcategory (a), discussed supra in the text. On the
potential nature of future U.S. involvement, see supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
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or terrorist acts in another State . . . when the acts referred to in
this paragraph involve a threat or use of force."23' The Declaration,
in interpreting the duty of non-intervention, also states "[N]o
State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate sub-
versive, terrorist or armed activities directed toward the violent
overthrow of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another
state."232
There exists some dispute, and not a little confusion, as to
whether military assistance to insurgents by itself constitutes a vi-
olation of the prohibition against the use of force, or a violation of
the duty to refrain from intervention in the internal affairs of an-
other state.133 This is not surprising given the fact that the two
categories overlap, the first being included within the second. In
any event, the important point is that the United States has sup-
ported and accepted the norms quoted above. 34
The United States also supported the 1974 General Assembly
resolution on the Definition of Aggression, which was adopted by
consensus after a long process of elaboration. In providing a non-
exhaustive definition of acts which constitute prima facie acts of
aggression, the definition included the following:
Art. 3(g). The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of
armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount
231. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 189, Principle 1 (Prohibiting the
Threat or Use of Force), para. 9.
232. Id. Principle 3 (Duty of Non-Intervention), para. 2.
233. See, e.g., Schwebel, supra note 217, at 458-59, 482-83 (Use of force, armed attack);
Malanczuk, supra note 224, at 765-66.
234. In a memorandum dated October 25, 1974, George H. Aldrich the Acting Legal
Adviser of the Department of State, stated the following:
A close reading of the Friendly Relations text suggests that, aside from the
threat or use of force, the Declaration clearly prohibits actions designed to co-
erce a state to secure advantages from it in contravention of its rights. In ac-
cepting this language, we were careful to interpret it as avoiding any condemna-
tion of economic or other pressures designed to protect or enforce the rights of
the state imposing the pressures . ...
The conclusions of the Acting Legal Adviser as to the legal status of these prohibitions are
particularly significant:
In summary, recent developments in international law have provided a principle
of non-intervention as part of the legal structure in which sovereign states co-
exist . . . The threat or use of force, assistance to armed revolutionaries, and
coercion designed to secure advantages from a state in contravention of its rights
are the only state acts clearly and expressly prohibited by the principle, but it
may well be extended further by the practice of states (emphasis added).
1974 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 225, at 7.
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to the acts listed above [in Article 3], or its substantial involve-
ment therein (emphasis added).
23 5
The acts enumerated in earlier paragraphs of article 3 include, in-
ter alia, attacks against the territory of a state or its armed
forces.236  The precise words "or its substantial involvement
235. Definition of Aggression, supra note 189, art. 3(g).
236. Article 3 establishes:
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and
in accordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of aggression:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of
another State, or any military occupation, however, temporary, resulting from
such invasion or attack;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of
another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of
another State ...
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of
another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or
marine and air fleets of another State;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the
disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act
of aggression against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregu-
lars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State
of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involve-
ment therein (emphasis added).
Definition of Agression, supra note 189, art 3. Articles 1 and 2 of the Definition provide as
follows:
Article 1. Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations as set out in this
Definition...
Article 2. The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter
shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression, although the Secur-
ity Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a determination
that an act of aggression has been committed would not be justified in the light
of other relevant circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned or
their consequences are not of sufficient gravity.
Id. arts. 1, 2. The definition further states that none of its provisions "shall be construed as
in any way enlarging or diminishing the scope of the Charter, including its provisions con-
cerning cases in which the use of force is lawful." Id. arL. 6.
Two aspects of the Definition of Aggression merit explanation. The first is that the acts
enumerated above do not constitute aggression and a violation of article 2(4) of the Charter
if they are taken in lawful exercise of the right of self-defense in accordance with article 51
of the Charter. The second aspect is that article 2, in its reference to "the fact that the acts
concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity," makes clear that minor bor-
der incidents, such as an exchange of gunfire not followed by more serious action, will gener-
ally not qualify as an act of aggression or an "armed attack" such as to give rise to the right
of self-defense. See A. RIFAAT, supra note 198, at 268-69; 2 B. FERENCZ, supra note 198, at
32-33. Of course, in accordance with article 2 of the Definition and articles 24 and 39 of the
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therein" represented a compromise, reflecting different views as to
whether "indirect subversion"-the financing and supply of arms
to insurgents, for example-should be included in the definition.
2 37
The position of the United States throughout the elaborative pro-
cess of the text was that such acts should be included.2 8
Although the United States might theoretically argue that the
financing and supplying of arms and materiel to insurgents do not
fall within the prohibitions contained in article 2(4) of the United
Nations Charter, the Declaration on Friendly Relations, or the
Definition of Aggression, such an argument would contradict ear-
lier U.S. positions. More importantly, it could amount to a state-
ment by the United States that it regards such actions as lawful.
This would be a dangerous argument indeed. It would also serve no
purpose, as the acts in question are prohibited by hemispheric
treaties which deal specifically with the conduct in question. Leav-
ing aside the question of whether article 20 of the OAS Charter
proscribes the financing of or supply of arms to the contras,"5 9 it is
clear that article 18 of the same treaty does prohibit such action.
Article 18 establishes:
U.N. Charter, the Security Council has "primary responsibility" for making determinations
regarding such matters. This responsibility is not exclusive, however, as the International
Court of Justice also has full authority to interpret and apply article 2(4) when required to
do so in deciding a case before it.
237. See T. BRUHA, supra note 198, at 118, 134, 218-23, 228-39, 265; 2 B. FERENCZ,
supra note 198, at 39-41; Schwebel, supra note 217, at 455-61.
238. See supra note 225. Article V(B) of the six-nation draft co-sponsored by the
United States defined as acts of aggression the following:
(6) Organizing, supporting or directing armed bands or irregular or volunteer
forces that make incursions or infiltrate into another State;
(7) Organizing, supporting or directing violent civil strife or acts of terrorism in
another State;
(8) Organizing, supporting or directing subversive activities aimed at the violent
overthrow of the Government of another State (emphasis added).
Schwebel, supra note 217, at 493-94 (text of six-nation draft).
Regarding Article 3 of the Definition finally adopted, the U.S. Representative stated the
following:
Article 3 of the text represents an effort to set forth certain familiar exam-
ples of the use of force which the Security Council could reasonably consider, in
the manner set forth suggested by Article 2, to qualify as acts of aggression. The
scope of the list of acts set forth in the article makes clear that no distinction is
made in terms of the means employed or the directness or indirectness of their
use (emphasis added).
Statement of R. Rosenstock to the Special Committee on Defining Aggression, Apr. 12,
1974, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 68 AM. J.
INT'L L. 733, 734 (1974).
239. See supra text accompanying note 193 (text of art. 20); supra note 226 and accom-
panying text.
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No State or Group of States has the right to intervene, di-
rectly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or
external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle pro-
hibits not only armed force, but also any other form of interfer-
ence or attempted threat against the personality of the State or
against its political, economic and cultural elements (emphasis
added) .240
The provision of money and arms to insurgents attempting to
overthrow the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua, or merely to
coerce it to adopt certain internal policies, certainly falls within
the prohibition of article 18. An important precedent is the imposi-
tion in 1964 of OAS diplomatic and economic sanctions against
Cuba.2 41 These sanctions, which were applied under article 6 of the
Rio Treaty, were largely based on the discovery of a single arms
shipment from Cuba to revolutionaries in Venezuela.242
It is important to note that the origin of article 18 can be
found in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Du-
ties of States, which was signed by the United States and the Latin
American countries. Article 8 of that convention provides, "No
state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of
another. '2 43 This prohibition and one in article 11 of the conven-
tion (corresponding to article 20 of the present OAS Charter) re-
flected the deep resentment of the Latin American states against
the numerous military interventions of the United States in pre-
ceding decades. While the United States originally attached a res-
ervation to its ratification of the 1933 Convention,244 it accepted
these principles without reservation when it signed an additional
240. OAS Charter, supra note 12, art. 18.
241. The sanctions included a total break in diplomatic relations with Cuba, a total
trade embargo (except for food, medicines, and medical equipment), and the suspension of
sea transportation with Cuba except for that which might be necessary for humgnitarian
reasons. 2 GENERAL SECRETARIAT, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, INTER-AMERICAN
TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE: APPLICATIONS 215-16 (3d ed. 1973).
242. Other actions cited as a basis for the sanctions included the supplying of funds to
Venezuelans visiting Cuba, training in Cuba of Venezuelans in subversion, and subversive
radio and written propaganda. Id. at 242. Article 6 of the Rio Treaty authorizes the imposi-
tion of sanctions in cases where no "armed attack" has occurred. The sanctions specified in
article 8 may be applied in such a case. See Rio Treaty, supra note 194, arts. 6, 8. Cases
involving armed attack are dealt with in id. arts 3, 7.
243. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S.
No. 881, 3 Bevans 145, 165 L.N.T.S. 19. See 1 F. GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note 226, pt. 1, at
80-86 (discussion and text of convention).
244. The ambiguously worded U.S. reservation is reproduced in 1 F. GARCIA-AMADOR,
supra note 226, pt. 1, at 84-85.
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protocol to the convention in 1936, and ratified it in 1937.2 5
A second hemispheric treaty of particular relevance in judging
United States support of contra activities against Nicaragua is the
1928 Convention on the Duties and Rights of States in the Event
of Civil Strife, to which both the United States and Nicaragua are
parties. 246 Article 1 of the convention establishes:
The contracting States bind themselves to observe the fol-
lowing rules with regard to civil strife in another one of them:
First: To use all means at their disposal to prevent the in-
habitants of their territory, nationals or aliens, from participat-
ing in, gathering elements, crossing the boundary or sailing from
their territory for the purpose of starting or promoting civil
strife ....
Third: To forbid the traffic in arms and war material, ex-
cept when intended for the Government, while the belligerency
of the rebels has not been recognized, in which latter case the
rules of neutrality shall be applied.
Fourth: To prevent that within their territory there be
equipped, armed or adapted for warlike purposes any vessel in-
tended to operate in favor of the rebellion.
2 4 7
In view of the foregoing analysis, one must conclude that fi-
nancing of and supply of weapons and other materiel to the con-
tras, even if the actions of the latter are not imputable to the
United States, violate a number of fundamental legal obliga-
245. Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention, Dec. 23, 1936, 51 Stat. 41, T.S.
No. 923, 3 Bevans 343, 188 L.N.T.S. 31; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 1982 TREATIES IN FORCE
268. The text of the Protocol is reproduced in 1 F. GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note 226, pt. 1, at
91. Article I of the Additional Protocol establishes: "The High Contracting Parties declare
inadmissible the intervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly, and for whatever
reason, in the internal or external affairs of any other of the Parties." Id. at 91. See S.
BEMIS, THE LATIN-AMERICAN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 242-94 (1943, 1971) (background
to United States acceptance of the principle of non-intervention). On the effect of the Addi-
tional Protocol, see specifically id. at 289. Nicaragua and the United States are parties to
both treaties. 1982 TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 245, at 268, 287. However, they have now
probably been superceded in large part, if not entirely, by the OAS Charter. See Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 198, arts. 30, 59.
246. Convention on the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife, Feb.
20, 1928, 46 Stat. 2749, T.S. No. 814, 2 Bevans 694, 134 U.N.T.S. 45. See 1982 TREATIES IN
FORCE, supra note 245, at 287. The text of the convention is reproduced in 1 F. GARCIA-
AMADOR, supra note 226, pt. 2, at 289-91.
247. Convention on the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife, supra
note 246, art. 1.
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tions,248 including those contained in treaties by which the United
States has been bound for over fifty years. Any future military as-
sistance to the contras such as that currently proposed by the Rea-
gan administration, would clearly violate these norms of interna-
tional law.24 9
c. The Supply of Arms, Materiel, and Financial Assistance
to Third Countries Aiding the Contras
There is considerable evidence to suggest that the United
States has supplied third countries with arms and equipment
which have subsequently become available to the contras engaged
in armed attacks against Nicaragua.2 50 It also seems highly possible
that military or economic assistance may have been provided to
third countries with either the knowledge or the understanding
that such funds or equipment would be transferred, whether di-
rectly or indirectly, to the contras. One way the United States is in
a position to make arms and equipment available to the contras is
by providing new arms to Honduras, and by leaving behind mili-
tary equipment and supplies following the large-scale maneuvers
that United States military forces have been carrying out in Hon-
duras. The old arms and abandoned supplies and equipment find
their way into the hands of the contras.251 Before mid-1984, such
practices seemed to be a built-in component of United States pol-
icy, 2 ' and a possible way for the Reagan administration to circum-
248. The U.S. counter-arguments, including that of collective self-defense are discussed
throughout this paper.
249. See supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 122-27 and
accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 150-53, 157 and accompanying text. A suggestive example is pro-
vided by the transfer of three light planes to a third government. The planes were subse-
quently used by the contras in an attack on Nicaraguan territory on September 1, 1984. The
transfer of the planes from the Defense Department to the third government was later ac-
knowledged by the Pentagon. Washington Post, Sept. 19, 1984, at A20, col. 1. It was appar-
ently part of a much larger program involving the transfer of "excess" equipment from the
Pentagon to the CIA to the contras. See Washington Post, Sept. 15, 1984, at Al, col. 2.
Following the end of U.S. funding in 1984, El Salvador and Honduras, among others, in-
creased their assistance to the contras. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1985, at 1, col. 6 (nat'l ed.).
Israel was reportedly also among the third countries supplying assistance to the contras. Id.
See also N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1985, at 1, col. 5 (nat'l ed.)(foreign aid to El Salvador and
Honduras has been used to help contras); N.Y. Times, May 18, 1984, at 1, col. 2 (nat'l ed.)
(transfers and "bailment" of equipment from Pentagon to CIA).
251. See, e.g., Washington Post, July 31, 1983, at Al, col. 1. Cf. N.Y. Times, Jan. 13,
1985, at 1, col. 6 (nat'l ed.)(transfer of ammunition from Honduras to contras).
252. The value of equipment left behind in Honduras after maneuvers has apparently
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vent the prohibitions on aid to the contras. It is important to un-
derstand that the use of such stratagems would make it possible
for officials to make the argument-however strained-to Congres-
sional intelligence oversight committees that the administration
was not in violation of the prohibition on such aid, because the
United States was not itself furnishing any assistance "directly or
indirectly" to the contras.
It is also possible that the United States has furnished mili-
tary or financial assistance to third countries with the knowledge
that such assistance would be transferred to the contras or free
resources in the third state so that other resources could be trans-
ferred. If such transfers have or are taking place, do they violate
international law? A starting point for legal analysis is the general
principle adopted by the International Law Commission in article
27 of its Draft Articles on State Responsibility. Article 27 provides:
Aid or assistance by a State to another State, if it is estab-
lished that it is rendered for the commission of an internation-
ally wrongful act carried out by the latter, itself constitutes an
internationally wrongful act, even if, taken alone, such aid or as-
sistance would not constitute the breach of an international
obligation. ss
This article is an application of the general principle that states
may not engage others to commit illegal acts on their behalf with-
out incurring international legal responsibility." 4 The difficulty, as
noted above, lies in establishing the requisite intent. However, in-
tent can be inferred from the consequences and circumstances, and
would appear to be established where the United States is aware
that weapons and materiel it has given to a state (Honduras, for
example) are being transferred to insurgents such as the contras,
and then continues to transfer such equipment and materiel to the
third state.
Such transfers would appear to violate the prohibition of in-
tervention "directly or indirectly, for any purpose whatever" in the
not been considered by the administration as falling within the $24 million cap on aid for
fiscal year 1985. While information on this point is not easy to acquire, such a practice
would help explain the fact that the contras have apparently obtained new supplies since
the summer of 1984. Transfers of funds or supplies from third countries other than Hondu-
ras may also have helped, as well as "private" assistance from the United States such as
that considered in the following section.
253. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 189, art. 27.
254. See id. art. 8(a), quoted supra at text accompanying note 219.
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internal affairs of another state contained in article 18 of the OAS
Charter.2 55 In addition, there can exist little doubt that such ac-
tions contravene the clear prohibitions contained in article 1
paragraphs (1), (3), and (4) of the Convention on the Duties and
Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife.256 Specifically, article
1(3) provides that the parties agree "To forbid the traffic in arms
and war material, except when intended for the Government, while
the belligerency of the rebels has not been recognized, in which
latter case the rules of neutrality shall be applied. ' ' 257 This article
refers to the state of "belligerency" which had a clear legal status
before the advent of the United Nations Charter in 1945.258 The
basic obligation remains intact and is directly applicable in the
present case. Certainly, the United States has made no formal dec-
laration of belligerency with respect to the contras operating in
Nicaragua. The convention, which was adopted prior to the prohi-
bition of state intervention contained in article 8 of the 1933 Mon-
tevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, must be
interpreted as prohibiting conduct by state officials as well as pri-
vate parties.
With respect to the supply of financial assistance to third
states aiding the contras, the same questions of intent and inferred
intent based on circumstances and consequences arise. Here, the
question of proof is likely to be extraordinarily difficult, particu-
larly where financial assistance is used to free other resources of
the third state for use in supplying the insurgents. By withdrawing
from the merits proceedings before the ICJ, the United States has
avoided the potentially embarrassing possibility of having to an-
swer accusations and inquiries regarding any such activities.
However well-concealed and elaborate the disguise, the United
States may not legally furnish through third countries financial or
military assistance to the contras which it cannot itself legally pro-
vide. This conclusion is a fortunate one, given the element of reci-
procity upon which all law is based. It means, to cite a hypotheti-
cal example, that the Soviet Union cannot legally provide arms or
financial assistance to Bulgaria if it is aware that such assistance
will be used to support insurgent activities in Turkey, Greece, or
255. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
257. Id.
258. See generally Bindschedler, Neutrality: Concept and General Rules, in 4 ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 9-14 (R. Bernhardt ed. 1982).
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Yugoslavia. Such an example reminds us that the arguments and
precedents established by the United States articulate the United
States' interpretations of international law. As law, the principles
so interpreted are applicable to, and may be invoked by, other
states as subjects of the international legal system.1
59
d. Private Assistance to the Contras by Groups and Individ-
uals in the United States
Funding of contra activities in and against Nicaragua officially
came to a halt when the twenty-four million dollars authorized for
fiscal year 1984 were expended, a point presumably reached some-
time during the spring or summer of 1984. A total prohibition of
such funding was included in the continuing appropriations resolu-
tion for fiscal year 1985 and was to remain in effect until Septem-
ber 30, 1985 unless Congress enacted contrary legislation.26 0 In
view of these direct prohibitions, the Reagan administration has
apparently sought other means for getting funds and military sup-
plies to the contras.2"' One such source of funds has been the "pri-
vate" efforts of non-governmental organizations and groups to col-
lect money and supplies to be transferred to the contras.26 2 At
259. This fundamental proposition is a corollary of the sovereign equality of all states.
See U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 1; Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 189 (Princi-
ple 6); OAS Charter, supra note 12, art. 9. All states may invoke principles of customary
international law. Generally, however, treaty provisions may only be invoked by parties to a
treaty, or in support of the argument that the corresponding principles have acquired the
status of customary international law.
260. See supra notes 109-24 and accompanying text. Legislation authorizing, by way of
exception, $27 million in "humanitarian aid" was enacted in August, 1985. See supra notes
125-27 and accompanying text.
261. Administration officials have privately acknowledged that U.S. aid to El Salvador
and Honduras has been transferred to the contras. Israel reportedly has been furnishing
weapons to the contras since 1983. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1985, at 1, col. 6. (nat'l
ed.); N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1985, at 1, col. 1 (nat'l ed.); N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1985, at 1, col. 5
(nat'l ed.). The Reagan administration has also considered funneling aid to the contras
through Asian governments. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1985, at 1, col. 1 (nat'l ed.). In
January, 1985, Senator Richard G. Lugar, Republican Chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, said if the $14 million could not be obtained from Congress, "then you
find a different route." One possibility mentioned was having other countries provide funds.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1985, at 1, col. 6 (nat'l ed.).
Another option, which officials admit has been pursued, is for the administration to
encourage "private" contributions to the contras. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 27, 1984, at 1,
col. 2 (nat'l ed.). At least one official of the White House National Security Council, Marine
Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, has actively facilitated fund-raising activities by the contras. See,
e.g., Washington Post, Aug. 11, 1985, at Al, col. 4.
262. See supra note 261.
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least five million dollars in funds and supplies may have been fur-
nished to the contras as a result of these efforts.2"'
Such "private" support of insurgents using armed force
against and within Nicaragua raises the questions of whether the
encouragement or toleration of such private action constitutes a
violation of international law by the United States, and whether
such "private" actions are imputable to the United States and
therefore legally constitute actions of the United States. The an-
swer to the second question depends on the degree of actual in-
volvement by officials in organizing and assisting such "private"
efforts to aid the contras. Based on the evidence currently availa-
ble, there is a substantial likelihood of such involvement, particu-
larly in view of the fact that such "private" aid expanded rapidly
once government funds for support of the contras began to run
out.2 4 In short, the answer depends on the facts, and the facts are
not fully known. If substantial government involvement has oc-
curred, however, it seems clear that such private efforts and
United States participation in them violates the rules of interna-
tional law discussed in the second subcategory, above.
Assuming, arguendo, that the United States has not instigated
and supported such "private" aid to the contras, the question as to
whether the United States has violated international law by toler-
ating these private activities within its territory still remains. It
should be noted that any such violation would result from the fail-
ure to prevent such activities from taking place within its territory,
and not directly from the activities themselves.265 To answer the
foregoing questions, legal analysis must begin with the general
principle of international law as set forth in the Corfu Channel
Case, in which the ICJ referred unequivocally to "every State's ob-
ligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts con-
trary to the rights of other States .. "266 This principle would
appear to clearly prohibit the U.S. tolerance of organized private
activities aimed at aiding insurgents in Nicaragua from within the
United States.
26 7
263. By May, 1985, between $5 and $10 million had reportedly been raised from private
sources and from non-U.S. "governmental sources." See, e.g., Washington Post, May 2,
1985, at A35, col. 1.
264. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1985, at 1, col. 6 (nat'l ed.); Washington Post, Oct.
21, 1984, at Al, col. 1.
265. See, e.g., NGUYEN Quoc DIHN, P. DALLIER, & A. PELLET, supra note 200, at 696.
266. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
267. See, e.g., A. VERnROSS & B. SIMMA, UNIVERSELLES VOLKERRECHT 233 (1976).
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The duty not to encourage and indeed to prevent activities
aimed at providing assistance to insurgents is also expressly en-
dorsed in the Declaration on Friendly Relations. The Declaration
provides:
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, insti-
gating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist
acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities
within its territory directed towards the commission of such
acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph re-
present a threat or use of force (emphasis added)." 8
This general principle of international law imposes a clear
duty on the United States to prevent and bring a halt to private
efforts within its territory designed to provide money, arms, and
materiel to the contras. The stringent requirements of the 1928
Convention on the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of
Civil Strife make this duty particularly clear, and even stronger in
the present case. As parties to the convention, both the United
States and Nicaragua have bound themselves to observe the fol-
lowing norm: "To use all means at their disposal to prevent the
inhabitants of their territory, nationals, or aliens, from participat-
ing in, gathering elements, crossing the boundary or sailing from
their territory for the purpose of starting or promoting civil strife."
(emphasis added).269 The collection of money and arms and their
transfer to the contras attacking Nicaragua would appear to fall
within the language of "participating in" or "gathering elements
. . . for the purpose of starting or promoting civil strife" in Nicara-
gua.2 70 Certainly, the quoted language would seem to impose a
268. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 189, Principle 1 (Prohibition of
Threat or Use of Force), para. 9. See also supra notes 223-25, 231 and accompanying text.
The Declaration further provides:
No state may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type
of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination
of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any
kind. Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate sub-
versive, terrorist or armed activities directed toward the violent overthrow of the
regime of another state, or interfere in civil strife in another state (emphasis
added).
Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 189, Principle 3 (Duty of Non-Intervention),
para. 2. See also supra notes 223-25, 232 and accompanying text.
269. Convention on the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife, supra
note 243, art. 1(1).
270. This interpretation, it is submitted, is supported by the rules of interpretation set
forth in articles 31-32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which now re-
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duty on the United States to prevent its inhabitants from leaving
the United States in order to assist the contras.s 1'
Article 1(3) of the convention also imposes a duty on the
United States "To forbid the traffic in arms and war materiel, ex-
cept when intended for the Government, while the belligerency of
the rebels has not been recognized, in which case the rules of neu-
trality shall be applied. ' s72 The reference to "the traffic in arms
and war materiel" would seem to include not only the direct provi-
sion of such items, but also the supplying of funds to acquire such
items. In any event, the United States is under a duty to prevent
its inhabitants from supplying arms and materiel to the contras.
By endorsing private organizational efforts to supply the con-
tras with funds, arms and materiel,273 and in particular by failing
to prosecute individuals for such actions under domestic legislation
known as the Neutrality Act,274 the United States would seem to
be clearly violating the terms of article 1 of the convention, as well
as the general principle of international law enunciated by the ICJ
and given authoritative expression in the 1970 Declaration on
Friendly Relations. This conclusion is certainly proper given the
difficulties of proving government complicity in "private" efforts to
fund and supply insurgents in another state. A contrary rule would
make it very easy for a government to secretly encourage large-
present customary international law. See Vienna Convention, supra note 198, arts. 31-32.
While the interpretation in the text is not free from doubt, it is submitted that in the con-
text of the treaty as a whole [including article 1(3)] and in view of its object and purpose,
Article 1(1) should be interpreted as prohibiting the collection and transfer of money and
supplies for use by the contras.
271. Two Americans aiding the contras were killed when their helicopter was shot down
in Nicaragua on September 1, 1984. The two belonged to an Alabama-based group known as
Civilian Military Assistance. See, e.g., Washington Post, Sept. 5, 1985, at Al, col. 2. CIA
officials had been aware that the private U.S. citizens were training rebel pilots. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 8, 1984, at 1, col. 2 (nat'l ed.).
272. Convention on the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife, supra
note 243, art. 1(1).
273. See supra note 261. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1984, at 1, col. 5 (nat'l ed.)(U.S.
decision not to discourage private citizens and foreign governments from providing assis-
tance to contras); Washington Post, Aug. 11, 1985, at Al, col. 4 (National Security Council
official assists contras in contacting potential "private" donors). Particularly noteworthy in
this regard is the fact that the stringent economic sanctions imposed on Nicaragua specifi-
cally exempt "goods ... exported from the United States, either to or destined for Nicara-
gua ... for the organized democratic resistance..." Nicaraguan Trade Control Regula-
tions, 50 Fed. Reg. 19890, 19891 (May 8, 1985) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 540.205).
274. See Note, Nonenforcement of the Neutrality Act: International Law and Foreign
Policy Powers Under the Constitution, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1955 (1982); Lobel, The Rise and
Decline of the Neutrality Act: Sovereignty and Congressional War Powers in United
States Foreign Policy, 24 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1983).
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scale private actions by its citizens which it itself is prohibited
from undertaking by international law.
e. Nicaraguan Violations of International Law: Legal Sig-
nificance and Appropriate Remedies
Had the United States proceeded to the merits stage before
the ICJ, it might have made two counter-arguments in defense of
its actions. The first is that even if its support of contra activities
amounted to supervision and control making it legally responsible
for the actions of the latter (that is, if its actions fell within the
first subcategory above) those actions were lawfully taken as an
exercise of the right of collective self-defense. The United States
might also have used this argument in defense of the direct mili-
tary actions it has undertaken against Nicaragua.
The second argument that it might have made is that U.S. ac-
tions in apparent violation of the international legal norms set
forth in the second and third subcategories above were legally jus-
tified as "non-forcible reprisals" or "counter-measures" in response
to prior violations of international law by Nicaragua. In essence,
the argument is that these legal prohibitions were temporarily sus-
pended due to Nicaragua's prior violations of relevant legal norms,
and that the actions taken by the United States were lawful under
the international legal principles permitting "non-forcible repri-
sals" or "counter-measures."
The distinctions drawn in the four sub-categories are of obvi-
ous importance in analyzing not only the actions of the United
States, but also in assessing the legality of any Nicaraguan support
of guerrilla activities in El Salvador-or in other neighboring coun-
tries. These distinctions are equally relevant in determining the le-
gally-permissible actions the United States or other countries
might take in response to any such support.
Nicaragua's support of the Salvadoran guerrillas through the
shipment of arms and supplies during 1980-81275 appears to consti-
tute a violation of the international legal norms set forth in the
second and fourth subcategories above. To the extent it continues
to supply arms, ammunition, or other assistance to revolutionaries
in El Salvador,78 or fails at present to exercise due diligence in
275. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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attempting to prevent non-governmental or "private" assistance to
Salvadoran guerrillas, such action or inaction violates these inter-
national legal provisions, as discussed above.
Only if Nicaragua exercises such direction and control over the
Salvadoran guerrillas as to make their actions legally imputable to
itself, could such actions justify the use of force against Nicaragua
in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense. Even
in this case, however, the use of force would have to be strictly
limited by the principles of necessity and proportionality in order
to be lawful.
In short, the legal norms examined above apply not only to the
United States, but also to Nicaragua-and to other countries in
the region. The fact that Nicaragua may have violated these legal
provisions, however, does not justify the use of force by the United
States against that country or its support of contras carrying out
armed attacks in and against Nicaragua, unless Nicaragua's actions
fall within the first subcategory and constitute an armed attack,
and then only within the inherent limits of the right of self-
defense.
Remedies are available for actions by Nicaragua against other
nations. El Salvador could modify its terms of acceptance of the
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ,277 and then immediately bring
a claim against Nicaragua;17  or ratify and initiate proceedings
under the American Convention on Pacific Settlement,2 79 which
contains a compromissory clause referring disputes not settled by
mediation to the ICJ for a mandatory decision.8 Nicaragua is a
party to the treaty, as are Honduras and Costa Rica." The latter,
277. Following its 1969 invasion of and war with Honduras, El Salvador modified the
terms of its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, in 1973. Its 1973 Declara-
tion appears to clearly exclude matters involving the use of force or the supply of arms or
other assistance to rebels in another country. Consequently, Nicaragua would not be subject
to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in a case relating to these matters. See supra
note 172 and accompanying text. The text of the 1973 Salvadoran declaration is reproduced
in 1983-84 Y.B.I.C.J. 64-66. On the 1969 war, see J. ROWLES, EL CONFLICTO HONDURAS-EL
SALVADOR (1969) Y EL ORDEN JURIDICO INTERNACIONAL (1980).
278. This stratagem was successfully followed by Portugal in the case it brought against
India. See Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), 1957 I.C.J. 125 (Pre-
liminary Objections Judgment of Nov. 26).
279. See American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, OAS Doc. OEA/Series A/3 (SEPF),
Treaty Series, No. 17 (1961), reproduced in 1 F. GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note 226, pt. 2 at
212.
280. American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, supra note 279, art. 32.
281. See I F. GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note 226, pt. 2, at 236.
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therefore, may obtain a legal settlement of any claims against Nic-
aragua at any time, as could El Salvador if it rejoined the treaty
regime from which it withdrew in 1973 following its 1969 war with
Honduras. 82 El Salvador could also invoke the Rio Treaty to halt
any ongoing violations by Nicaragua of the principles referred to
above, 83 or call upon the OAS to employ the procedures for pacific
settlement contained in the OAS Charter.2 84 El Salvador could also
resort to the United Nations Security Council, as Nicaragua has
done on several occasions.28 5 The United States could have brought
a claim or counter-claim against Nicaragua in the ICJ, invoked the
Rio Treaty, initiated pacific settlement procedures under the OAS
Charter, or actively sought resolution through the United Nations
Security Council.
Thus, both the United States and Nicaragua are prohibited by
international law from organizing and supporting guerrillas or rev-
olutionaries in another country, whether that be Nicaragua or El
Salvador. Violation of the norms set forth above permits the use of
force in response, however, only in exercise of the right of individ-
ual or collective self-defense. Such a right exists only when both
(1) the degree of support to guerrilla groups amounts to supervi-
sion and control (as in subcategory [a]), and (2) the actions of the
guerrillas are on such a scale as to amount to an "armed attack"
within the meaning of article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
3. The Asserted Justification of Collective Self-Defense
After failing for almost three years to offer any public legal
justification for its covert operations against Nicaragua, 26 since
April, 1984 the United States has argued that its actions are justi-
fied as lawful self-defense under article 51 of the United Nations
Charter.2 87 Article 51 provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Mem-
ber of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
282. Id.
283. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
284. See, e.g., infra note 311 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; infra notes 313-15 and accompanying
text.
286. See supra notes 1, 138, 199 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 1, 138 and accompanying text.
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measures necessary to maintain international peace and secur-
ity. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of
self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and re-
sponsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security (emphasis
added).288
There are three essential prerequisites for the lawful exercise
of the right of self-defense. First, the state exercising the right
must either be the victim of "an armed attack" by the state
against whom measures of self-defense are taken, or be responding
to a request for assistance by a state which is a victim of an armed
attack.289 Second, the exercise must be both necessary to halt the
attack in question and proportionate to the threat such an attack
represents. 0  These limitations are inherent in the very concept of
self-defense, 291 and correspond to similar requirements found in
domestic law.2 92 The requirements of necessity and proportionality
were fully developed in customary international law prior to the
advent of the United Nations Charter.29 3 An authoritative state-
ment of these principles was made, for example, in diplomatic cor-
respondence in the Caroline Case294 in 1841 and 1842. U.S. Secre-
tary of State Daniel Webster stated that Great Britain could
justify its actions in U.S. territory only if it could show
[the] necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. It will be for it
to show, also, that the local authorities of Canada, even suppos-
ing the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter the
territories of the United States at all, did nothing unreasonable
or excessive; since the act justified by the necessity of self-de-
fense must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within
288. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
289. The argument that collective self-defense is permissible only pursuant to a pre-
existing collective security agreement is rejected by most writers. See, e.g., Malanczuk,
supra note 224, at 769-70, 794-95.
290. See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, supra note 190, at 261-64; Malanczuk, supra note 224, at
767-69.
291. Cf. note 294 and accompanying text.
292. Cf. NGUYEN Quoc DINH, P. DALLIER & A. PELLET, supra note 200, at 882-84.
293. See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, supra note 198, at 262-63, 274-75; Malanczuk, supra note
224, at 768-69.
294. 2 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409-14 (1906).
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it (emphasis added).29 5
The final requirement is that any measures or action of self-
defense "be immediately reported to the Security Council."296 This
requirement is of critical importance: only if it is satisfied can the
Security Council identify violations of article 2(4), assess the ap-
propriateness of measures taken in alleged self-defense, and adopt
measures necessary to restore international peace and security. 9 '
The first condition is not satisfied because Nicaragua has not
launched an "armed attack" against El Salvador or Honduras,
within the meaning of that term as used in article 51 of the United
Nations Charter.298 While the U.S. claims such an armed attack
has been launched by Nicaragua,299 the evidence in the public rec-
ord does not substantiate such a claim. 00 There are no Nicaraguan
295. Quoted in I. BROWNLIE, supra note 198, at 42-43.
296. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
297. See infra note 313 and accompanying text. Cf. Rio Treaty, supra note 198, art. 5.
Article 5 establishes an even more stringent requirement for reporting to the Security Coun-
cil of "complete information concerning the activities undertaken or in contemplation in the
exercise of the right of self-defense or for the purpose of maintaining Inter-American peace
and security." Measures of self-defense taken by a state party to the Rio Treaty are to be
considered by the Organ of Consultation (i.e., the parties to the treaty), which "shall meet
without delay for the purpose of examining those measures and agreeing upon the measures
of a collective character that should be taken." Id. art. 3(2). Both this provision and articles
51 and 54 of the U.N. Charter serve the essential function of bringing cases involving the
use of force to the attention of international institutions so that they may make collective
judgments regarding the lawfulness of actions taken and then take whatever collective ac-
tion may be necessary to bring the illegal use of force to a halt.
298. See, e.g., 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 198, at 373; Malanczuk, supra note 224, at 765-
66. The shipment of arms does not constitute an armed attack, at least when the state
shipping arms does not exercise such control over the activities of the recipients as to make
them, in effect, its agents.
299. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1985, at 3, col. 1. Public statements by U.S. officials
seem to have been limited to the argument that Nicaragua has committed an armed attack
against El Salvador. In a statement issued upon its withdrawal from further proceedings
before the ICJ, the United States noted that El Salvador had stated it was under armed
attack and had requested assistance from the U.S. The statement did not address the issue
of the proportionality of its actions to the purported "attack," nor did it address the failure
of the U.S. to report its actions to the Security Council as required by article 51 of the U.N.
Charter. See Statement of the U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by Nicara-
gua in the International Court of Justice, Jan. 18, 1985, reproduced in 24 I.L.M. 246 (1985)
(hereinafter cited as U.S. Statement of Jan. 18, 1985).
300. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. The statements of David C. Mac-
Michael, a CIA contract employee from 1981 to 1983, are particularly significant. Affirming
that he had had access to the most sensitive intelligence on Nicaragua, including that relat-
ing to the flow of arms to El Salvador, MacMichael declared:
The whole picture that the Administration has presented of Salvadoran in-
surgent operations being planned, directed and supplied from Nicaragua is sim-
ply not true. There has not been a successful interdiction, or a verified report, of
478 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:3
troops in El Salvador;30 1 the level of Nicaraguan assistance to the
rebels in El Salvador does not at present, °2 even according to U.S.
claims, extend beyond the furnishing of ammunition and some
equipment.303 Such assistance to rebel groups does not amount to
an "armed attack" within the meaning of the term as defined in
article 51 of the United Nations Charter.0 '
The term "armed attack" as used in article 51 has a clear and
specific core meaning in international law. 0 5 It is clear, particu-
larly in the light of preparatory work which led to the General As-
sembly's adoption of the Definition of Aggression resolution,0 '
that the right of self-defense is a narrowly circumscribed exception
to the general prohibition of the threat or use of force contained in
article 2(4) of the Charter.30 7 It is a right which may be exercised
only in response to the illegal use of armed force by one state
arms moving from Nicaragua to El Salvador since April, 1981.
N.Y. Times, June 11, 1984, B6, at col. 3; see also Washington Post, June 13, 1984 at A 28,
col. 4. The Reagan Administration does not appear to have effectively refuted this state-
ment with persuasive evidence, despite several attempts. A recent position paper, based
largely on the accounts of Salvadoran rebels who had been captured or who had defected,
said to be corroborated by undisclosed intelligence information, quotes one captured rebel
as saying his faction still receives approximately three-fourths of its ammunition and all of
its explosives from Managua, which directly controls the distribution of such supplies. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 14, 1985, at 3, col. 1.
Significantly, the United States has declined the opportunity to make its case to the
ICJ by withdrawing from further participation in the merits phase of the proceedings. One
reason given for its non-participation was that proof of its case would require the disclosure
of "evidence ... of a highly sensitive intelligence character." See Statement of Jan. 18,
1985, supra note 299, at 24 I.L.M. 248.
301. While Nicaraguan forces may have entered Honduran territory on various occa-
sions, in each case they appear to have been pursuing contras to their home base camps or
attempting to destroy the bases from which contras were conducting ongoing attacks against
the territory of Nicaragua. Such Nicaraguan actions would appear to be fully justified as
undertaken in lawful exercise of the right of self-defense guaranteed by article 51 of the
U.N. Charter. See, e.g., Malanczuk, supra note 224, at 769. For a recent example of such an
incident, see N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1985, at 3, col. 4.
302. See supra notes 52-53, 300 and accompanying text. Force may be used in exercise
of the right of self-defense only in response to an ongoing armed attack. This results from
the requirements of necessity and proportionality. The use of force against a state which has
committed an armed attack and thereafter brought it to a halt (withdrawing to its own
territory) constitutes a forcible reprisal. Such actions are illegal. See, e.g., Malanczuk, supra
note 224, at 741, 773-74, 798.
303. See, e.g., supra note 300.
304. See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, supra note 198, at 278-79, 365-68; Malanczuk, supra note
224, at 765-66.
305. See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, supra note 198, at 278-79; Malanczuk, supra note 224, at
757, 785-92.
306. See supra note 225.
307. See, e.g., Malanczuk, supra note 224, at 757-59, 773-74, 785-86, 792.
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against another.30 8 It is important to understand, moreover, that
any interpretation that equated "armed attack" as used in article
51 with the furnishing of arms would have the effect of greatly re-
laxing the prohibition of force contained in article 2(4).309 The
drafters of the Definition of Aggression resolution were fully aware
of this fact, which accounts for the careful wording of article 3(g)
of the Definition that was finally adopted.
3 10
The second condition has not been satisfied by U.S. military
and other covert actions against Nicaragua. The United States has
had available the procedures for peaceful settlement available
under both the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty," ' yet has re-
sorted to neither to halt any arms shipments from Nicaragua to
the rebels in El Salvador."1 ' In the April, 1982 debates on a draft
Security Council resolution calling on members to observe the
principles of the United Nations Charter, the United States vetoed
the corresponding resolution. 313 Similarly, on April 4, 1984, the
U.S. vetoed a draft resolution condemning the mining of Nicara-
guan harbors and calling on all States "to refrain from carrying
out, supporting or promoting any type of military action against
any State of the region. ' '31 4 It is therefore questionable whether
any necessity for the use of force in collective self-defense exists
given that neither El Salvador nor the United States has sought
308. See id. at 779, 782, 785-86.
309. See id. at 757-59. Any relaxation of the "armed attack" requirement in article 51
would have the necessary consequence of reducing the range of activities that are prohibited
by article 2(4), as actions permitted by the former are excluded by way of exception from
the prohibition of the latter. The "armed attack" requirement represents a "bright line"
which in most cases allows disinterested states to readily identify illegal uses of force giving
rise to the right to use force in lawful self-defense. To relax the "armed attack" requirement
in order to include the provision of money and arms to rebels where control is not exercised
by the providing state, for example, would both eliminate the "bright line" and greatly ex-
pand the number of situations in which the use of force is deemed lawful.
310. See A. RIFAAT, supra note 198, at 273-74 (1979); 2 B. FERENCZ, supra note 198, at
39-40.
311. See Rio Treaty, supra note 194, arts. 2, 3(2), 6, 7, 8, 10-21; OAS Charter, supra
note 12, arts. 23-28, 59-67, 60-90.
312. While recourse to these formal OAS procedures for pacific settlement has occa-
sionally been considered by the United States, it has not been undertaken. The principal
reason appears to be that the United States would probably not be able to muster the neces-
sary votes to take any action, while the legality and wisdom of its current policies would
very likely be subjected to intense criticism. On the reactions of Latin American states to
U.S. policies toward Nicaragua, see, e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1985, at 6, col. 5 (nat'l ed.).
313. Supra note 2. The vote was twelve in favor, one against (U.S.), and two absten-
sions (U.K. and Zaire), Id.
314. Supra note 2. The vote was thirteen in favor, one against (U.S.), and one absten-
sion (U.K.). Id.
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appropriate action by the OAS,3 1 5 while the United States blocked
through its veto the Security Council's efforts to deal with the
situation."1 6
Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that Nicaraguan arms
shipments constituted an "armed attack," and that the requisite
necessity for measures of self-defense existed, it is clear that U.S.
actions against Nicaragua have violated the principle of propor-
tionality which is an inherent limitation on the right of self-de-
fense. 7 The mining of Nicaraguan harbors,318 the massive destruc-
tion of oil storage facilities, 319 and the organization, financing,
support and direction of ten to fifteen thousand contras operating
against and within Nicaragua with the avowed purpose of over-
throwing the government,3 20 or of forcing it to change its internal
policies, 21 is in no sense proportional to any "attack" which might
be represented by the shipment of arms by Nicaragua.32 2 More-
over, the use of armed force by the contras operating in Nicaragua
has not been related to the objective of halting arms shipments. 23
That is, the actions of the contras bear no rational or proportion-
ate relation to the objective of halting arms shipments to El Salva-
dor, and hence cannot be justified as actions taken in self-defense.
Here, facts, and not Presidential or other administration dec-
larations, 24 are determinative of U.S. legal responsibility under in-
ternational law. The facts, as amply reported in the American and
international press, 28 show that the necessity for the use of force
by the United States against Nicaragua is doubtful, 2 ' while the
disproportionate nature of the actions taken is clear.
27
The third condition for exercise of the right of self-defense,
immediate notification to the security counsel, has not been satis-
315. See supra notes 277-85, 312 and accompanying text.
316. See, e.g., supra notes 2, 313-14 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 290-95 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
320.. See supra notes 45-50, 62, 88-94, 97-103, 153-59 and accompanying text.
321. The United States has unequivocally stated that a primary objective of its policy
toward Nicaragua is to "pressure" that country's government into making changes in its
internal policies. See, e.g., supra note 62 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 51-54, 300 and accompanying text.
323. See generally Part I(B), supra.
324. See, e.g., supra notes 1, 62, 86 and accompanying text.
325. See generally Part I(B), supra.
326. See supra notes 51-54, 300, 311-16 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 317-23 and accompanying text.
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fled by the United States. 2 8 The United States carefully refused to
comment on its military actions against Nicaragua for over two
and a half years. To this date, it has not provided the Security
Council with specific information regarding the measures which it
has taken in alleged exercise of the right of collective self-de-
fense.32 9 Failure to satisfy this requirement is of fundamental im-
portance because it is only through notification of self-defense
measures that the Security Council is able to consider a dispute in
a timely manner and discharge its "primary responsibility" for the
maintenance of international peace and security.330
In short, the United States has failed to satisfy any of the
three conditions necessary for lawful exercise of the right of self-
defense under article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Its actions, therefore,
328. This policy became untenable after clear evidence of U.S. responsibility for the
mining of Nicaraguan ports and harbors became public in April, 1984. See supra notes 112,
134-38 and accompanying text.
329. See Washington Post, Feb. 23, 1985, at A13, col. 4. In February, 1985, the State
Department stated, " ITihe situation in Nicaragua has been brought to the attention of the
Security Council on numerous occasions and the United States has clearly informed the
Council of our view that Nicaragua has committed an armed attack against its neighbors
and that we have been acting in self-defense with them." (emphasis added). Washington
Post, Feb. 23, 1985, at A13, col. 4.
However, simply stating to the Security Council that one's government is acting in self-
defense does not satisfy the reporting requirement of article 51. That article specifically
provides,
... Measures taken by Members in exercise of this right of self-defense shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect
the authority and responsibility of the Security Council to take at any time such
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace
and security (emphasis added).
U.N. CHARTER art. 51. Nor is the difference merely one of form. The purpose of the report-
ing requirement is to bring to the attention of the Security Council the details of all actions
undertaken in alleged exercise of the right of self-defense, so that it may make a collective
judgment as to the legality of such actions and take collective measures to bring to a halt
the illegal use of force by any party to a dispute. The reporting requirement is therefore an
essential component of the United Nations system which has as its principal aim the main-
tenance of international peace and security through the exercise of collective judgments and
the taking of collective action *here appropriate.
The importance of the reporting requirement is suggested by the fact that one or more
governments might have voted differently on the Security Council resolutions vetoed by the
United States in 1982 and 1984, had the United States furnished the council with details
regarding all of the actions it was taking against Nicaragua at that time. It is even conceiva-
ble that the U.S. might have abstained from casting its veto in one or both instances had
the debates in the council been informed by knowledge of the relevant facts, as mandated
by article 51. It should be noted, moreover, that in cases not involving action by a perma-
nent member possessing the power of veto, compliance with the reporting requirement of
article 51 is likely to have an even more decisive impact on the council's deliberations.
330. See supra notes 299, 329 and accompanying text.
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cannot be justified under the rubric of self-defense. Of particular
importance in assessing the validity of the U.S. claim of self-de-
fense, is the fact that on April 4, 1984, the Security Council re-
jected this claim, as shown by its vote on a resolution condemning
the United States' actions.33' As the Security Council has primary
(though not exclusive) authority to determine the validity of uni-
lateral claims of self-defense, its vote on the above resolution has
great significance in assessing the U.S. claim, despite the fact that
the resolution was not adopted due to a U.S. veto.332 Also impor-
tant is the fact that the United States has attempted to evade the
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in order to avoid an impartial
judicial determination of the validity of its self-defense
justification. 333
4. The Possible Justification of Non-Forcible Reprisals or
Counter-Measures
As the preceding section makes clear, the United States can-
not justify its actions involving the use of force against Nicaragua
as taken in lawful exercise of the right of individual or collective
self-defense. This statement applies both to direct United States
military action against Nicaragua, and to United States actions in
organizing and supporting contra activities against Nicaragua
where the degree of its supervision and control makes it legally re-
sponsible for both its own actions and those of the contras acting
as its agents.
Nonetheless, had it proceeded to the merits phase of the pro-
ceedings before the International Court of Justice, the United
States might have argued that it did not exercise such supervision
and control over the contras as to make it responsible for their
actions. This is essentially a factual issue. Even if it were able to
sustain such an argument, however, United States actions from
1981 to mid-1984, unless otherwise justified, would violate. the
prohibitions against supporting revolutionary groups operating
against and within Nicaragua. Any resumption of such assistance
to the contras after mid-1985 would similarly violate those legal
norms. Moreover, whether before or after mid-1984, the supply of
economic and other assistance to the contras through third coun-
331. See supra notes 2, 314 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 7, 121, 299-300 and accompanying text.
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tries, or the encouragement or tolerance of private efforts in the
United States to supply financial and other assistance to the con-
tras, would also violate international law.
There is, however, one argument the United States might have
made before the ICJ in order to justify the taking of such appar-
ently unlawful actions. That argument would be based on the prin-
ciple permitting the taking of non-forcible reprisals under certain
conditions. Within the last ten years the principle has been in-
creasingly referred to as one permitting the taking of "counter-
measures" precluding the wrongfulness of otherwise illegal actions
under certain conditions, reflecting the adoption of this terminol-
ogy by the International Law Commission (ILC) in its ongoing
work on the preparation of Draft Articles on State Responsibility.
It is now generally agreed that reprisals involving the use of
force are prohibited by article 2(4) of the United Nations Char-
ter. " Non-forcible reprisals are still permissible, however, pro-
vided they satisfy certain stringent conditions. The classic formu-
lation of these principles was set forth in the 1928 Naulilaa
arbitration between Germany and Portugal. In that case, the arbi-
trators set forth the following rules:
Reprisals are acts of self-help by the injured State, acts in
retaliation for acts contrary to international law on the part of
the offending State, which have remained unredressed after a
demand for amends. In consequence of such measures, the ob-
servance of this or that rule of international law is temporarily
suspended, in the relations between the two States. They are
limited by considerations of humanity and the rules of good
faith, applicable in the relations between States. They are illegal
unless they are based on a previous act contrary to international
law. They seek to impose on the offending state, reparation for
the offense, the return to legality, and the avoidance of new
offenses (emphasis added).33 1
The opinion also made clear that, in the words of Brierly, "the
measures adopted must not be excessive, in the sense of being out
of all proportion to the offense received."
3 3
6
A contemporary restatement of these rules is found in the
334. See, e.g., Malanczuk, supra note 224, at 727.
335. Quoted in J. BRIERLY, supra note 208, at 401. See supra note 208 and accompany-
ing text.
336. J. BRIERLY, supra note 208, at 401.
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Commentary of the International Law Commission on article 30 of
its Draft Articles on State Responsibility. Article 30 provides that,
The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an
obligation of that State towards another State is precluded if
the act constitutes a measure legitimate under international law
against that other State, in consequence of an internationally




In its commentary on article 30, the ILC, after stressing the pro-
portionality requirement set forth in the Naulilaa arbitration,
states that reprisals involving the use of force are now illegal.338 It
then explicitly recognizes that reprisals not involving the use of
force are legal "if the necessary conditions are fulfilled" (emphasis
added). Those conditions are spelled out in a footnote as follows:
[TIhat the offence to which the reprisals are intended to be a
response must not be such as to entail any consequence other
than to give rise to the right of the injured party to obtain repa-
ration; that if such is the case, the injured party must have
made a prior attempt to obtain reparation; and that in any
event, the reaction must not have been disproportionate to the
offense. An additional condition is that there must not be any
procedures for peaceful settlement previously agreed upon by
the parties.'"
The essential requirement for the taking of a non-forcible re-
prisal by one state against another is that the latter has committed
an internationally wrongful act violating the legal rights of and
thus causing injury to the former. This bilateral relationship was
the sine qua non for the taking of any reprisal under traditional
law. It remains so today, despite the fact that certain fundamental
legal obligations, considered to be binding with respect to all states
(erga omnes), has resulted in a certain amount of confusion among
some writers and others. If these legal obligations are owed to all
states, it might be argued, does not the violation of such a funda-
mental norm give any state the right to take non-forcible reprisals
against the state violating the norm?
The ILC, as well as certain leading writers, have provided a
337. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 189, art. 30.
338. International Law Commission, Commentary on Draft Articles on State Responsi-
bility, Art. 30, [1979] Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, Vol. II, pt. 2, at 118 [hereinafter cited as ILC
Commentary].
339. Id. at 116, 118 & n.595.
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clear response to this question. The Commission in its commentary
to article 30 stresses that, with respect to legal obligations binding
erga omnes, the international community has turned
towards a system which vests in international institutions other
than States exclusive responsibility, first, for determining the
existence of a breach of an obligation of basic importance to the
international community as a whole, and, thereafter, for decid-
ing what measures are to be taken in response and how they are
to be implemented.
3 40
The necessary conditions for the lawful taking of non-forcible
reprisals or "counter-measures" may be summarized as follows:
1) There must exist a prior violation of an international legal
obligation owed by the violating state to the state taking non-forci-
ble reprisals or counter-measures;3 41
2) An attempt to obtain reparation must be made by the in-
jured state, without success, before non-forcible reprisals may be
taken;
342
3) The purpose of the non-forcible reprisals must be limited to
restoration of compliance with the international obligation which
has been violated, reparation, and ensuring that the violation will
not recur; s4 3
4) The non-forcible reprisal or counter-measure must not be
disproportionate to the offense, i.e., the original violation of inter-
national law causing injury to the responding state;
4
5) There must not exist any means, agreed upon by the two
states concerned, for peaceful settlement of the claims resulting
from the original violation of international law;345 and
6) The non-forcible reprisals or counter-measures may be
taken only by: a) the state which has been directly injured, in its
bilateral relations, by the original act in violation of international
law; or b) in the case of fundamental legal obligations binding erga
340. Id. at 19. See Malanczuk, supra note 224, at 742-47.
341. See supra notes 335, 337 and accompanying text.
342. See supra note 339 and accompanying text. This requirement may be interpreted
as not requiring such an attempt when it is wholly inappropriate or impossible in the cir-
cumstances. See Malanczuk, supra note 224, at 725-56. Cf. id. at 737.
343. See supra note 335 and accompanying text; Malanczuk, supra note 224, at 726.
344. See supra notes 335-39 and accompanying text; Malanczuk, supra note 224, at
726.
345. See supra note 339 and accompanying text.
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omnes, pursuant to the corresponding decision of a competent in-
ternational institution.346
These requirements have not been met by the United States
in the present case. Even if Nicaragua has violated the legal rights
of El Salvador by furnishing arms to guerrillas within the latter's
borders, only El Salvador would be legally entitled to take non-
forcible reprisals, by suspending compliance with treaty obligations
regarding trade, for example, or arguably even observance of inter-
national legal prohibitions against furnishing financial and other
support to revolutionaries in Nicaragua. In any event, such mea-
sures would have to be proportionate in nature. Absent an appro-
priate decision by a competent international institution, no third
state may undertake non-forcible reprisals or counter-measures
against Nicaragua due to the latter's violation of legal obligations
causing direct injury to El Salvador.
Even assuming, arguendo, the obligation not to support guer-
rillas is owed not only to El Salvador but also to the international
community as a whole, no competent international institution has
either determined that Nicaragua violated its legal obligations by
its actions with respect to El Salvador, or authorized the taking of
counter-measures against Nicaragua by third states. Neither the
Security Council nor the OAS acting under the Rio Treaty has au-
thorized any such action by the United States or any other state.
On the contrary, on several occasions when the question of United
States military and paramilitary actions against Nicaragua has
come before the Security Council, an overwhelming majority of its
members have voted in favor of resolutions wholly inconsistent
with any such authorization. 4"
Whether third states may take non-forcible reprisals or
counter-measures against a state which has violated a fundamental
legal norm binding erga omnes, absent authorization by a compe-
tent international institution, is a question which is central to the
very existence and functioning of the international legal system.
On the one hand, there is appeal in the notion that all states
should be free to take counter-measures against any state violating
a fundamental norm with erga omnes effect-as in the case of hu-
manitarian norms protecting the right to life, freedom from tor-
ture, and freedom from arbitrary detention, or in the case of ag-
346. See supra notes 335, 337, 339-40 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 2, 313-14 and accompanying text.
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gression, piracy, or the slave trade. Theoretically, such action
would help deter violations of norms of fundamental importance
for all states, thereby strengthening the international community
and the governing influence of international law in its affairs.
Against this consideration, however, must be weighed the
stark reality of the decentralized nature of the existing interna-
tional legal system, and the probable consequences of permitting
third states-and blocks of states-to decide unilaterally both that
a fundamental norm has been violated and what counter-measures
may be taken in response. Since the effect of non-forcible reprisals
or counter-measures is to suspend legal obligations between the
states involved, the net effect would be to allow third states to
avoid their legal obligations toward the state which has allegedly
violated international law. Any such determinations made unilater-
ally are quite likely to be shaped by political and other considera-
tions rather than by an impartial consideration of the facts and
relevant law. Other states, more friendly to the alleged violator of
international law, may view those counter-measures taken by third
states as constituting illegal acts in response to which non-forcible
reprisals or counter-measures may be taken. Consequently, to per-
mit third states to take counter-measures on a unilateral basis is
likely to lead to an escalating series of actions in derogation of gov-
erning principles of international law. 348 Such a development
would undercut the decision-making authority of existing interna-
tional institutions, further distracting attention from the urgent
necessity of strengthening their capacity to collectively coordinate
the direction of international affairs.
Despite the apparent appeal of allowing third states to take
counter-measures, this alternative must be rejected because it
would undermine the very foundations of international law and in-
stitutions. These are based on universal values and collective
processes of decision. The adoption of counter-measures by third
states on the basis of their own unilateral and subjective determi-
nations of facts and law would introduce centrifugal forces into the
international system which are hardly needed, given the current
weakness of international authority.8
49
Fortunately, these policy considerations are fully reflected in
348. See, e.g., Malanczuk, supra note 224, at 738.
349. See generally id. at 742-47; Dupuy, Observations sur la practique r~cente des




the current law. Under customary international law, only the state
directly injured by a violation of international law may take non-
forcible reprisals or counter-measures against the offending state,
unless a competent international organization has decided other-
wise. In its work on the Draft Articles on International Responsi-
bility, the ILC has not deviated from the traditional position with
respect to violations of legal obligations valid erga omnes. In any
event, as evidenced by the ILC commentary on article 30, it is
clear that no customary rule of international law has come into
existence which authorizes non-forcible reprisals or counter-mea-
sures by third states in the absence of authorizations by a compe-
tent international institution.350 This is the current law, and, de-
spite ongoing discussions in the ILC regarding the text of other
provisions in Part II of its Draft Articles, 51 there fortunately ap-
pears to be little chance that a new customary rule will ever be
established that would permit such third-state counter-mea-
sures.3 52 The one possible exception to this conclusion might be the
development of a customary norm permitting the taking of such
counter-measures against states guilty of a persistent pattern of
massive violations of fundamental human rights. Even here, how-
ever, the considerations set forth above are directly relevant.
Such a new rule generally permitting the adoption of counter-
measures by third states in response to violations of legal norms
with erga omnes effect, it should be noted, would also tend to un-
dermine the entire body of international law governing the duty to
refrain from intervention in the internal affairs of any state. Such a
new rule would undermine the law governing non-forcible acts of
intervention because a group or block of states would be able to
impose economic and other sanctions having an extremely coercive
effect on the target state, while justifying their actions as lawful
counter-measures permitted as exceptions to the law of non-inter-
350. See, e.g., Malanczuk, supra note 224, at 747.
351. See, e.g., Malanczuk, Zur Repressalie im Entwurf der International Law Commis-
sion zur Staatenverantwortlichkeit, 45 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLXNDISCHES OFFENTLICHES
RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 293 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Malanczuk, Zur Repressalie]; Mc-
Caffrey, The Thirty-sixth Session of the International Law Commission, 79 AM. J. INT'L L.
755 (1985).
352. The requirements laid down in the Naulilaa arbitration are generally accepted as
representing customary international law. See supra notes 208, 335-36 and accompanying
text. The customary rule applies only to bilateral situations. For a new rule of customary
law to emerge, it must become "a general practice accepted as law" by an overwhelming
majority of states. Cf. I.C.J. Stat., supra note 164, art. 38(1)(b). This has not occurred with
respect to countermeasures taken by third states. Nor is it likely to.
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vention. Given the decentralized nature of the international legal
system and the unilateral character of decisions to adopt counter-
measures, great latitude for abuse of the new norm would necessa-
rily exist. This is not a result that would be acceptable to the over-
whelming majority of developing and other states in the world
today.
It is clear that the United States cannot justify its violation of
the legal norms prohibiting its financing and supplying of contras
under the rubric of non-forcible reprisals or counter-measures.
This conclusion does not mean that the international community
must stand idly by when a state is the victim of an armed attack or
invasion by another state and the Security Council is unable to act.
In such a case, any state, as an exercise of the right of collective
self defense, may come to the aid of the victim if assistance is re-
quested. The measures it may take include, but are not limited to,
actions involving the use of force. In other cases in which a funda-
mental legal obligation has been violated, third states remain free
to take a number of economic and other measures against the of-
fending state in accordance with the customary law permitting ac-
tions, known as retorsions, which do not involve the violation of
existing international legal obligations. 5
Returning to the question of whether United States financing
and support of the contras can be justified as non-forcible reprisals
or counter-measures, it should be noted that even assuming, argu-
endo, that such counter-measures may be taken by third states,
the United States has failed to satisfy a number of the remaining
requirements for the lawful taking of such actions.
The failure to satisfy three of these requirements is particu-
larly clear. First, the purpose of U.S. actions in support of the con-
tras and in imposing economic sanctions on Nicaragua is not lim-
353. See, e.g., NGUYEN Quoc DINH, P. DALLIER & A. PELLET, supra note 200, at 853.
Although economic and other measures not involving the use of force which constitute
prima facie violations of existing legal obligations may not be justified as third-state
counter-measures, it nonetheless appears that they may be taken in exercise of the right of
collective self-defense, when they are directed against a state which has committed an
armed attack against a state requesting assistance in exercise of the right of self-defense.
See, e.g., Bowett, International Law and Economic Coercion, in INTERNATIONAL COERCION
AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 87, 93-95 (1976). If this were not so, a third
state would be entitled to use force but prohibited from taking lesser measures, a result
which is inconsistent with the objective of limiting the use of force and with the require-
ments of necessity and proportionality which are inherent limitations on the exercise of the
right of self-defense. Economic measures of self-defense are, of course, subject to the same
conditions and requirements of self-defense measures involving the use of force.
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ited to securing Nicaraguan compliance with its international legal
obligations, as revealed by U.S. demands that Nicaragua change
the internal structure of its government, secure the withdrawal of
foreign military advisers, and reduce the size of its defense
forces.35' Second, the non-forcible measures the United States has
taken in support of the contras are not proportionate to the injury
Nicaragua may have inflicted on El Salvador by providing arms to
the Salvadoran guerrillas in 1980-81, and perhaps minor levels of
arms and supplies since that time.3 5 Even if these two conclusions
might be disputed, it is clear that the United States and Nicaragua
have available the means for the peaceful settlement of any claims
which may have arisen as a result of Nicaragua's violations of in-
ternational law. Such means are provided by the compulsory juris-
diction of the ICJ, where the United States has had every opportu-
nity to bring any counterclaim it might have against Nicaragua.
Instead, it has withdrawn from the case. Thus, even if we were to
assume that the United States could undertake non-forcible repri-
sals against Nicaragua in response to the latter's violations of its
obligations toward El Salvador, it is evident that it has not satis-
fied the legal requirements for the taking of such measures.
B. United States Intervention in the Internal Affairs of
Nicaragua
We now turn to the principle of international law that estab-
lishes the duty of all states to refrain from intervening in the inter-
nal affairs of any other state. This principle is broader than the
prohibition against the threat or use of force and the other legal
norms prohibiting the support of rebels or revolutionaries attempt-
ing to overthrow or alter the structure of an established govern-
ment by force. The categories of proscribed activities overlap, with
the direct use of force and the support of revolutionary groups
merely constituting the most egregious. forms of intervention. But
there are other forms, particularly the use of economic power to
coerce another state to forego the exercise of sovereign rights to
which it is entitled under international law.
The principle of non-intervention had its genesis in the West-
ern Hemisphere as a reaction against the military interventions of
certain European powers and the United States in the latter half
354. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 51-53, 300-02 and accompanying text.
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of the 19th century and the first third of this century. United
States intervention in, and military occupation of, a number of
countries in Central America and the Caribbean, including in par-
ticular Nicaragua, 35 was a frequent occurrence in this century up
until 1933. Franklin D. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy and the
adoption of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and
Duties of States brought the practice to a halt.357 Articles 8 and 11
of the Montevideo Convention,3 8 and a subsequent protocol rati-
fied by the United States, 359 ended whatever legal validity the
Monroe Doctrine may have had prior to 1933. In 1948, the new
OAS Charter broadened and reaffirmed these prohibitions against
intervention, which are now embodied in articles 18-20 of the re-
vised OAS Charter.360
The principle of non-intervention is a basic and necessary co-
rollary to one of the most fundamental principles of international
law: the sovereign equality of all states. If the sovereignty of all
states is to be maintained, each state must respect the sovereignty
of other states, including their personality, territorial integrity, po-
litical independence, and the right to freely choose and develop
their political, economic, social, and cultural systems. 361
Outside the hemisphere, the principle of non-intervention has
gradually achieved recognition, particularly since the United Na-
tions General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Inadmissi-
bility of Intervention Into the Domestic Affairs of States in 1965,
following the United States military intervention in the Dominican
Republic earlier that year.36 2 The principle has been solemnly reaf-
firmed in the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations and in a
number of other General Assembly Declarations.3 63 It has acquired
356. See J. BOOTH, THE END AND THE BEGINNING: THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION 27-50
(2d ed. 1985).
357. See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
359. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
360. See OAS Charter, supra note 12, arts. 18-20.
361. See, e.g., Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 189, Principle 6, (Sover-
eign Equality of States). The free development of their political, economic, social, and cul-
tural systems may, of course, be subject to certain international legal obligations, particu-
larly in the area of human rights.
362. See L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMrr, supra note 33, at 920-22.
363. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 189, Principle 3 (Duty Not to
Intervene in Matters Within the Domestic Jurisdiction of Another State). Other resolutions
which reaffirm the Declaration on Friendly Relations include the 1974 Definition of Aggres-
sion. See Definition of Aggression, supra note 189, Preamble.
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the status of customary international law.3 64
The general principle prohibiting intervention frequently has
been formulated in broad terms. While there is considerable con-
troversy over the outer limits of the prohibition, its core meaning
is clear, encompassing (1) the adoption of measures of a highly co-
ercive nature; and (2) doing so for the purpose of forcing another
state to forego the enjoyment or exercise of its sovereign rights
under international law. 65 Thus, measures which are in and of
themselves lawful may lose that character if they are adopted for
an illegitimate purpose and are highly coercive in nature. The prin-
ciple of non-intervention is, in certain respects, analogous to the
doctrine prohibiting the abuse of rights (abus des droits) found in
a number of civil law jurisdictions such as that of France. 66
In terms of customary international law, the formulation of
the principle in the 1974 Declaration on Friendly Relations is au-
thoritative. It provides that:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, di-
rectly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or
external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed inter-
vention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats
against the personality of the State or against its political, eco-
nomic and cultural elements, are in violation of international
law.
No State may use or encourage the use of economic, politi-
cal or any other type of measures to coerce another State in or-
der to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sov-
ereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind. Also,
no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate
subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed toward the vio-
lent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in
civil strife in another State.
Every State has an inalienable right to choose its political,
economic, social and cultural systems, without interference in
364. See, e.g., supra note 234 and accompanying text. Cf. B. DOHNE, DIE GRUND-
PRINZIPIEN DES VOLKERRECHTS OBER DIE FREUNDSCHAFTLICHEN BEZIEHUNGEN UND DIE ZUSAM-
MENARBEIT ZWISCHEN DEN STAATEN 134 (1973).
365. See, e.g., A. VERDROSS & B. SIMMA, supra note 267, at 248-49. As noted above,
coercive measures not involving the use of force may be adopted in response to a prior
violation of international law, provided certain conditions are met including the requirement
that the state taking such non-forcible reprisals or counter-measures be directly injured by
the illegal act of the target state.
366. See, e.g., R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 695-701 (4th ed. 1980).
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any form by another State.367
These prohibitions reproduce, almost verbatim, the prohibi-
tions contained in the OAS Charter, particularly articles 18, 19,
and 20. The latter, of course, represent treaty obligations which are
directly binding on the United States, Nicaragua, and other coun-
tries in the region. Article 18 provides:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, di-
rectly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or
external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle pro-
hibits not only armed force but also any other form of interfer-
ence or attempted threat against the personality of the State or
against its political, economic, and cultural elements.368
These provisions clearly prohibit the direct use of force by the
United States against Nicaragua and its support of the contras
conducting armed attacks against that country. With respect to
United States assistance to the contras, it should be noted that
even if the activities referred to above are viewed as not represent-
ing a use of force in violation of article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter and other prohibitions, they nonetheless constitute viola-
tions of the customary law principle of non-intervention and the
corresponding prohibition contained in article 18 of the OAS Char-
ter. Of particular significance is the fact that the United States
provision of financial and other assistance-even that labeled "hu-
manitarian" aid and that involving the exchange of intelligence in-
formation 369-is clearly aimed at maintaining the effectiveness of
the contras' paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua in or-
der to coerce Nicaragua to modify its internal policies and the
367. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 189, Principle 3 (Duty not to Inter-
vene in Matters within the Domestic Jurisdiction of Another State).
368. OAS Charter, supra note 12, art. 18. Article 19 provides:
No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or
political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and ob-
tain from it advantages of any kind.
Id. art. 19. Article 20, it will be recalled, establishes the following:
The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily,
of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, di-
rectly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or spe-
cial advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be
recognized.
Id. art. 20. See supra notes 193, 240 and accompanying text.
369. In July, 1985, Congress approved $27 million in "humanitarian assistance" to the
contras, and also authorized the sharing of intelligence information between contras and
U.S. officials. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
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structure of its government."' 0
Other United States actions, not involving the use of force or
the support of anti-Sandinista guerrillas, also appear to violate the
principle of non-intervention. First, the imposition of economic
sanctions by the United States against Nicaragua in early May,
1985, clearly violates articles 18 and 19 of the OAS Charter as well
as the rule of customary international law prohibiting intervention
in the internal affairs of another state.71
A second possible example is the use of unprecedented eco-
nomic and political pressure on the Inter-American Development
Bank (IADB), a multilateral lending institution, to block a fifty-
three million dollar loan to Nicaragua. U.S. opposition has not
been limited to the potential use of its vote within the Interna-
tional Development Bank's (IDB) formal decision-making
processes. In a January 30, 1985 letter to the president of the IDB,
Secretary of State Schultz expressed his strong opposition to the
loan and his "hope that the Bank's management will be able to
defer the release of the documentation" prepared by the Bank's
staff in its support. Among the reasons given for his request was
the fact that the loan would "relieve financial pressures (on Nica-
ragua) and free up other monies that could be used to help con-
solidate the Marxist regime and finance Nicaragua's aggression
against its neighbors . . . . "" (emphasis added). Speaking on a
background basis, a State Department official later stated with re-
spect to the loan, "Our pressure on Nicaragua, of course, is mul-
370. See, e.g., supra notes 58, 61-62, 122 and accompanying text.
371. The economic embargo against Nicaragua was adopted as a part of a strategy to
"pressure" the Nicaraguan government into changing its internal policies, modifying its gov-
ernmental structure, and making concessions in bilateral negotiations with the United
States and multilateral negotiations with its Central American neighbors carried out within
what has come to be known as the "Contadora process." The coercive intent of the sanc-
tions is apparent not only from the statements of United States officials, but also-and
revealingly-from the fact that the trade embargo specifically exempts exports to the con-
tras or so-called "democratic resistance in Nicaragua." Given the size and proximity of the
United States market, traditional trade relationships between the United States and Nicara-
gua, and the high degree of dependence of the latter on certain items such as spare parts
from the former, the coercive nature of the trade embargo is readily apparent. See supra
notes 58-62, 122, 153-60, 273 and accompanying text; Washington Post, May 1, 1985, at Al,
col. 5; Washington Post, May 2, 1985, at Al, col. 2; Washington Post, May 8, 1985, at Al,
col. 6.
372. The letter further stated that approval of the loan would make administration
efforts to provide additional financial contributions "even more difficlt" and would under-
cut more general efforts to broaden the Bank's financial base. Washington Post, Mar. 8,
1985, at Al, col. 1. See also Washington Post, Jan. 20, 1985, at A19, col. 4.
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tifaceted. It is not devoted to any particular area. 3 73 This state-
ment would seem to apply equally to the economic embargo
imposed on Nicaragua by the United States. In the examples cited
it appears that both requirements for an illegal act of intervention
have been met: (1) the measure adopted was highly coercive in na-
ture; and (2) it was adopted in order to "pressure" Nicaragua to
forego the exercise of its sovereign rights and to achieve advan-
tages which it would not willingly grant in the absence of such
coercion.
These actions cannot be legally justified either as lawful mea-
sures of collective self-defense, or as non-forcible reprisals or
counter-measures. Consequently, they contravene the international
legal norms prohibiting intervention in the internal affairs of an-
other state. At the same time they also appear to constitute rather
clear violations of several provisions of the 1956 U.S.-Nicaragua
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation.
3 7 4
C. United States Actions and the Principle Requiring the
Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes
Since the turn of the century, a fundamental objective of those
who have sought to create and strengthen international law and
institutions that regulate the use of force has been to establish the
373. Id. Washington Post, Mar. 8, 1985, at Al, col. 1.
374. See supra notes 206-11 and accompanying text. The imposition of an economic
embargo and other sanctions against Nicaragua appears to violate many of the FCN
Treaty's provisions. The United States has argued, however, that any actions it may have
taken against Nicaragua are exempted from the provisions of the Treaty by virtue of article
21. Article 21 provides:
1. The present Treaty shall not preclude the application of measures:
(d) necessary to fulfill the obligations of a party for the maintenance or res-
toration of international peace and security, or necessary to protect its essential
security interests;
FCN Treaty, supra note 64, art. 21. This provision, however, must be interpreted in the
context of the treaty as a whole in the light of its object and purpose. So interpreted, it is
highly doubtful that the parties intended to create an escape clause that leaves such a deter-
mination to the unilateral discretion of one party. Nor does it appear that articte 21 can be
stretched to encompass an economic embargo. On the applicability of the FCN Treaty and
article 21, see U.S. Department of State, Observations on the International Court of Jus-
tice's November 26, 1984 Judgment on Jurisdiction and Admissibility in the case of Nicara-
gua v. United States of America, reproduced in 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 423, 428-29 (1985). See
also Washington Post, May 8, 1985, at Al, col. 6 (Justice Department officials "unable" to
offer opinion on legality of sanctions, suggesting opinion of illegality).
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principle requiring the peaceful settlement of international dis-
putes. 75 This goal was achieved in 1928 due to United States and
French efforts when the Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of
War as an Instrument of National Policy, popularly known as the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, was signed. In article I of the Treaty, the
contracting parties declared "that they condemn recourse to war
for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as
an instrument of national policy in their relations with one an-
other. "376 The corollary of article I, the peaceful settlement of dis-
putes, was established as an obligation in article II. Article II pro-
vides, "The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or
solution of all disputes of whatever nature or of whatever origin
they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought
except by peaceful means."' 377 Both the United States and Nicara-
gua are parties to the treaty, which remains in force.
378
The principle was subsequently incorporated into the United
Nations Charter and represents a fundamental pillar of the inter-
national legal system. In a statement to a United Nations commit-
tee prior to the adoption of a General Assembly resolution in 1976,
the U.S. representative reaffirmed the inherent interrelationship
between the prohibition contained in article 2(4) and the principle
requiring the peaceful settlement of disputes established in article
2(3) of the United Nations Charter. He stated "[t]he Charter
wisely listed the obligation to 'settle international disputes by
peaceful means' ahead of the prohibition of the use of force be-
cause disputes must be settled if we are to avoid violence. The two
norms are part of an inseparable whole"(emphasis added).7 9
Article 2(3) of the Charter itself establishes that "[a]ll Mem-
bers shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in
such a manner that international peace and security, and justice,
are not endangered." 380
Article 33 of the United Nations Charter also establishes the
duty of peaceful settlement in explicit terms. It provides
375. See, e.g., B. DOHNE, supra note 364, at 134-35.
376. Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy
(Kellogg-Briand Pact), Aug. 27, 1928, art. I, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 2 Bevans 732, 94
L.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter cited as Kellogg-Briand Pact).
377. Id. art. II.
378. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 1981 TREATIES IN FORCE 335-36.
379. Statement of Representative Albert W. Sherer, Jr., in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
1976 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 684, 685.
380. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
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1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, en-
quiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,
resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful
means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call
upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.38'
The obligations contained in article 2(3) and article 33 must be
fulfilled in good faith.
3 8 2
The principle requiring peaceful settlement of disputes has
been explicitly reaffirmed by the General Assembly in its 1970
Declaration on Friendly Relations. The Declaration reproduces the
language of articles 2(3) and 33, adding the following clarifications:
The parties to a dispute have the duty, in the event of fail-
ure to reach a solution by any one of the above peaceful means
(i.e., those enumerated in Article 33), to continue to seek a set-
tlement by other peaceful means agreed upon by them.
States parties to an international dispute, as well as other
States, shall refrain from any action which may aggravate the
situation so as to endanger the maintenance of international
peace and security, and shall act in accordance with the pur-
poses and principles of the United Nations.3 s8
The foregoing provisions represent not only an authoritative
interpretation of the charter, but also a statement of customary
international law. 8 4 The Charter of the OAS also contains provi-
sions requiring the peaceful settlement of international disputes.
Article 3(g) reaffirms the principle that, "Controversies of an inter-
national character arising between two or more American States
shall be settled by peaceful procedures. '"3 8 8 Article 25 establishes
the duty to seek a peaceful settlement of any dispute, as follows:
"In the event that a dispute arises between two or more American
States, which, in the opinion of one of them, cannot be settled
through the usual diplomatic channels, the parties shall agree on
381. Id. art. 33.
382. See, e.g., id. art. 2, para. 2.
383. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 189, Principle 2, paras. 3-4 (Settle-
ment of International Disputes by Peaceful Means).
384. See, e.g., B. DOHNE, supra note 364, at 158.
385. OAS Charter, supra note 12, art. 3(g).
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some other peaceful procedure that will enable them to reach a
solution."3 86 Articles 63, 82 and 83-90 also establish mechanisms
for the peaceful settlement of international disputes between OAS
members, as does the Rio Treaty.
3 8
The United States has clearly violated its legal obligations to
settle its dispute with Nicaragua by peaceful means. Together with
its failure to provide the Security Council with the information it
is required to report concerning "measures taken" in alleged exer-
cise of the right of collective self-defense, it has frustrated the Se-
curity Council's efforts to peacefully settle its dispute with Nicara-
gua by vetoing draft resolutions in 1982 and 1984 which aimed at
resolving differences between the two countries. Its veto of the
1982 resolution, which simply called for observance of basic norms
of the Charter while calling on the parties to resolve their differ-
ences by peaceful settlement, is particularly revealing in this
regard. 88
Moreover, the United States has refused to pursue judicial set-
tlement of its dispute with Nicaragua by withdrawing from the
proceedings on the merits before the ICJ, in effect defying the
Court's determination that both Nicaragua and the United States
are bound by the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.3 89 It has
also failed to invoke the formal procedures established for the set-
tlement of international disputes under the Rio Treaty,8 0 and
under the OAS Charter.
3 91
Most importantly, by continuing to support the contras, the
United States has violated its obligation, set forth with clarity in
the Declaration on Friendly Relations "to refrain from any action
which may aggravate the situation so as to endanger the mainte-
nance of international peace and security." Since May 10, 1984, it
has done so in direct violation of the ICJ's Order of Interim
Protection.3 92
Finally, the United States has broken off bilateral negotiations
386. Id. art. 25.
387. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
388. See supra notes 2, 313 and accompanying text.
389. See supra note 6, 7, 121, 299-300 and accompanying text.
390. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
391. See id.
392. See supra notes 383-84 and accompanying text; Interim Protection Order of May
10, 1984, supra note 5, at 187.
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with Nicaragua, 93 and seems to have acted to block the successful
conclusion of a Central American peace treaty adopted within the
framework of the Contadora process.
3 94
Viewing United States actions against Nicaragua - in support
of the contras since 1981 - one cannot escape the conclusion that it
has repeatedly and continuously violated article II of the Kellogg-
Briand Pact, articles 2(3) and 33 of the United Nations Charter,
various provisions of the OAS Charter, and its duties under cus-
tomary international law to resolve its differences with Nicaragua
exclusively by peaceful means.
III. POSTSCRIPT
After the foregoing article was written, the ICJ handed down
its Judgment on the Merits on June 27, 1986.3 " The dispositive
clauses of the Court's decision are reproduced in the appendix fol-
lowing this article. Two points merit special mention here. First,
the Court held that the "multilateral treaty reservation" (Vanden-
berg Amendment) contained in the 1946 U.S. declaration accepting
compulsory jurisdiction under article 36(2) of the Court's Statute
required it to decide all of Nicaragua's claims, other than those for
breach of the 1956 U.S.-Nicaragua Treaty of Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation (FCN Treaty), on the basis of customary in-
ternational law and general principles of law accepted by civilized
nations.96 Consequently, although the Court agreed in general
with the foregoing analysis in applying customary international
law, it was unable to apply the multilateral treaties referred to
above.
393. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
394. See, e.g., Washington Post, Sept. 23, 1984 at A24, col. 1 (Nicaragua announced it
would sign without modification draft Central American peace treaty in Contadora talks);
Washington Post, Sept. 30, 1984, at Al, col. 2 (U.S. urges Central American allies to reject
treaty); N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1984 (National Security Council memo regarding success in
blocking of agreement). For details regarding internal divisions within the administration
over whether or not to actively pursue negotiations, see Washington Post, July 7, 1984 at
Al, col. 4.
395. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14 (Merits Judgment of June 27), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1023 (1986) [hereinafter
cited as Judgment of June 27, 1986].
396. Id. at paras. 42-56, 172-82, 292. The Court referred explicitly to "the other treaties
or the other sources of law enumerated in Article 38 of the Statute." Id. at para. 172. See
also id. at paras. 56, 220. This reference is equivalent to the statement in the text. See I.C.J.
Stat., supra note 164, art. 38(1).
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It should be noted, however, that despite the Court's inability
to apply these multilateral treaties, they have been, and remain,
immediately binding on both the United States and Nicaragua.
The fact that the terms by which the United States agreed to the
jurisdiction of the ICJ precluded their application in Nicaragua v.
U.S. in no way deprives the United Nations Charter, the OAS
Charter, and other multilateral treaties not superceded by the for-
mer of their legally binding force. The legal analysis in Part II of
this article is therefore of continuing relevance in any attempt to
assess the legality of U.S. actions against Nicaragua under interna-
tional law.
In applying customary international law to the case at hand,
the ICJ, establishing a high standard of proof, held that on the
basis of the evidence presented to the Court, it was unable to con-
clude that the United States had exercised sufficient control and
direction over the contras to make their actions generally imputa-
ble to the United States.397 It did find that certain direct attacks
by the United States and the mining of Nicaraguan ports and
harbors violated the prohibition against the use of force, as did the
supply of weapons, training, and other military aid, 98 while financ-
ing and other forms of assistance to the contras violated the prin-
ciple of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of another state.399
A second development of major importance was the approval
by the House on June 2500 and by the Senate in mid-August,
1986401 of seventy million dollars in military aid and thirty million
dollars in so-called "humanitarian assistance" for the contras.
40 2
Final adoption of the measure appeared virtually assured, despite
the fact that such action would place the United States in the posi-
397. Judgment of June 27, 1986, supra note 394, at paras. 93-116. However, the Court
did suggest that such direction and control over specific operations might be established by
the presentation of additional evidence. Id. at para. 115. This may occur in further proceed-
ings to establish the amount of reparation or damages owed by the United States to
Nicaragua.
398. Id. at paras. 80-81, 86, 227, 292.
399. Id. at para. 228. For a detailed examination of the Court's decisions relating to
provisional measures of interim protection, jurisdiction and admissibility, and the merits, as
well as an analysis of U.S. covert actions against Nicaragua and U.S. responses to the
Court's decisions, see J. ROWLES, CONTEMPT OF COURT: THE UNITED STATES, NICARAGUA AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Princeton University Press, forthcoming).
400. N.Y. Times, June 26, 1986, at Al, col. 5.
401. N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1986, at A2, col. 3.
402. For details of President Reagan's original request, see N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1986,
at A21, col. 1; Washington Post, Feb. 19, 1986, at Al, col. 5.
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tion of defying the ICJ's decision on the merits. Such a posture
was suggested, however, by the initial response of the Reagan ad-
ministration to the June 27 decision, and by the U.S. veto on July
31, 1986 of a U.N. Security Council draft resolution calling for full
compliance with the Court's decision. 0 8 Such defiance of the June
27 decision constitutes a clear violation of article 94, paragraph 1
of the U.N. Charter, which provides, "Each Member of the United
Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party."
40
4
Thus, by the end of August, 1986, the question was no longer
whether U.S. actions toward Nicaragua were in conformity with in-
ternational law,405 but rather whether and when the United States
might return to its more traditional role of supporting interna-
tional law and institutions. To do so, it will have to abandon a
policy and course of action based on open and flagrant violation of
the most fundamental legal norms of the international community.
403. For the initial and negative reaction by the United States to the Court's judgment
on the merits, see Washington Post, June 28, 1986, at A14, col. 2. In support of the U.S. veto
in the Security Council, U.S. Ambassador Vernon Walters stated that adoption of the draft
resolution would have been a disservice to international law, a cover for Nicaraguan actions
violating U.N. principles, and would not have contributed to peace in Central America. The
vote was 11-1, with Britain, France, and Thailand abstaining. Washington Post, Aug. 1,
1986, at A18, col. 4. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1986, at A3, col. 1.
404. U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para. 1.
405. It is now likely that the legality of alleged actions by Costa Rica and Honduras in
support of the contras will also be determined by the Court. On July 28, 1986, Nicaragua
filed an application in the ICJ initiating proceedings against these states. Washington Post,
July 29, 1986, at As, col. 3; see also N.Y. Times, July 29, 1986, at A3, col. 4. The text of the
applications are reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1290, 1293 (1986).

APPENDIX
JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE IN CASE
CONCERNING MILITARY AND
PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES IN AND
AGAINST NICARAGUA
(NICARAGUA V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)*
THE COURT
(1) By eleven votes to four,
Decides that in adjudicating the dispute brought before it by
the Application filed by the Republic of Nicaragua on 9 April 1984,
the Court is required to apply the "multilateral treaty reservation"
contained in proviso (c) to the declaration of acceptance of juris-
diction made under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the
Court by the Government of the United States of America depos-
ited on 26 August 1946;
IN FAVOR: President Nagendra Singh; Vice-President de
Lacharri~re; Judges Lachs, Oda, Ago, Schwebel, Sir Robert Jen-
nings, Mbaye, Bedjaoui and Evensen; Judge ad hoc Colliard;
AGAINST: Judges Ruda, Elias, Sette-Camara and Ni.
(2) By twelve votes to three,
Rejects the justification of collective self-defense maintained
* Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.)
1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment on the Merits of June 27, 1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1023
(1986)(operative part of Court's Judgment). The court was composed of the following
members: President Nagendra Singh (Republic of India), Vice-President de Lacharrire
(French Republic), Lachs (Polish People's Republic), Ruda (Argentine Republic), Elias
(Federal Republic of Nigeria), Oda (Japan), Ago (Italian Republic), Sette-Camara
(Federative Republic of Brazil), Schwebel (United States of America), Sir Robert Jennings
Jennings (United Kingdom), Mbaye (Republic of Senegal), Bedjaoui (Democratic and
Popular Republic of Algeria), Ni (People's Republic of China), Evensen (Kingdom of
Norway), and Colliard (French Republic), special ad hoc judge appointed by Nicaragua in
accordance with art. 31, para. 2 of the statue of the Court.
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by the United States of America in connection with the military
and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua the subject of
this case;
IN FAVOR: President Nagendra Singh; Vice-President de
Lacharri~re; Judges Lachs, Ruda, Elias, Ago, Sette-Camara,
Mbaye, Bedjaoui, Ni and Evensen; Judge ad hoc Colliard;
AGAINST: Judges Oda, Schwebel and Sir Robert Jennings.
(3) By twelve votes to three,
Decides that the United States of America, by training, arm-
ing, equipping, financing and supplying the contra forces or other-
wise encouraging, supporting and aiding military and paramilitary
activities in and against Nicaragua, has acted, against the Republic
of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary interna-
tional law not to intervene in the affairs of another State;
IN FAVOR: President Nagendra Singh; Vice-President de
Lacharri~re; Judges Lachs, Ruda, Elias, Ago, Sette-Camara,
Mbaye, Bedjaoui, Ni and Evensen; Judge ad hoc Colliard;
AGAINST: Judges Oda, Schwebel and Sir Robert Jennings.
(4) By twelve votes to three,
Decides that the United States of America, by certain attacks
on Nicaraguan territory in 1983-1984, namely attacks on Puerto
Sandino on 13 September and 14 October 1983; an attack on
Corinto on 10 October 1983; an attack on Potosi Naval Base on 4/5
January 1984; an attack on San Juan del Sur on 7 March 1984;
attacks on patrol boats at Puerto Sandino on 28 and 30 March
1984; and an attack on San Juan del Norte on 9 April 1984; and
further by those acts of intervention referred to in subparagraph
(3) hereof which involve the use of force, has acted, against the
Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary
international law not to use force against another State;
IN FAVOR: President Nagendra Singh; Vice-President de
Lacharri~re; Judges Lachs, Ruda, Elias, Ago, Sette-Camara,
Mbaye, Bedjaoui, Ni and Evensen; Judge ad hoc Colliard;
AGAINST: Judges Oda, Schwebel and Sir Robert Jennings,
(5) By twelve votes to three,
Decides that the United States of America, by directing or au-
thorizing overflights of Nicaraguan territory, and by the acts im-
putable to the United States referred to in subparagraph (4)
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hereof, has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of
its obligation under customary international law not to violate the
sovereignty of another State;
IN FAVOR: President Nagendra Singh; Vice-President de
Lacharri~re; Judges Lachs, Ruda, Elias, Ago, Sette-Camara,
Mbaye, Bedjaoui, Ni and Evensen; Judge ad hoc Colliard;
AGAINST: Judges Oda, Schwebel and Sir Robert Jennings.
(6) By twelve votes to three,
Decides that, by laying mines in the internal or territorial wa-
ters of the Republic of Nicaragua during the first months of 1984,
the United States of America has acted, against the Republic of
Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary interna-
tional law not to use force against another State, not to intervene
in its affairs, not to violate its sovereignty and not to interrupt
peaceful maritime commerce;
IN FAVOR: President Nagendra Singh; Vice-President de
Lacharri~re; Judges Lachs, Ruda, Elias, Ago, Sette-Camara,
Mbaye, Bedjaoui, Ni and Evensen; Judge ad hoc Colliard;
AGAINST: Judges Oda, Schwebel and Sir Robert Jennings.
(7) By fourteen votes to one,
Decides that, by the acts referred to in subparagraph (6)
hereof, the United States of America has acted, against the Repub-
lic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligations under Article XIX of
the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the
United States of America and the Republic of Nicaragua signed at
Managua on 21 January 1956;
IN FAVOR: President Nagendra Singh; Vice-President de
Lacharri~re; Judges Lachs, Ruda, Elias, Oda, Ago, Sette-Camara,
Sir Robert Jennings, Mbaye, Bedjaoui, Ni and Evensen; Judge ad
hoc Colliard;
AGAINST: Judge Schwebel.
(8) By fourteen votes to one,
Decides that the United States of America, by failing to make
known the existence and location of the mines laid by it, referred
to in subparagraph (6) hereof, has acted in breach of its obligations
under customary international law in this respect;
IN FAVOR: President Nagendra Singh; Vice-President de
Lacharri~re; Judges Lachs, Ruda, Elias, Ago, Sette-Camara,
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Schwebel, Sir Robert Jennings, Mbaye, Bedjaoui, Ni and Evensen;
Judge ad hoc Colliard;
AGAINST: Judge Oda.
(9) By fourteen votes to one,
Finds that the United States of America, by producing in 1983
a manual entitled "Operaciones sicol6gicas en guerra de guerril-
las", and disseminating it to contra forces, has encouraged the
commission by them of acts contrary to general principles of hu-
manitarian law; but does not find a basis for concluding that any
such acts which may have been committed are imputable to the
United States of America as acts of the United States of America;
IN FAVOR: President Nagendra Singh; Vice-President de
Lacharri~re; Judges Lachs, Ruda, Elias, Ago, Sette-Camara,
Schwebel, Sir Robert Jennings, Mbaye, Bedjaoui, Ni and Evensen;
Judge ad hoc Colliard;
AGAINST: Judge Oda.
(10) By twelve votes to three,
Decides that the United States of America, by the attacks on
Nicaraguan territory referred to in subparagraph (4) hereof, and
by declaring a general embargo on trade with Nicaragua on 1 May
1985, has committed acts calculated to deprive of its object and
purpose the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation be-
tween the Parties signed at Managua on 21 January 1956;
IN FAVOR: President Nagendra Singh; Vice-President de
Lacharri~re; Judges Lachs, Ruda, Elias, Ago, Sette-Camara,
Mbaye, Bedjaoui, Ni and Evensen; Judge ad hoc Colliard;
AGAINST: Judges Oda, Schwebel and Sir Robert Jennings.
(11) By twelve votes to three,
Decides that the United States of America, by the attacks on
Nicaraguan territory referred to in subparagraph (4) hereof, and
by declaring a general embargo on trade with Nicaragua on 1 May
1985, has acted in breach of its obligations under Article XIX of
the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the
Parties signed at Managua on 21 January 1956;
IN FAVOR: President Nagendra Singh; Vice-President de
Lacharri~re; Judges Lachs, Ruda, Elias, Ago, Sette-Camara,
Mbaye, Bedjaoui, Ni and Evensen; Judge ad hoc Colliard;
AGAINST: Judges Oda, Schwebel and Sir Robert Jennings.
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(12) By twelve votes to three,
Decides that the United States of America is under a duty im-
mediately to cease and to refrain from all such acts as may consti-
tute breaches of the foregoing legal obligations;
IN FAVOR: President Nagendra Singh; Vice-President de
Lacharri~re; Judges Lachs, Ruda, Elias, Ago, Sette-Camara,
Mbaye, Bedjaoui, Ni and Evensen; Judge ad hoc Colliard;
AGAINST: Judges Oda, Schwebel and Sir Robert Jennings.
(13) By twelve votes to three,
Decides that the United States of America is under an obliga-
tion to make reparation to the Republic of Nicaragua for all injury
caused to Nicaragua by the breaches of obligations under custom-
ary international law enumerated above;
IN FAVOR: President Nagendra Singh; Vice-President de
Lacharri~re; Judges Lachs, Ruda, Elias, Ago, Sette-Camara,
Mbaye, Bedjaoui, Ni and Evensen; Judge ad hoc Colliard;
AGAINST: Judges Oda, Schwebel and Sir Robert Jennings.
(14) By fourteen votes to one,
Decides that the United States of America is under an obliga-
tion to make reparation to the Republic of Nicaragua for all injury
caused to Nicaragua by the breaches of the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation between the Parties signed at Managua
on 21 January 1956;
IN FAVOR: President Nagendra Singh; Vice-President de
Lacharri~re; Judges Lachs, Ruda, Elias, Oda, Ago, Sette-Camara,
Sir Robert Jennings, Mbaye, Bedjaoui, Ni and Evensen; Judge ad
hoc Colliard;
AGAINST: Judges Schwebel.
(15) By fourteen votes to one,
Decides that the form and amount of such reparation, failing
agreement between the Parties, will be settled by the Court, and
reserves for this purpose the subsequent procedure in the case;
IN FAVOR: President Nagendra Singh; Vice-President de
Lacharri~re; Judges Lachs, Ruda, Elias, Oda, Ago, Sette-Camara,
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(16) Unanimously,
Recalls to both Parties their obligation to seek a solution to
their disputes by peaceful means in accordance with international
law.
